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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to outline a solution to the general problem
of how organisms control their behaviour relative to the environment.
The principal concern is with how such guidance is achieved on the basis
of visual information. The main argument is that behaviour is controlled
on the basis not of current information but of previously acquired
information. Experiments are reported which show that even complex
locomotor acts can be accurately executed when all visual information is
excluded during the act. The research suggests two ways by which motor
activity is controlled. Firstly, visual information can be used directly
to formulate programs for action. These programs contain precise
prescriptions of the motor actions necessary for controlling the behaviour,
and are executed with minimal reliance on information available during the
act. It seems that programs can be formulated for distances up to about
five metres. Secondly, a map or internal representation of the external
environment can be formed which can be used in place of direct vision to
formulate programs and control behaviour. Such maps allow behaviour to
be controlled over distances up to 21 metres at least, though they are an
effective substitute for vision for not more than about eight seconds.
Programs seem to have a longer duration. The findings are taken to imply
that vision is used to a far lesser degree in on-going control than is
commonly supposed. Two basic reasons are proposed for this. Firstly, it
is argued that only a map/program strategy of this kind can allow the
complexity typically seen in visually-guided behaviour. Secondly, vision
must frequently be free to perform its many other functions. Only by
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When I go toward the exit to a room,
I am already there.
M. Heidegger
"Bauen, wohnen, den^ken"
Vortrgge und Aufsgtze II, 1954
PART I
A FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
1
INTRODUCTION
The world in which animals live and with which they must interact
is a highly complex one. It is not an open world, with the ground
surface extending unbroken to the horizon: such cases are limited to
sandy deserts or the open sea. The surrounding environment is usually
a highly cluttered one. It is littered with boulders and rocks, with
broken branches and fallen trees. It abounds with protrusions like
exposed roots and overhanging limbs. It is pock-marked with gaping
holes, ditches and streams. And it is peopled with plants, bushes
and forests of trees. These things constitute the furniture of the
earth and give it its distinctive character. For the animals which
inhabit the world, they can afford many things; from food or shelter,
tools or missiles of war. There is one thing which is afforded by
almost all of the earth's furnishings, however: they afford impedance
to an animal's free movement. No comprehensive list of the preventers
of locomotion exists, but Gibson (1976) has proposed the following
as generalised categories. The preventers of locomotion consist of
obstacles like rocks or trees; of barriers like cliff faces; of water
margins like the banks of a river; and of brinks, like the edge of a
cliff. Any animal wishing to move around in the world can do so only
by overcoming such impedances with which it is confronted. For this
reason, we may conceive of much of the behaviour of animals as being
directed towards the solving of what may be termed motor problems posed
by the external environment. Understanding how such motor problems are
solved represents a fundamental problem over a wide area of Psychology.
It is also the problem to which this thesis is addressed.
To solve this very broad problem, there are two fundamental sub-
questions which may be asked:
(1) What information does an organism have about the external
environment and how does it become available?
(2) How is that information, however acquired, actually used
by an organism faced with the practical problem of inter¬
acting with the external world?
In the past, perceptual theorists have concerned themselves almost
exclusively with the first of these questions. Consequently, while there
are theories of perception purporting to explain every facet of our
perceptual awareness, when it comes to explaining how such information
is used to accomplish even apparently simple acts like lifting objects
or walking through doorways, theoretical arguments are conspicuous by
their absence. For this reason, the majority of models of perceptuo-
motor control to be found in the literature are essentially trivial when
compared to the complexity of behaviour which they are meant to accom¬
modate. It is true that most writers have recognised the severe
limitations of their models; yet, remarkably little progress has been
made towards the development of a convincing model of perceptuo-motor
control since the early days of the cybernetic revolution. The classical
contribution made 30 years ago by Wiener (1948) has not been substantially
developed since, and was indeed itself in many ways eclipsed by a state¬
ment of the problem published some 20 years before that (Bernstein, 1935).
The work reported in this thesis constitutes just such an attempt to go
beyond these elementary outlines to the development of a model capable
of accommodating at least some of the fundamental abilities underlying
the perceptuo-motor control to be found in ^he behaviour of animals and
man.
A fundamental factor underlying the research reported here has been
the conviction that only by considering problems of the kind actually
experienced by living organisms in their natural environments, can we
succeed in building up a meaningful and non-trivial model of motor
control. In this, the present writer differs from most other workers
in this area, who are prone to examine behaviours of very limited
extent, more often than not in entirely artificial situations. Such
studies are generally founded on the assumption that the essence of real
life skills is most clearly to be seen in highly simplified versions of
the natural event. Other reasons frequently cited in defence of the
artificial experimental situation are the increased ease with which it
is said that subjects* performance can be measured; the greater control
which the experimenter can exercise over the stimulus situation; and
the possibilities which can be created for separating the different
mechanisms which are normally simultaneously mobilised in skilled
performance. This approach was rejected throughout the present series
of investigations on a number of grounds. Firstly, it was considered
that it is, in fact, perfectly possible to investigate the mechanisms
of skilled performance without resorting to the drastically simplified
experimental situation with its accompanying dangers: the dangers
in particular of trivialising the essential problem through an ac¬
cumulative neglect of the basic issues, and of forcing a mechanism
designed to function in one way to function in another. Secondly, it
was felt that, while such approaches are not valueless, the number of
insights into the nature of motor control which they have generated
has not been particularly encouraging, and it is still difficult to
feel that any real progress towards an understanding of the essential
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features of motor control has been made. It was felt at an early stage
that many fundamental issues were not being considered from within the
existing paradigms and that this neglect was essentially due to the
1
paradjw&e- themselves which had become self-perpetuating. Finally, it
was felt to be not through mere coincidence that some of the best
experiments to be done in the area of motor behaviour, some of them
at a very early stage indeed, had retained as straightforward and
natural a situation as possible (e.g. Woodworth, 1899; Bryan and Harter,
1899). For these reasons, the experiments reported below have attempted
to keep the experimental situation in just this natural vein insofar
as this was possible, while at the same time ensuring the strict
control of all relevant variables. The reader may judge for himself
the success of this approach in generating ideas and evidence on the
nature of perceptuo-motor control.
It must be said that the perceptuo-motor system investigated in
this thesis belongs to a terrestrial animal which is rather unusual
(bipedal) in its mode of locomotion. Some points must be made about
this. Firstly, whilst the subjects of the experiments used one form
of locomotion among many to be found amongst terrestrial animals, it
was felt that the principle is equally applicable to them all. Indeed,
the generation of the theoretical position involved, and was in some
ways dependent on# arguments based on the diversity of locomotor styles
to be found amongst terrestrial animals. Secondly, although we have
concentrated on the problems faced by terrestrial animals, it is
argued that these problems are shared at least to some extent by
organisms using other forms of locomotion (cf. birds and fish).
Nevertheless, it is admitted that the problems encountered by these
/
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animals are likely to be sufficiently different for a model of control
formulated with respect to one class not to be fully generalisable to
the others. It is hoped, however, that some principles will be adduced
which are shared by all of these rather different species.
It must also be emphasised that it is locomotion and not any other
form of motor behaviour, which is considered here. This, too, differs
from most research on motor skills, which generally involves reaching
or manipulating with the hands. Once again, it is not necessarily the
case that a model which fits one form of motor behaviour will necessarily
fit them all. This is perhaps particularly so in view of the great
differences which superficially at least, exist between locomoting on
the one hand and manipulating with the fingers on the other. For this
reason, most of the conclusions are restricted to locomotion, though
discussion of other behaviours is included where appropriate.
Lastly, although reference has been made on several occasions to
perceptuo-motor control, we are here concerned principally with visuo-
motor control. No other source of information is discussed in detail.
The use which animals might make of other sources is left mainly to the
discussion of perceptuo-motor control in general at the end of the
thesis.
6
STATEMENT CF THE PROBLEM
The present discussion takes for its starting-point the
proposition that the behaviour of animals constitutes attempts to
solve motor problems posed by the external environment. These
problems normally arise in the course of achieving certain higher-
order goals. For example, the desire to reach some fresh grazing
on the far side of a stream involves a set of locomotor problems
which have to be solved before the higher-order goal can be realised
(for example, the stream has to be crossed). It is now necessary to
attempt an analysis of the mechanisms underlying these motor resolutions.
AThe following is the outline tq a potential model; detailed consideration
will be given to the various sections when this is necessary.'
Receptor System
The first requirement of any system designed to interact with the
environment is, of course, that it be capable of picking up information
about the layout of that environment. Hence the system must be
provided with a receptor of set of receptors. The amount of information
which the receptors are capable of picking up may vary according to the
nature and complexity of the behaviour to be performed, but there must
always be sufficient information to enable the organism to perform its
life-activities.
Absolute Distance Perception
If an animal is to control its behaviour in relation to the objects
and surfaces in the world, however, it is not sufficient for it to know
only the relative layout of the surrounding environment. In order to
perform tasks like circumventing obstacles in the path of locomotion
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or stopping short at the brink of a cliff, it must obtain sufficiently
y-
precise information about its own subjective relation to these
obstacles before reaching them, in order that it can take appropriate
action. The problem of how this information is derived has traditionally
been called the problem of absolute distance perception. This term is
usually taken to refer to our ability to apprehend, in one way or another,
the actual physical distance of objects. It is normally set against
relative distance perception, which enables us to say whether one object
is nearer to us or farther away from us than another, but does not allow
us to say what the distances involved actually are. Only absolute
distance perception can allow us to do this. Much research effort has
been devoted to trying to understand how these latter judgments are
possible.
The classical explanation of the visual ability to "measure"
distances in this way draws on a system of "cues" of which the main ones
are said to be accommodation of the lens, convergence of the eyes,
disparity between the images in the two eyes and motion parallax. The
essential proposition was that proprioceptive information derived from
the various pye and (in the case of motion parallax) neck muscles,
combines with that provided by vision to bring about a solution. In
the case of motion parallax, for example, proprioceptive information
from the neck and eye muscles together with transformations of the
optic array at the eye are said to provide sufficient information for
a "trigonometrical" solution to the problem to be possible (Johansson,
1973).
However, there are numerous difficulties with these explanations.
In the first place, with few exceptions, the experiments (of which
there have been many) have come out with negative results; though there
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has always remained an element of doubt due to methodological problems.
Of the cues of accommodation and convergence, Woodworth (1938) wrote;
•From all these experiments so far ... we can surely
conclude that the tactile-kinesthetic sensations of
accommodation and convergence contribute very little
to the accurate perception of distance. Even at
distances as small as 6 to 12 inches convergence and
accommodation alone seem to have little effect on
perception of depth ...•
1938, p. 652.
The same conclusion is reached by Linschoten (1956) after his long
review. The cues of motion parallax and binocular disparity invoked
as powerful informants about distance since Helmholtz*s (1867) work,
are subject to the same criticisms. Although it has long been clear
that they provide information about the relative layout of objects in
space (Helmholtz, 1867; Bourdon, 1902), their role as a cue to
absolute distance has been unclear (Eriksson, 1972; Gogel, 1972),
Even in the most favourable studies (for example Johannson, 1973) it is
not clear that the degree of veridicality achieved is sufficient to be
"usable" and to allow the kind of accuracy that we characteristically
find in the visually-guided behaviour of animals. Certainly, there is
no evidence that these cues can provide even the most approximate
information about the absolute distance of objects when these are out-
with the near-space (generally defined as around 2 metres). Yet it
seems certain that the absolute position of objects can be apprehended
at distances which are far greater than this. The evidence derives
first of all from the fact that we seldom find when we have walked up
to an object that its position is different from that which we thought
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it to be in the first place, even when this distance is great (the
occasions on which this does happen are most noticeable). In the
second place, for reasons which will be elaborated on below, it would
seem to be impossible for behaviour of the complexity typically seen
in animals and man to be found if they are only able to relate themselves
to objects and surfaces at less than 2 metres distance. Briefly, there
is a finite time below which corrective actions cannot be made due to
limited processing times in the nervous system. The minimum time
during which a correction can be made seems to be approximately ..5 to
1 sec. However, an animal running at, say 15 m.p.h. will cover
approximately 7 metres in 1 sec. This means that if evasive action is
to be taken, it would have to be planned at a distance of 7 metres at
least. For these reasons it would seem that animals must be able to
accurately apprehend distances of far more than 2 metres. The question
then arises as to why studies' of absolute distance perception have so
uniformly failed to evidence it.
The most common method of measuring a subject's perception of the
absolute distance of an object has been simply to ask him to estimate,
in inches, feet or metres, how far. away the object lies. This method
of investigation makes the assumption that if the subject can make a
reasonably accurate estimation of the target distance in these terms,
then he can "see" where it lies in space and could orient to it appro¬
priately if asked to do so. Conversely, if he cannot make such an
estimation then he cannot "see" its spatial location and could not lift
or touch it if this was required of him.
This method of examining the perceptual processes is a highly
artificial one. It seems to be underlain by three fundamental errors.
Firstly, it makes the implicit (though not necessarily explicit)
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assumption that the metric system is a basic and absolute framework for
the measurement of distances in Euclidean space. It further assumes
that the perceptual system resonates to this framework in a sufficiently
direct way for the estimations to represent a close reflection of
phenomenological experience. Essentially then, this standpoint takes
the traditional ontological position whereby only the basic variables
of physics are given primary reality status. Clearly, however, this
position is quite unjustified. Metric systems of measurement are
structures arbitrarily imposed on ggt the world by those with the
practical aim of describing its topographical organisation and structure.
Metrics are mere inventions to ease this process; they have no
independent reality, and there is therefore no reason to suppose that
the perceptual system apprehends distance in terms of them. The
arbitrariness is clearly seen in the use of two different systems, the
imperial and the metric, to describe the perceptions. If we accept
that the use of such techniques is occasioned merely by convenience,
we are confronted with an even more daunting problem, however. We
nave no reason to suppose that an inability to give a numerical tag
to perceived distance is a genuine reflection of the subject »s
phenomenological experience. A number of studies show that the
ability to estimate distance in these terms varies widely. Gibson and
Bergman (1954), for example, have found that training to estimate
distances in feet and inches improves markedly after training, and
improves also over a control group who have as much experience, but no
training. Gibson, Bergman and Purdy (1955) showed that the effect
could be generalised to a number of different terrains, and that the
effect was not produced by familiarity with one particular layout.
Clearly, therefore, an inability to give good estimates is no
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evidence that absolute distance is not perceived. The same argument
applies in reverse, because a subject giving1 a good estimate of
distance does not guarantee that the phenomenal experience corresponds.
The problem is that reported distance contains both a perceptual and a
cognitive component. Gilinsky (1951) describes the problem as
follows:
•When a subject says that a distant object appeals
to be one mile away, he means that it appears as
far away as an object known to be a mile away.
That is an absolute judgement (based on past
experience) and not a measure of perceived
distance ... Accordingly, the perceived distance
of an object 100 yards away may be only 30 or 40
yards, although we may have learned, by training
or experience, to judge it as 100 yards away.
Similarly, the perceived distance to the horizon
or the moon may be only 50 yards by this definition.*
1951, pp. 464-465.
It is clear, then, that such results offer no real evidence concerning
the subjects*perceptual abilities. Conclusions about this can only be
left to the reader's subjective discretion.
A second important point concerns the evaluation of published
data as evidence of distance perception, even if it is, in fact,
accepted as a genuine reflection of the subject's experience. Normally,
means and standard deviations of subjects* judgments are presented, and
it is left to the reader to decide if they are sufficiently close to
the actual position of the object to represent accurate distance
perception. The implication in published work is, of course that
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they do. Yet this methodology provides no satisfactory way of
deciding whether or not a judgment does represent such a case of
absolute distance perception. Considering the fundamental importance
hinging on inaccurate estimations in the real world, this lack of
interest in attempting to specify the "practical" border between absolute
and non-absolute judgments is remarkable. After all, an only approxi¬
mate judgment can mean death to an animal with a predator in pursuit,
and the distance judgments animals are forced to make must frequently
be considerably more accurate than those cases which are sometimes taken
as examples of veridical perception in the laboratory. The fact that no
attempt has ever been made to arrive at a definition of adequacy in
evaluating the judgments made in this area, presumably belies the fact
that the problem has not been seen in this way, but merely as another
"phenomenal" event to be explained. The fact that writers frequently
refer to "approximately veridical" perceptions reinforces this point.
Finally, we are left with the problem that if absolute distance
perception does not express itself in the kind of terms that have been
employed to examine it, then it must do so in some other way. In what
terms is_ distance perceived? How can we really judge whether a report
is accurate or not? The traditional outlines offer us no insight into
these problems.
A potential, purely visual source of information about an animal's
absolute distance from objects, formulated within the context of
ecological optics (Gibson 1963) has been described by Purdy (1958) and
Lee (1974). These authors have suggested that there exists "body-
scaled spatial information" about the layout of the environment which
is optically specified in units of the animal's height above the ground.
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In this way, height from the ground could be used as a constant - a -
kind of metre-stick - in terms of which distances could be measured.
The problem for the system would be simply to pick up this source of
information. Although such a system is very plausible, the body-
scaled information does not, of course, have to consist of height-
units. One alternative to be developed here is that distances are
apprehended in terms of what we will call the animal's natural action
units - or more specifically, in terms of the results of such actions.
In the case of terrestrial animals, such action units would be steps
or derivatives of steps, like leaps, hops or crawls. Such action units
are always intrinsically defined and therefore do constitute accurate
units of measurement. To use them as a measure of distance, the
organism has only to learn what transformation of the optic array will
accompany such action units or groups of action units when he moves
relative to the environment.
One argument in support of this idea concerns the absolute distance
perception of birds and other flying organisms, and of fish. These
have no optical constant like height above the ground, and there is no
other obvious, purely optical constant with the status of the height-
constant which could be used. However, according to the present
argument distances could be measured by such animals in terms of
wing-beats in the case of birds, and tail-thrusts in fish. Wing-beats
and tail-thrusts are the natural action units of these respective
species and correspond to the steps of terrestrial animals. It is
known, of course, that the movements of both birds and fish are at
times subject to external pressures from air speed and fast currents.
Terrestrial animals, too, are affected by external constrictions.
This would render any simple action-unit account implausible, since a
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given action unit would produce different results according to the
influence of these variables. For example, in terrestrial animals a
standard action unit like a pace will yield a different result depending
on the surface walked on (walking uphill, downhill or horizontally).
However, this need not prove an insurmountable problem so long as the
external forces are constant in their effect. If they are, the
organism requires only a recalibration based on a number of instances
of the effect, to put the system back in order. This will not be
possible in violent crosswinds or squalls, or in areas of competing
currents. However, in such conditions the animal's relation to the
ground surface, and his ability to make corrections to it, will be
greatly disturbed anyway. His perception of the distances will still
be in action unit terms, even if such action units would not realise the
intended results.
A second argument is based on the fact, shown by the experiments
reported below, that it is possible to locomote accurately to objects
at considerable distances when the eyes are closed throughout the
orientation period. This finding implies that the specific motor
actions necessary to achieve this result were programmed in advance.
In this instance, the specific motor actions would be the number of
steps necessary to reach the object. Thus, even if distances were
apprehended in terms of height from the ground, this would have to be
translated into action units for the above-mentioned results to be
possible. We have every reason to suspect, therefore, that these action
units are themselves the constants used to measure distance.
It will be seen that this account of the units for space measure¬
ment offers a potential way out of the difficulties outlined above in
relation to the classical approaches to the problem of absolute distance
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perception or a conglomerate of perceptual and cognitive influences
can be accommodated because we need accept only instances of accurate
behavioural responses as examples of absolute distance perception.
This approach to the problem is limiting, of course, insofar as it
restricts the methods available. Nevertheless, this seems the only
way out of that dilemma. The problem of defining adequacy in absolute
distance perception may also be solved in this way since a behavioural
response performed blind may be checked against one performed visually.
If the accuracy of the non-visual response matches the accuracy of the
visual one, then we can accept the non-visual response as adequate in
terms of the accuracy achieved under normal visual conditions.
The proposition with which we began this discussion was that -
animals need more than relative distance information if they are to
control their behaviour in relation to the objects and surfaces in the
world. It was argued that they also need to be able to relate their
f 1
own activity to distances in space, and it was argued that they do this
_
by means of natural action units. Returning to the development of our
model, this conclusion bears an important implication. It implies that
the "absolute" distance of an object is not given directly in the
receptor information but depends on the placement of what we call an
absolute distance overlay on the "primary" information; that is, on
the relative distance information directly available at the eye. This
overlay allows us to see in advance of action the transformations in
the optic array which would accompany a natural action unit or group of
such units if we were to make them. In this way, distances in space
are defined in terms of quanta of action, and the absolute distance
overlay may be thought of as a kind of motor map of space existing
within the nervous system and mirroring the external space on which it
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is calibrated. In this way, every individual within every species has
its own measuring-stick for the apprehension of "absolute" distance.
General Concepts from Control Theory
The two components of the system described above would seem to
be logically essential if the organism is to be able to interact with
its environment; it must have information about the layout of the
world and the objects and surfaces which comprise it, and it must know
its "dynamic" relation to those parts of the world with which it is to
interact. The precise way in which motor problems are solved on the
basis of this information is not so obviously dictated by logical
necessity. Since the outline to be presented here differs in a number
of important respects from existing outlines, it will be profitable to
examine these alternative models first. In this way, these important
aspects will be highlighted.
Most models of control to be found nowadays are heavily influenced
by the concepts of control theory which, in turn, is heavily influenced
by the concepts of cybernetics. Cybernetics, which can be defined in a
general way as the "science of steermanship" (Wiener, 1948), is
characterised by the fact that it is a functional science. It is
concerned primarily with how things work rather than with what they
are. As such, it has had wide application throughout the physical
and biological sciences, drawing attention to the remarkable simila¬
rities in functioning between apparently incommensurate systems.
Whether that system be electronic, mechanical, neural or economic
does not seem to matter. Cybernetics can be applied with benefit to
them all.
The central concept in control theory is probably that of difference
or change. The task of a control system is defined as being to maintain
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a particular state in spite of external pressures threatening to produce
change. There are three ways in which such control can be achieved.
Occasionally, where external pressures are absent or exceptional, the
system may operate by means of "open-loop" control. This means that
once a response is initiated, no changes can be made to that response,
which is executed as an independent "whole". This kind of control is
said to be restricted in the main to fast movements where there exists
no possibility of correction on the basis of information obtained
during the act, because the speed of the movement precludes the
possibility of using the information. A more common situation, however,
is said to occur when independent forces attempt to create differences
between the desired state and the state realised, and steps are there¬
fore necessary to counteract these forces wherever they occur. This
type of regulation is known as "closed-loop" control.
The essential mode of functioning of such a system is as follows:
an input specifies a desired state that the system is to attain. A
servo-mechanism controls the output with that desired state in mind.
Some kind of controlling device feeds back information about the course
of realisation of the state to the input element, and the input speci¬
fications to the servo are changed accordingly. In this way, the
system organises itself to counteract external fluctuations. Sometimes,
the nature of these disturbing factors are known or can be learned. In
that case, it may be possible to predict their occurrence and set up
anticipatory adjustments to them in advance. Such a mode of action is
known as "feed-forward". We will have much more to say about this mode
of operation presently. Simply open-loop, closed-loop, and feed-forward
systems are shown in Fig. I.
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Examples of these different modes of operation are fairly readily
available in the literature. Open-loop explanations have been linked
to only two cases: where it is considered that a disturbance of output
during normal functioning is unlikely; or where the behaviour is to be
performed at a speed which precludes correction once the act has been
initiated. The most usual example of the first case concerns the control
of eye movements. Since the eye is not normally a loaded organ, with
little likelihood of consequent disturbance, it could be expected to
differ in functioning from the limbs, for example, which are frequently
subject to such disturbances. The reafference model of eye control
(von Hoist and Mittelstaedt, 1950), makes such a supposition. According
to these writers, eye movements are controlled by means of commands
from the system alone, a position which was also adopted by the outflow
theory of Helmholtz (Helmholtz, 1867). There is some evidence for it,
since little proprioceptive information apparently derives from the eye
muscles (Merton, 1961). That vision itself might be used as the source
of feedback information about eye position is sometimes vaguely mentioned,
but never seriously considered. Obviously, however, commands to move
must be based on information about where the eye presently is in the
head. Since proprioceptive information from the muscles cannot supply
this information, and since the eyes are subject to uncontrollable
drift(Yarbus, 1967), and consequently command information cannot supply
this information with accuracy either, the only reliable source of such
information is vision itself. Such information obviously constitutes
feedback. And although saccadic eye movements are themselves too quick
to be guided in any continuous way, and must obviously be executed as a
whole, these movements are never wholely accurate. According to
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Jeannerod and Prablanc (1973), a saccadic movement takes place as a
preprogrammed act, but small errors which inevitably occur are sub¬
sequently adjusted to centre the focusing. If we now consider tracking
tasks - which also are executed through saccadic jumps - it will be
clear that unless such small errors are taken into account after each
jump (or small number of jumps), the error will increase and become
significant. Jumps must be programmed taking into account the success
of previous jumps and this requires feedback about the success of
previous jumps. Eye movement control cannot therefore be completely
open-loop. An interesting interaction of pre-programmed acts made
in association with visual feedback about the success of these acts
appears to take place.
The second type of open-loop control is said to occur as a result
of the speed with which some actions are made. We have already seen
that the eye-saccade itself constitutes such an open-loop act. Others
are not difficult to find. Messenger (1968) has suggested that the
cuttlefish Sepia officinalis captures prey by means of an open-loop
attack. The animal orients to its prey and strikes with a rapid
(30 m^sec.) movement of the tentacles. It is assumed that no correction
can take place during the execution of such an act. A similar method'
of attack occurs in the mantid parastagmatoptera unipunctata
(Mittelstaedt, 1957), which captures prey with a 10-30 m^sec. movement
of the forelegs. In general, it is assumed that any act performed fast
enough to beat the feedback loop is executed as a result of efferent
commands only (McFarland, 1971).
While openJ.oop control may provide useful advantages of speed,
such control is considered exceptional. Most systems are open to
disturbances which are capable of seriously disrupting the system9s
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performance, and some mechanism is necessary to counteract these
influences. Such interfering factors occur widely in biological
systems, and are compensated for by closed-loop feedback control.
Among the most"widely studied examples are to be found in homeostasis,
for example in heat regulation where the disturbing factor will
normally be excessive heat or cold or in the pupillary reflex, where it
will normally be excessive or insufficient light. In all these
systems, regulation is achieved by feeding back information about the
current state, which is then compared to the goal state desired, and
any discrepancies between the two corrected. The system is thus
self-regulating.
Finally, we must make mention of control by means of feed¬
forward. We have already noted that feedforward may occur whenever
external forces likely to disrupt attainment of the goal state are
known or can be predicted. According to MacKay (1966):
•It is often possible to increase speed and accuracy
by arranging that, in addition to the "feedback"
signals ... the selector system S receives an input
computed directly ... together with any other relevant
advance indications obtainable via auxiliary sensors.
This "feedforward" need only roughly approximate to the
required form, but will leave C (i.e. the control system)
free for the task of fine adjustment, on which it has the
last word*.
1966, p. 4-11
Examples of this mode of control are to be found again in heat
regulation, as when a sudden increase or decrease of temperature at
the skin initiates steps determined to correct the corresponding
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change in the temperature of the body as a whole which will occur at
a later period as a result of the temperature change being
reconnoitered at present by the skin (Milhorn, 1966). Examples in
motor behaviour are to be found in cases where loadings of the system
have to be taken into account, for instance, in the act of lifting
a ping-pong ball as opposed to a brick. Since such objects are
normally picked up smoothly and easily, it seems reasonable to suggest
that the system can predict the force necessary to accommodate the
excess load (consider the case where errors are made, as in mistaking
a box full of lead for an empty box). Furthermore, this feeding
forward of predictions about the force necessary to accommodate a
load is evident in early infancy, where a child can be fooled into
thinking that an object is heavier (or lighter) than it really is,
producing clearly identifiable excessive or insufficient effort to lift
the object (Bower, 1973). The technique is used to study weight
conservation in infancy. We shall have much more to say about the
concepts of feedback and feedforward below.
Models of Perceptuo-motor Control
Most discussions of perceptuo-motor control draw heavily on the
notion of closed-loop control. And while most writers have seen that
such models are far from sufficiently sophisticated to account for the
complexity of the behaviour typically seen in animals, remarkably little
attempt has been made to go beyond an elementary outline. The models are
thus frequently referred to as "simple" models of control (Paillard,
1960), or even as "the simplest possible" models of control (Bernstein,
1967). Adams (1961) in criticising the limited range of behaviour with
which students of motor skills have concerned themselves, said of the
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uses of servo-mechanisms that they "have been gross or analogous and
can(t be taken seriously as descriptions of continuous behaviour"
(p.186). In spite of these convictions that the essential features
of sensory-motor control were not being elucidated, writers have
continued to quote such "simple" models, and have made very little
progress beyond this point (see, for example, McFarlane, 1971; Legge,
1970; Annett, 1969; Legge and Barber, 1976). Nor has this situation
been caused entirely by a lack of evidence suggesting further develop¬
ments, for as we shall see, such evidence is available in the literature.
Its implications have not been properly appreciated, however, and the
significance of the results has been overlooked. We shall be returning
to this point in much greater detail below.
Since our purpose in this section is to show up the weaknesses of
most current models of control, it will be profitable now to present
an example of such a model which can then be examined in detail. One
good outline for comparison with the one to be presented here is the
system of Bernstein (1967), since this model encapsulates the essential
features of most models in a lucid way.
Bernstein argues that any system for the accomplishment of motor
acts must include among its minimum requirements the following: a
control element, which conveys to the system in one way or another the
nature of the task to be accomplished. The control element is thus said
to specify the "sollwert" (Sw), that is, the required value of the
parameter to be regulated. Bernstein is not altogether specific about
the nature of the sollwert, but it seems essentially to correspond to
rather broad commands such as "walk towards that tree". The sollwert
thus corresponds, in this case, to the shortest possible route between
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the subject's present position and the target though presumably a
different "route" could have been chosen. In a way, therefore, sollwert
seems to apply to directional commands. We shall return to the concept
of sollwert below.
The second requirement in Bernstein's system is said to be a receptor
(like the eye), which specifies the factual course which the organism is
taking at any time. In this way, the receptor is said to provide
information about the "istwert" (Iw), that is, the current, actual
state of events. The discrepancies between Sw and Iw (Aw) is picked
up by the third element in the system, the comparator. The process
of accomplishing a simple act is therefore basically a process of
regulating this mismatch so that Sw and Iw always correspond. As an
actual example of this process, we are asked to consider the coordinational
act of picking up an object from a table. Bernstein describes the
process as follows:
'The coordinational act of seizing a visible obj ect from
a table-top may be regarded as a constant process of
estimation of the rate of diminution of that section of
2r.
the path over which the hand must still travel to meet
the object under consideration. We have every justi¬
fication to designate the position of the object Sw, the
current position of the hand Iw and the regularly
diminishing distance between them Aw (Iw - Sw).'
1967, p. 129.
In this way, the difference between the planned path of movement and
the movement itself defines the extent of the corrections necessary
during a movement. The final components of Bernstein's system are
all concerned with the translating of this information into effector
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functions. The system therefore contains an apparatus for encoding
£lw into correctional impulses which are relayed to a regulator
controlling the functions of the effectors themselves. The system is _
shown diagrammatically in Fig. II.^Examples of^commonly cited
is
alternative models- awe presented alongside.
A number of differences between this model and the one currently
being elaborated are evident immediately. In the first place,
Bernstein includes in his system no linkage between the sense receptor
and the command system. Such a linkage is obviously necessary, however,
since otherwise the system has no information on the basis of which to
specify the sollwert. Secondly, there is no component for the speci¬
fication of absolute distance. This would follow from the fact that
no receptor/command link is included, but it is not treated within the
context of the istwert either. The fact that control is supposed to
operate continuously would, of course, rule out the need for absolute
distance information. On the other hand, an organism must always be
able to appreciate whether an obstacle is 10 yards or 10 miles away.
Some sort of absolute distance information would therefore have to be
available even to a system operating by means of continuous control.
We have already seen, however, that at times an animal requires very
precise information about its relation to the surrounding objects and
surfaces, since an animal has to know at some point in advance where
an obstacle lies in relation to itself so that it can organise evasive
action. At times, as when the animal is running at speed, this would
have to be some distance in advance.
The central feature of Bernstein's model, however, concerns the
manner of regulation of motor activity by means of sollwert, istwert
and mismatch. The system implies a continuous process of information
Ig = indication of goal (a) = feedback
C = comparator (b) = feedforward from Ig
I = indicator (receptor) (c) = from I
E - effectors
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FIG, II Commonly cited models of perceptuo-motor control.
(a) from Mackay(1966)
(b) from Bernstein (1967)
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pick-up together with continuous matching. On the basis of this
information adjustments are continually made to keep the parameters in
line. There are two reasons why it is considered necessary that
guidance be continuous. Firstly, we can simply never know when a
deviation from the planned path of movement will occur and it is
therefore essential that the receptor system remain constantly alert
for their occurrence. Secondly, it is commonly supposed that distances
become increasingly hard to judge as physical distance increases. For
example, Legge and Barber (1975) state •'... vision cannot accurately
locate objects at some considerable distance (distance becomes
increasingly hard to judge as it increases)r (p.52). These statements
in the textbooks are based on the results of psycho-physical studies of
distance perception. For example, in Gilinsky*s classical 1951 study,
distances quickly become substantially underestimated as they increase.
For example, at a distance of 10m, the perceived distance is rated at
7m (30% underestimation). At 20m, the perceived distance was 11m
(45% underestimated). The effect was even more marked with other
subjects. Studies of this kind have led to the general belief that
distances outside the near-space are not perceived veridically. It is
for this reason that we have seen Bernstein describe the process as
'a constant process of estimation ... of the path over which the hand
must still travel to meet the object under consideration*, (p.129,
my italics). Paillard (1960) writes of servo mechanisms in the
following way:
*Their common feature is that they possess some
kind of controlling device able to appreciate
continuously the state of the machine realised
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at a given moment and the final aim assigned to
it by its constructor*.
1960, p. 1700, my italics.
A little later he adds:
•Through a feedback circuit, the information
collected from an error-detecting device is
at every moment sent back to the servo motor
controlling the output.*
1960, p. 1700, my italics.
The element concerned with the supply of this information is considered
to be the eye, as we have seen, which continuously feeds back infor¬
mation about the current state of the ongoing act. In this way, the
eye is given a remarkably limited role in the control of behaviour. It
is not concerned in the formulation of sollwert, only in regulation of
activity to realise that sollwert. It is for this reason that control
models tend to omit the obviously essential link between receptor and
control system (Bernstein, 1967; MacKay, 1958, 1966). This omission can
only be interpreted as a theoretical muddle, occasioned by too close a
reliance on the already developed cybernetic control systems (like
thermostats) and not enough on the actual problem at hand. In thermo¬
stats, automatic pilots and the like, the sollwert is either permanently
defined in the system, or else is under the control of a completely
foreign agent,- as when a housewife adjusts the temperature setting of
her central heating system. In neither case is the command setting
determined by the "receptor". Obviously, such systems bear only the
most distant relation to the perceptuo-motor control systems found in
[f r /which are presently being discussed.animals and man
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Programming Systems
An alternative and more economical system to the ones offered
above is possible, however, if we assume that the system is capable
of intermittently sampling the array and using this intermittently-
acquired information to construct in advance a motor program of the
precise motor actions required for behaviour within this spatio-
temporal "packet". Such a system would not only be more economical
but seems on various grounds to be necessary. Firstly, it is simply
not possible to make motor responses "on top of" information which is
just being picked up, because by the time the information had been
relayed from the periphery, appropriate motor responses planned, and
the corresponding coded commands relayed to the effectors, the animal
would have passed the point in the world where the information would
have been useful. In other words, the appropriate motor responses
could not be formulated and put into effect by the time the point in
the environment specified by the information had been reached and the
animal would collide with the obstacle or trip over the rock. For
this reason it is always necessary to plan the behaviour some finite
time in advance of the point in the world where the behaviour is
appropriate. If we now consider an animal running at speed it will be
clear that the amount of programming will at times have to be large.
This is so because the faster an animal runs, the greater the distance
it covers in a given time. In this way, if speed is to be achieved or
maintained, the amount of programming will have to increase mono-
tonically with this speed. Detailed arguments about the limitations
imposed by processing times and other factors will be deferred until
we come to investigate the literature on motor behaviour, but at the
moment we may consider the limitations imposed by a perceptuo-motor
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lag of 1 second which, as we shall see, is a rather liberal estimation
of the time necessary to prepare a response of the complexity that is
normally demanded by circumstances in the external environment. An
animal running at 15 m.p.h. (a rather average speed for many animals),
will cover 7.35 yards in 1 second. This means that a response to an
obstacle situated at that distance, together with all responses necessary
to reach that obstacle from the current position, would have to be
fully formulated (and accurately formulated) in advance, because no
further corrections can be effected after that point. The complexity
of such a program is further dependent on the number of obstacles which
are located within the "space-packet". Total program complexity is
therefore a function of both the nature and number of impedances in the
environment, and of the animal*s speed of travel. Other considerations
will also effect the amount of programming, but we will come to these
below.
There is a second important reason why the behaviour of animals
cannot be continuously guided. This is that the visual system of any
locomoting animal must frequently be free to perform functions other
than the simple guiding of locomotion. A predator in pursuit of prey,
for example, must pay constant attention to the behaviour of the prey
and must react at high speed to changes in its behaviour, since every
split second lost increases the chances of the animal escaping. The
predator must therefore be capable of locomoting without the eyes being
constantly focused on the task of visual guidance. This point applies
even more strongly to those species which hunt in groups, since only
by watching the behaviour of the other members of the pack can the
hunt be coordinated and have a hope of success. It is known that pack
animals like lions, wolves and, of course, man use fairly extensive
signalling systems to coordinate the joint activity most efficiently,
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and this demands that the members of the group be receptive to such
signals (as well as being prepared to make them). Finally, the
independence of vision is most fundamental of all to those species
which form the prey of some other, for these engage in continuous
scanning of the environment for possible attacks. Indeed, this
constant scanning is particularly important when the animal is
locomoting, for it is at such times that the animal will be most
i
visible (and therefore most vulnerable (Tinbergen, 1951). It is
clear, then, that independence of the receptor system from the task of
straightforward guidance is fundamentally important to all species, and
this demands that behaviour be capable of continuing when the eyes are
turned from guidance tasks. A programming system would therefore seem
to be essential for any animal which is to be capable of even
moderately cdmplex behaviour.
It should be noticed that the programming system advocated here
does bear some resemblance to Bernstein's sollwert-specifying command
system. A number of fundamental differences must be highlighted,
however. We noted earlier a certain lack of precision as to the
definition of sollwert, which was defined by Bernstein to be the actual
spatial location of the object. He claims: 'we have every justification
to designate the position of the object Sw ...» (p. 129). On the other
hand, immediately after this, he writes: »... I shall regard ... the
continuous planned path or process of movement of an organ as the
variable Sw ...' (pp. 129-30). In this case, Sw seems to correspond
to a sort of "invisible line" extending through the most direct
route between the hand's present position and the target under consider¬
ation. Thus he writes:
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•... w will be the threshold values of deviations
which are more or less accurately corrected
during the course of the movement, as an example
of which we may take the deviations of lines
drawn by hand with a pencil or the point of a
planimeter from a ruled line which a subject is
set to follow1.
ibid, p.130.
Sollwert therefore seems to be defined simply in terms of the most
direct route to the target. On other occasions, the sollwert is
actually given by the task itself. The line which the planimeter is
set to follow in the above example is such a case, and many tracking
tasks employ a ready-defined sollwert in the form of a 'wave" which has
to be followed (Poulton, 1957). On other occasions, as in 'pursuit
tracking* experiments, the subject*s task is to keep a pointer on a
target which moves along a pre-determined path. Again, therefore, the
task is to "trace" an invisible line which is defined by the path of the
target though, in this case, the path has to be discovered. Only by
learning this track can the subject maximise his accuracy in tracking
(see Poulton, 1954, 1957; Legge and Barger, 1975). In the present
context, however, such a "sollwert" becomes little more than the reason
for constructing a sollwert. It specifies the goal which the program is
designed to realise, but it is not in itself a program. In the present
system, the sollwert does constitute such a program, containing within
it not just a statement of the goal, with perhaps the most general
guiding directives, but also a formulation of the motor actions necessary
to attain a solution, defined so precisely that no corrections to the
formulation may be necessary. In other words, the sollwert can be broken
down into the exact motor components of which it is composed. Sollwert
in this system is consequently a highly complex program of motor actions.
In comparison to this, Bernstein's sollwert scarcely deserves the term
"program".
Other Elements in the System
The program of actions worked out by the programming system on
the basis of visual information requires for its fulfilment an effector ,
system (ES) capable of executing such programs. In fact, the effectors
are not controlled directly from the PPS but are regulated by a
-fvjL. prwj
controller (C) which encodes the 3^6 specifications|into nervous impulses
and relays these to the effectors.
The Role of Monitoring during Execution of a Program
It is now necessary to re-examine the notion of istwert - the element
concerned with the factual state of affairs - which in Bernstein's system
was supplied by the continuous pick-up of information by the receptor.
This method of control was opposed in the present system, but this was
not meant to imply that istwert information is unnecessary: indeed
it is necessary, but its nature and supply are considerably different
from in Bernstein's system, as we shall now see.
Any system of the type under discussion must receive information
during the course of a movement to indicate that the program is being
executed according to plan. There is a number of reasons why such
information is necessary. One simple and basic reason is that some
purely "technical" fault may occur which will require correction if
the program is to continue. At times such a technical problem may be
severe enough to necessitate a total break in the program's execution
(the animal has to stop), or else a reorganisation or extension of the
program if the animal is to continue. Examples of such technical faults
34
are to be found in cases of proprioceptive loss, where control of
activity may become extremely difficult. This would indicate that
programs are not always executed as planned, or may on occasion not
be sufficiently precise to be run off "blind*'. Some form of monitoring
would therefore be necessary in order to evaluate whether or not the
program is being executed as intended. We will return to the problem
of how this monitoring is achieved below.
A second reason why it is necessary to monitor on-going activity
is that some change may occur in the approaching environment which was
not taken into account in the original program (as when an animal runs
out into the path of locomotion). It may be necessary to have a
mechanism specifically designed to contend with disruptions of this
sort.
A third reason is that, as we shall see, a program cannot always
take into account all of the salient features of the approaching terrain
on which an ideal program would be based. There will frequently be
(except in the most predictable environments) some degree of mismatch
to be regulated during the execution of the program. These situations
requiring changes in the plans for behaviour and for reorganisation
and termination of programs probably occur much more frequently than
we might at first suppose. This is probably because most of these
occur without it being necessary to draw on conscious attention
(though they may be revealed by an introspective attitude). In any
case, it seems as if these alterations and reorganisations are
fundamental to the system and depend on the detection of error during
the execution of programs. We must now consider the forms of
monitoring which may be operating.
It will be remembered that in Bernstein's system, information
about current state was supplied in a continuous way by the receptors.
However, we have already noted that the system requires a good deal of'
independence from such guidance constraints. In the present system,
therefore, either such information must be provided by some other
source, or else it must be provided by the eyes in such a way that
no restrictions on the organ's other functions are applied. In fact,
both these propositions seem to be true. To make this clear, we will
need to examine the concept of monitoring rather closely.
The term "feedback" has so far been employed as a general concept
with the broad, functional definition that it exists to provide
information about the actual state of affairs at any given moment.
The cybernetic models which we have so far discussed therefore refer
simply to "the feedback loop". In the case of complex behaviours of
the sort being discussed here, however, this is far too broad a
classification. We must recognise that in perceptuo-motor control,
monitoring exists on a number of levels, and is concerned with control
of different parts of the total system. From the point of view of the
present discussion, we may draw upon the two forms of feedback
distinguished by Lee (1977). According to Lee, we require proprio¬
ceptive information, which is defined as "the obtaining of information
about the positions and movements of the parts of the body relative
to the body.(1977, original italics). This term is thus defined close
to its original meaning (Sherrington, 1906). We further require
exproprioceptive information, which is defined as "the obtaining of
information about the position, orientation or movement of the body as
a whole, or of parts of the body, relative to the environment (1977,
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original italics). Lee claims that all "feedback" information can be
classified as of these two sorts.
If we now return to the notion of feedback employed by Bernstein,
it will be clear that he was referring principally to exproprioceptive
feedback. His concern was with the eye as an indicator of where the
limb, or body as a whole, now stood in relation to the goal at any
given moment. We have argued, however, that this kind of feedback
is frequently unnecessary, as it is possible to formulate programs
which are sufficiently precise to rule out the need for it. However,
this does not rule out the need for proprioceptive feedback during the
course of an act even when the act, in exproprioceptive terms, is un-
monitored. We have already noted the possibility, in principle at
least, that some "technical" fault might appear in the execution of
the program which would need correcting. Since the program would now
be formulated in motor terms, it would not be necessary to obtain
further exproprioceptive information in order to account for such
errors, but merely to monitor the execution of the program. This can
be done by means of the proprioceptive system alone. It would appear
that efferent commands alone are not sufficently precise to enable
animals to perform acts in the absence of this type of internal
monitoring, for in such cases, the act becomes ataxic. We shall be
reviewing the evidence on proprioceptive loss below. At this point
we may merely note that while the system is frequently freed from the
necessity of obtaining exproprioceptive information, some form of
proprioceptive monitoring continues to be necessary. The sampling
of proprioceptive information may, of course, itself be intermittent.
But its continued supply during the course of program seems to be
essential.
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There is a further point which should be made at this juncture
concerning' the concept of feedback in general. As we have seen,
monitoring of the kind being discussed is normally referred to as
feedback. However, it is not at all clear how this concept should be
defined, because it is in many ways indistinguishable from the concept
of feedforward. For instance, in the example of heat regulation of
the body which was given earlier, a change of heat at the skin is
used to initiate steps to create a corresponding change in the tempe¬
rature of the body as a whole. The detection of temperature at the
skin may be described as feedback about the current state of affairs.
This information, however, is then used as feedforward to initiate
changes in the program controlling temperature of the body as a whole.
Even if the concept of program is replaced with the vaguer and more
general concept of "goal state", information indicating deviation from
this goal state is picked up and used to correct the current state.
The distinction between feedback and feedforward becomes meaningless
in this situation, however, because both concepts refer to the same
information. In view of this kind of confusion, it may be best to
abandon these terms altogether and speak instead only of the information
which is picked up during execution and which can be used to initiate
changes in the program if desired. This is the practice advocated here,
though for the purpose of discussing the existing literature the terms
will still be occasionally used at the present time.
We gave two other reasons why some form of monitoring during the
course of a program was necessary which did concern the exproprioceptive
system, however. These reasons were that a change may occur in the
environment and that a program cannot take into account all of the
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salient features on which an ideal program would be based. Since these
problems are concerned with the environment or with changes occurring
within the environment, it is clear that they concern the exproprio-
ceptive system rather than the proprioceptive system. The information
necessary to correct such problems can therefore only be supplied by
exproprioception. The problem of intruders getting in the way is not _
something which occurs with any regularity under normal circumstances,
though most people have experienced it. In some species, the
information for intrusion may be picked up by a different perceptual
modality. However, it seems that the visual system can be used to
detect this information without this interfering with the eyes'other
functions. Trevarthen (1968) has drawn a detailed distinction within
the visual system between "ambient" vision and "focal" vision. The
distinction is made on anatomical, physiological and behavioural
grounds which we need not go into here. The former system is said to
be capable of responding to information about spatial location and
movement in a "direct" way, without picking up information about form
or any other exteroceptive properties at the same time. That system
thus seems geared to respond, among other things, to obtrusions
emerging into the visual field while the eyes are in fact essentially
focused on quite different tasks. As evidence we may mention the fact
that in every species examined, stimulation of the tectum in the
free-moving animal results in "visually 'elicited orienting movements"
which appear to be indistinguishable from natural orienting behaviour
(Ingle, 1970). The head is sharply turned to that region corresponding
to the locus of retinal input, or rather where a retinal input would
have occurred if the situation had been a natural one. It would appear
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that in these cases the animals are responding, not to an identifiable
object, but rather to an unexpected intrusion to the visual field
represented by the electrical stimulation. It would appear then, that
the visual system does have the capacity to pick up intrusion information
without this being any burden to the eyes other functions. If the head/
eye system is directed in such a way that the intruder is outwith the
visual field, then a collision may occur. A collision could then only
be avoided if the animal has an alternative system capable of securing
the information (auditory system, vibration-sensitive system, etc.).
The final reason why exproprioceptive information may be necessary
during the execution of a program is that a program is normally some¬
what limited: it cannot take into account all of the salient features
of the environment on which an ideal program would be based. The
problem is that in running over uneven ground, for example, it is not
possible to formulate a program which tells the organism exactly
where its feet should be placed in relation to all the dips and pro¬
tuberances on the surface. The significance of this is two-fold. First
of all, and probably of greatest importance, the posture of the animal,
which is obviously critical for the execution of the program, would be
upset: indeed, the animal might easily fall. Secondly, the variations
in surface level would tend to make the animal deviate from its
directional course. Both of these problems therefore need correction
during the execution of the program, and this correction must be sub¬
stantially visual in nature. It seems clear now that the control of
balance in situations like that pointed out above is dependent on
vision (Lee and Lishman, 1975). This information is available no
matter what direction the head is oriented in relative to the environ¬
ment (Lee, 1974). Once again, then, the detection of information for
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the control of posture need not inhibit the other functions of the
eyes.
It will be evident, then, that the concept of monitoring being
employed here is a concept defined on more than one level. Information
about the ongoing control of a program is relayed by the proprioceptive
system (PS). Information for the control of posture during the execution
of a program and for the pick-up of intrusions is supplied by the
o ~
exproprioceptive system of ambient vision (EPS). The information thus
acquired is used for whatever adjustments are necessary to the program
under consideration; to initiate minor corrections; to extend programs;
to reorganise them; and in some cases to terminate them and construct a
new one. In this way, the organism is capable of controlling its
activity relative to the goals it' sets itself, or has set for it, in
the external world. The complete system is shown diagrammatically in
Fig.III.
Ctoe or two final points about the model must be made. Firstly,
it will be seen that no link has been made between the absolute
distance perception overlay and the control system. Although it
might be thought that such a link is necessary for those occasions
when continuous control is needed, the argument being presented here
is that control is never genuinely continuous, though it may frequently
appear to be. Programming appears to operate at many levels, not
necessarily simultaneously. For example, in pilot studies on which
the experiments reported below were based, subjects were asked to walk
up to objects which had been placed at varying distances from the
subjects and pick them up. The task had to be performed with the eyes
shut during the orientation period. It was found that the locomotor
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R = receptor ES = effector system
ADPO = absolute distance perception overlay
PS = programming system
C = controller PPS = proprioceptive system
EPS = exproprioc eptive system
FIG. Ill A model of perceptu o-moto r control.
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section of the act brought the subjects within the same vicinity to the
object as it did when the eyes were open, but that error accumulated
during the reaching phase. This was demonstrated by the fact that the
error obtained was the same whether the subject had to walk 2 or 10
metres to get within reaching distance of the object. This finding
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might have led us to conclude that the first section of the act (the
locomotor section) is programmable, but that the second section (the
reaching section) requires continuous, closed-loop guidance. However,
Woodworth (1889) found that whensubjects were asked to join points
2 feet apart with a pencil line, the longest part of the act was pre¬
programmed as evidenced by the fact that the lines were almost
identical whether the eyes were open or shut. Only the last inch or
two benefited from further visual guidance. These reaching acts
therefore seem to have been subject to the same type of control as the
locomotor act above. When subjects were asked to join lines which
were separated by little more than this terminal phase, the accuracy
was now higher still. This suggests that no area of motor behaviour
is subject to guidance by means of continuous control but that
programming is to be seen at all levels of motor behaviour. The
problem seems rather to be that not all sections of a complex motor
act are programmed at once. Apparently, a hierarchically organised
group of programs has to unfold sequentially. Presumably, the
formulation of one program takes place as the other, already formulated,
proceeds. We shall return to this problem below.
Finally, some links have been omitted from the model for the sake of
clarity. A control link exists between the effectors and the receptor
system to allow control of the ocular muscles. Links also exist between
4 3
♦
the effectors and the proprioceptive and exproprioceptive systems, the
latter being further linked to the receptors.
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A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The main contention of the model which has just been presented
is that in guiding themselves around the objects and surfaces in the
world, animals do not use vision as a continuous source of information
about their dynamic relation to the environment, but sample this infor¬
mation only intermittently, using that information to construct programs
which can then be run off "blind". Our task now is to uncover any
evidence which may exist in the literature to support such a notion
before committing ourselves to an empirical investigation.
In our theoretical analysis, we saw that most models of control
stress the closed-loop, continuous nature of control. This poses an
immediate problem, however. Since there is an infinite number of
points between Sw and Iw whenever these do not correspond, it is
obviously impossible for a finite system to guide a mismatch through
any such infinite series. Control must therefore operate on blocks
of such points which must then be treated as single "units". But
this raises a fundamental question; when is "continuous" control
discontinuous ?
Reaction Time
The problem of defining the limits to continuous visual control
has been attacked in a number of ways. In the first place, we know
that a response cannot follow immediately upon receipt of a stimulus,
because before any response can be effected a number of conditions
has to be met. -The stimulus information must be relayed from the
periphery, decisions about how to act formulated, appropriate motor
responses planned, and the corresponding coded commands relayed to the
effectors. All these operations take time. Under favourable conditions,
where the subject knows that a stimulus is due, knows what form that
stimulus will take, and knows what response is required of him, the
reaction time (RT) is never less than .2 seconds (Woodworth and
Schlossberg, 1954). This, then, would represent a first limiting
factor to continuous control. When the testing conditions are not
so favourable, RT is easily increased. When S is rendered uncertain
about the lengths of time which will elapse before onset of the
stimulus (foreperiod uncertainty) the basic RT is increased to about
.6 sees. (Klemmer, 1957). In most studies, the foreperiod is varied
within very modest limits (usually no more than several seconds of
uncertainty being used). When the uncertainty generated is more akin
to that found in the real world (response required several times per
day, or once every several days), RT is again increased. Warrick et
al. (1964) performed such an experiment and obtained RTs of about
.8 sees. This probably represents the maximum limit to RT occasionable
by foreperiod delays (except when the stimulus is completely missed,
as sometimes happened in the above study). RT can be manipulated in
other ways as well, however, simply by varying other sections of the
simple RT paradigm. Thus when complexity is increased by requiring S
to respond to only one of a group of possible stimuli, forcing him to
make a discrimination and then a choice of response, RT can easily be
raised to just under 1 sec. (Donders, 1868; Merkel, 1885). This effect
is old and well known. When the task is yet further complicated by
demanding a separate response to each of a number of separate stimuli,
RTs of 1 second and more can be obtained, due to the increased response
selection demands (Woodworth and Schlossberg, 1954). Thus as the task
increases in its approximation to the complexities of natural behaviour,
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so does the RT increase. That increase can be shown to vary logarith¬
mically with the induced complexity (Hick, 1952). Just how this com¬
plexity, defined in the mathematical terms of information theory, can
be equated with the complexities of natural behaviour is a difficult
problem, but we are surely right in supposing that in natural situations,
RT will frequently be considerably greater than 1 sec.
The Psychological Refractory Period
Any voluntary movement has a reaction time, which we have seen is
never less than about .2 sec. Similarly, the voluntary correction of
a movement also has a reaction time. According to Vince (1948) the
sooner the signal indicating that a correction must be made follows
the signal for the original movement, the longer RT to the second move¬
ment will be. Under conditions where S is half-expecting to have to
make a correction, the RT to the corrective movement can easily reach
.3 sec. (Hick, 1949). This period following initiation of a movement
during which further movements have increased latency is called the
"psychological refractory period" (Craik, 1948). Various theories
have been proposed to explain it (e.g. Welford, 1952; Elithorne and
Lawrence, 1955; Broadbent, 1958). Here, then, we find a further
limitation to the possibilities of continuous control. Since a
voluntary response to visual information takes at least .2 sees, and
since a further correction cannot begin to take effect until at least
.3 sees, later, this theoretically eliminates the possibility of
corrections occurring more frequently than once every .5 sees.
(Poulton, 1954). From this we might conclude that continuous control
in practice means control effected no more frequently than once every
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half second. Such a supposition has, in fact, been evidenced
empirically by Craik (1947; 1948) and by Vince (1948). In these
classical tracking studies, subjects were asked to keep a pointer
fixed on a target line in the face of external influences forcing
the pointer off to one side. An analysis of the track records shows
that corrections were being made on average every .5 sees. The result
strongly supports the intermittency claim made above. Furthermore,
Woodworth (1899) has shown that when subjects are asked to draw lines
corresponding to a standard form, performance is better when visual
information about the response is available, until the frequency of
responding reaches 2 per second. At that response rate, it made no
difference whether S had his eyes open or closed during the drawing
period. Again, this would indicate that responses taking .5 sees, or
less cannot be corrected on the basis of visual information.
A number of deviations from this .5 second limitation must be
noted, however. Several studies have found that vision can have an
influence at less than this critical time. Pew (1966) asked subjects
to keep a light fixed on a target on an oscilloscope by means of two
buttons, one of which caused acceleration to the left, and the other
to the right. When the target was blanked out for periods of up to 410
m.sec. the modal time before a correction was initiated once the target
came on again was 300 - 350 m.sec. Keele and Posner (1968) asked
subjects to make discrete aiming responses at a target ^ inch in
diameter and 6 inches away from the home station. Movements were
trained to take approximately .15, .25, .35, and .45 sees. On half
of the trials the lights were out. The existence of visual information
made no difference to performance when movement time was less than
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190 - 260 m.sec. Beggs and Howarth (1970) asked subjects to make a
vertical aiming movement at a target. As the arm came up, it passed
through a photo-electric beam which extinguished the lights. When
this happened 290 m.sec. or less before the hand reached the target
position, accuracy was not affected. At longer intervals, it was
disturbed. These studies all imply that visual information can have
an influence at something less than .5 seconds.
The first thing that we should note here is the discrepancy
between the critical times in the different experiments. Again, we
may judge these differences to reflect the role of different degrees
and types of task complexity. The fact that the times here are
shorter than those obtained in the studies discussed above should not
disturb us unduly, however. Craik himself obtained some corrections
at .25 sec. intervals; though he also noted many that required at
least 1 second. Clearly, something must be said about the varying
times obtained within and between experiments.
The experiments of Keele and Posner, and Beggs and Howarth,
while designed to show the minimum time during which a visual cor¬
rection can be made, cannot be considered to have genuinely done so
because in both cases the target position was specified in advance.
This means that initial RT together with the accompanying psycho¬
logical refractory period is absent in these experiments, because the
stimulus is constantly available, and the decision about when to act
is left with the subject alone. This means that subjects could, in
principle, use this information as feed-forward to formulate a program
for action. In the Pew study, the subjects do not have quite this
information, but have the means of controlling the moving light. Since
they know from their use of the buttons which direction the light is
moving in, and since they must have built up some idea of the speed
at which the light moves, this information must also be seen as consti¬
tuting feedforward. But we have already seen that feedforward aids per¬
formance in RT experiments. When uncertainty is reduced by making the
time at which the stimulus arrives predictable, RT is correspondingly
decreased. (Klemmer, 1957; Wahrick et al., 1964). When in a choice
RT experiment the probabilities of the various stimuli are manipulated,
it can be shown that responses speed increases with stimulus probability
(Hyman, 1953; Fitts et al., 1963). Furthermore, it can easily be shown
that the continuity characteristically seen in tracking tasks is a
function of the subject*s ability to anticipate what the approaching
track will be like due to regularities in layout (Poulton, 1950) or
to see various distances ahead (Crossman, 1960). With the general
pattern of the movement planned, the system is free to pick up any
consequent errors and correct them. A single reaction time would then
suffice to make one correction, since an RT is shorter than the
critical times observed in each of these experiments. The fact that
at these lower times the performance is only marginally higher than in
the non-visual condition, and much lower than in the longer visual
conditions further suggests that only a single correction is being
made. These experiments, then, instead of showing the minimum time
at which a visual correction can be made, inst-ead seem to evidence the
very programming strategies and consequent intermittency of functioning
which we are ourselves trying to show. A genuine case of the minimum
time at which visual information is useful would occur only when a
discrete signal appears (for example, an animal runs into the path
of locomotion at a point .5 sec. in front of S) and evasive action has
to be taken. If he has forwarning of the existence of the intrusion,
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then we allow him the opportunity to use feedforward mechanisms to
alter his performance.
From these data it appears reasonable to assume that .5 sees,
constitutes a basic unit of intermittency. Two points must be made in
qualification, however. We have no reason to believe that .5 sec.
forewarning- is enough to accommodate the majority of behavioural changes
which would be necessary in the world. We have already seen the
differences in time necessary to formulate responses in choice RT
experiments as opposed to simple RT. If we now consider the decisions
and responses normally required in the world, it will be apparent that
the complexity vastly exceeds that manipulated in the laboratory. When
simple tracking adjustments may easily require 1 second for correction,
how long, then, would a complex behavioural adjustment be expected to
take? There has been no systematic research done on the times necessary
to make "ecological" adjustments of the type we are considering, but if
we accept Hick's (1952) demonstration that time increases logarith¬
mically with complexity, we can be fairly certain that biological
actions like those we considered above will take considerably longer
than .5 sees, to accommodate.
It can be seen, then, that there is a number of factors limiting
the possibilities of continuous control. We should note, however, a
fundamental difference between the limitations outlined above and the
theoretical position being advocated here. The limitations we have
just discussed are essentially limitations in the system's ability
to handle incoming information: there is no implication that infor¬
mation pick-up is intermittent. Indeed, in the tracking studies upon
which most of this research is based, the pick-up of information is
said to be continuous because it is never possible to tell when an
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error in tracking will occur, and so the system must remain constantly
on the alert for such errors. Nevertheless, the fact that the system
must operate by means of response intermittency indicates that some
form of programming of actions for the future must be taking place
in order to generate the smoothness of performance which is character¬
istically found whenever S can see some distance ahead along the track.
Open-loop Functioning and Ballistic Control
If we accept as a first approximation that .5 to 1 second represents
a limit to the possibilities of visual correction, we can show that a
variety of behaviours must in consequence be guided independently of
"current" visual information. In the first place, we may consider
all those behaviours which simply take less than the critical time
for execution. Such behaviours are much more common than we might at
first suppose. According to Tinbergen (1951), much of the behavioural
regulation observable in animals consists of two phases. The first
phase consists of "a sequence of reactions to external stimuli that
continuously correct the direction of movement in relation to the
spatial properties of the environment" (1951, p. 87). Tinbergen calls
this section of an act a taxis; that is, a guided orientation relative
to a target. The second component comprises "a more or less fixed
pattern ... which, once released, is integrated by internal mechanisms
only, quite often independent of further external stimulation"
(ibid, p. 86). This component is termed a fixed pattern. This duality
of orientation mechanisms has been known for some time. The dis¬
tinction was first made by Lorenz (1937), who called the visually-
guided component a "Taxiskomponente" and the ballistic, fixed pattern
an "Erbkoordination". The terms clearly correspond to the distinction
between open- and closed-loop control which we discussed earlier. One
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section of the act is guided by closed-loop, feedback circuits, the other
by pre-planned, open-loop sequences which are not modified after
initiation. This type of control system is frequently referred to as a
"dead-reckoning control system" (McFarland, 1971). Examples of this
type of control are common. We have already drawn attention to
Messengerrs (1968) report of prey capture in the cuttlefish. The
animal orients to the prey by means of closed-loop mechanisms and then
strikes with a 30 m\sec. movement of the tentacles. The act has been
e
well documented by Wfclls (1958), 1962). A similar method of capture
can be seen in the mantid, which has been extensively investigated
by Mittelstaedt (1957). In this case, capture is effected by a rapid
movement of the forelegs. Other common examples are to be found in
the frog, which captures prey by means of a rapid flick of the tongue
(Tinbergen, 1951), and in the firefly photus which orients to brief
flashes of light. Since it can be shown that fireflies orient
accurately to such stimuli even after the stimuli have been extinguished,
it is clear that the behaviour is not continuously guided but is planned
and executed as a whole (Mast, 1912).
The activities which we have just examined represent examples of
single reflex like acts which, due to the necessary speed of execution,
must be performed ballistically. There are, however, many cases where
much more complex acts must be performed ballistically. We may, for
example, consider those acts which are composed of rapidly-executed
groups of movements. Such grouped movements must often be executed
ballistically because they are frequently so closely "spaced" that they
cannot be continuously guided in sequence from one movement to the next
along the chain. As an example we may take the finger strokes of a
musician which can reach a frequency of 16 per second in some passages
(Lashley, 1951). Because of the speed at which such a passage must be
played, the movement sequences have to be planned ahead of time and run
off as unguided wholes. Other activities where such chunking of be¬
haviour will be required are to be foqnd in typing, singing and in
speech. Of course, there must exist some limit to the size which such
programs can be. In some cases, a complicated passage may consist of a
number of such programs guided on to each other in sequence. In this
case, the units of behaviour have ceased to be notes, and have become
programs for the execution of groups of notes. There is some evidence
that "trills" may be guided in this way (Deutsch and Clarkson, 1959).
It should be noted at this point, particularly with regard to the
latter, grouped movements, that these acts are not of necessity per¬
formed rapidly and therefore ballistically. All of them are capable
of slow, more deliberate execution and hence of more continuously
guided control. The need for programming in these cases arises mainly
as a result of the need for speed. Although the effect of speed on
motor functioning is exceptionally clear in these examples, its influence
is much more widespread than we might at first assume. Let us consider,
for example, van Danzig*s (1969) examination of the activities involved
in painting. Van Danzig claims that there exist some three classes of
stroke which can be discerned in painting or drawing. We may dis¬
tinguish "spontaneous" strokes which are commonest in free sketching
and which are said to be ballistically triggered. The evidence of this
claim is that such strokes, even when quite inadequate for the artist's
purpose, are never interrupted part-way through their execution, but
are always completed and do not differ in form from any other stroke of
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the same class. Corrections are effected only after the stroke has been
completed. It is for this reason that sketches normally take the form
of many short, sharp strokes rather than single lines. The acts for
each stroke are ballistically executed. A second class of stroke, which
van Danzig terms the "inhibited" class, are commonest where the artist
is copying from a model. In this case, the strokes show "discontinuous
and often non-logical changes in the line", as the artist strives to
exactly replicate the original. Finally, we may distinguish "mechanical"
lines. These strokes are uniform from beginning to end of the stroke.
They are commonest in traced drawings.
Denier van der Gon and Wienecke (1969) have examined these classes
of stroke carefully in the situations where they are said to arise;
in free sketch, copying and tracing. Strokes of the first class are
characterised by heavy pressure at the start of the stroke, which tails
off gradually and consistently as the stroke proceeds. Correspondingly,
the line is thicker and darker at the start, with this also gradually
fading. The copied strokes showed an evenness of pressure, thickness
and darkness not found in the free sketch strokes, together with
c\s
peculiar variations in the form the artist tries to change his stroke
during execution as he sees that he is veering from the original. In
tracing, the lines were smooth and uniform in all respects, and con¬
sequently easily detectable. These differences in stroke-type have
been widely used by art critics to detect forgeries. The copier is
unable to produce the same ballistic strokes as the original artist,
and has to resort to class 2 strokes of the restrained type. This
can easily be picked up by the critic, however, and immediately leads
to the copier's denouncement (Van Danzig, 1969).
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Ballistic acts were apparently also common in the writing of the
old Chinese bamboo writers, who deliberately cultivated the skill
because it was impossible to retouch their work once it had been
\<
executed. Furthermore, the accepted form of the wor«l came to depend
on such a ballistic execution, with the varying thickness and darkness
of the strokes being considered vital. No Chinese character can be
o successfully obtained through tracing or carefully copying. Only when the
character is executed as a whole is the correct form obtained (van der
Tweel, 1969).
It seems clear, then, that some forms of representational skill
require the ability to execute ballistically at least part of the time.
This seems to be true of ordinary handwriting as well. The principles
delineated above were used by Denier van der Gon and Thuring (1965)
to examine this mode of representation. In relatively fast handwriting
it was found that speed was constant throughout, indicating that
subjects were not attempting to guide, or correct errors. This effect
persisted irrespective of the size of the writing, although it might be
expected that large writing would be bound to be subject to more control.
No such control was evident. In slow writing, by contrast, such
constant speed was absent. The temporal pattern was jerky and dis¬
continuous, suggesting that in this case guidance was operating.
Denier van der Gon and Thuring were able to show that the stretch
reflex in the hand is suppressed during fast hand movements and present
during slower ones. This would suggest that fast hand movements are
executed open-loop as programmed wholes because the mechanism of
correction in such cases is shut off. The implication is that this is
typical of all fast movements. If this is true, then programming must
be far commoner than we ordinarily think.
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Perceptual Adaptation and the Development of Perceptuo-motor Co¬
ordination
So far, we have dealt mainly with acts which are executed as un-
guided wholes as a result of the speed with which it is necessary that
such acts be executed. These limitations have been discussed as if they
were due to limitations in the ability to use information available.
However, there is much evidence to support the claim that even when
visual information could be used in a more or less continuous fashion
so far as limiting factors like speed are concerned, nevertheless
control is still effected by means of programmed acts. Let us now
examine the literature in support- of this claim.
It has been known for some time that when a subj ect puts on a
pair of laterally-displacing prisms, he misreaches for objects placed
in front of him (Held, 1958). This happens irrespective of the mode of
orientation employed: it makes no difference whether the subject is
asked to reach for the object or walk towards it (Hay and Pick, 1966).
The effect is furthermore obtained even if S can see his hand and arm
during the reaching period. Indeed, even in this case where S can see
his arm outstretching in front of him, it requires rather careful visual
guidance to lock hand and object together. This difficulty suggests
that such acts are not being continuously guided but are executed
unchanged after initiation, or at least are corrected at intermittent
intervals of fairly large extent. Furthermore, Rock (1966) has claimed
that up to 70% of adaptation to such a shift is obtained after the
first attempt, even when S can see neither his original attempt to
locate the object, or his second, modified, attempt, but only the end
result of the action. In this case there is no possibility of con¬
tinuous visual guidance, since S has no visual exproprioceptive
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information with which to effect such guidance. The effect must be due
to a reformulated program for reaching based on the perceived error at
the end of the sequence, together with the information about the previous
program. The fact that 70% adaptation is obtained after the first trial,
at which point none of the characteristic post-adaptation shift is
obtained, indicates that the effect is not due to a proprioceptive
shift in the felt position of the arm, but to a reformulated program
for action.
A further finding we should note in this context is the fact that
it takes so long to obtain full adaptation. Although 70% is obtained
after only one trial, it takes some time - a time which is further¬
more variable depending on the conditions - to fully adapt. Again,
this can only indicate that the process is not one of simple visual
guidance. The interpretation that S is using programs which must be
adjusted on the basis of the new information is much more consistent
with the results.
Finally, a consistent finding in prism adaptation experiments has
been that adaptation is only obtained - or at least is far better -
when the subject is able to move his arm or body himself. When the
process is passive, as when he is wheeled around or has his arm moved
for .him, the adaptive shift is small. Again, the fact that visual
information alone is insufficient to being about an adaptation shows
that the problem is not one of simple visual guidance.
A variety of further examples of this kind can be found. When
displacing prisms are placed on young chickens, they mispeck at
grains of food placed before them (Hess, 1956). Although their
actions, and the result consequent upon them, are evident, these
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chickens never achieve any degree of adaptation at all to the distorted
information. Again, it is clear that the chickens do not use vision as
a simple visual guider. The fact that adaptation is never achieved shows
clearly that the animals are not continuously guiding, but have programs
for behaving, programs which in this case are not modifiable on the
basis of experience. The chick learns nothing from its mistakes.
o
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Sperry (1943) rotated the eyes of newts through 180 . When this
had been done, the animals would respond to prey in the left half of the
visual field by striking to the right and vice versa. Sperry (1951)
performed a similar intervention on the eyes of frogs, after which a
prey-object placed in front of the subject was responded to as if it
were placed behind, and vice versa. By appropriate surgical inter¬
vention, animals could be made to respond to the opposite half of any
section of the visual field. The animal never achieves any degree of
sensory—motor recoordination. These results again strongly suggest
that the animals are not using vision as a constant source of visual
feedback, but rather use it to construct programs for action. Visual
information about the state of execution of the act is available,
but does not seem to be used to guide the progress of the act once it
has been started. The act seems to be executed as a unified whole,
uninfluenced by feedback.
This position is further supported by studies of the development
of perceptuo-motor abilities in infancy. As examples, we may note
the development of the placing reaction in very young kittens. It is
known that uncertain reaching is obtainable at the 20th day of age, but
that a full reaction cannot be expected much before the 30th day
(Norton, 1974). The fact that the full reaction is not found before
the 30th day cannot be said to be due to mere physical weakness, since
the physically demanding part of the behaviour is already obtained. It
is once again clear, then, that we are not here dealing with a system
designed simply to monitor current position and effect appropriate
changes. The system clearly functions at a more complex level than
this. This basic finding is widely obtainable. In baby macaques,
inaccurate, ballistic reaching is apparent at 3 - 10 days, but a full
response is obtained only after some fourteen days, and the time
necessary may even reach 56 days (Wilson and Riesen, 1956). Again,
the effect is not due to physical demands, since the demanding section
can be seen at an early stage.
These developmental "anomalies", at least so far as the cybernetic
models we discussed earlier are concerned, have their counterparts in
human development also. Visually guided reaching, containing the
basic structure of a mature reach, can be seen in newly-born infants
if conditions are favourable (Bower, 1974). This elementary form of
reaching disappears, however, at about the fourth week and does not
reappear until the fourth or fifth month. Both the early and the
later reaching show all the features of mature reaching, however,
except for quantitative differences, such as success rate, which is
about twice as high at the later age. Nevertheless, newborn infants
have a success rate of around 40%. Again, the cybernetic models we
discussed above have difficulty coming to terms with such findings.
If the child can reach successfully at 4 weeks, why is it that the
behaviour disappears only to reappear after a considerable time lapse?
Why is there now greater accuracy in spite of no practice being
apparent in the intervening period? Once more, the observed behaviour
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does not seem to coincide with any simple explanation.
It can be shown in a much more direct way that the reaching of
infants is not in fact controlled by continuous visual guidance, but
rather by programs, even at as early an age as this. First of all, it
can be shown that a neonatal reach contains all the elements of
anticipation. The fingers stretch according to the size and shape of the
object to be grasped, and accommodate during the reach section of the
act in anticipation of the point of contact. If tactual contact is
lacking, as by the use of a virtual object, the infant becomes upset,
indicating that they expect the tactual consequences of pairing the hand
with a seen object in space (Bower, Broughton and Moore, 1971). Further
evidence that even at this age infants do not simply use vision as a
constant source of feedback information, comes from the finding that
infants can successfully reach for an object even in total darkness.
If the object is shown when the lights are on, and then, after the
infant has just initiated a response, they are extinguished, the child
nevertheless can reach out and catch the object with very high accuracy
(Bower and Wishart, 1972). This can only mean that vision was not
necessary for control of the act after initiation.
The research on the effects of early visual deprivation conform
closely to the view that visually guided reaching is not effected by
means of continuous visual control. If a baby monkey is reared with
normal vision but without sight of the limbs, only a few hours of
limb-exposure is necessary to generate ballistic, partially-accurate
reaching. Several days of exposure are necessary,however, to generate
full visual reaching. The fact that the largest portion of the act is
obtained almost immediately, with only fine adjustments lacking,
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indicates that simple visual control is not operative (Held and Hein,
1967). A similar result is obtained, with children who lose sight
early, but who recover it in late childhood or adulthood. In these
subjects, inaccurate, "ballistic" reaching can be observed within a
few days, although several weeks are necessary for the revival of
visually controlled prehension. In the congenitally blind who later
recover sight, the ballistic stage is almost never passed, with the
full prehension never developing (Jeannerod, 1975b). In kittens,
15 weeks of visual deprivation allows almost immediate, inaccurate
reaching. More accurate orienting requires a considerably longer
time (Vital-Durand et al., 1974).
These various results are not the result of motor difficulties:
in all cases the limbs are healthy and developed. The animals can
obviously do the physically exacting parts of the act, that is, the
stretching out of the limbs to the general area of the target. Only
the last, zoom-in portion is weak. Clearly, therefore, the system
does not operate by means of simple visual control, for if this were
the case, such disjunctions would not arise. The results seem to
indicate that the problem of perceptuo-motor control is far from as
simple as the cybernetic models we discussed above would imply. It
appears, indeed, that not only is control achieved by some means other
than simple visual guidance, but that control depends on more than one
mechanism (Schneider, 1967; Trevarthen, 1968; Jeannerod, 1975a).
Leaping
There is one large and important class of movements which, on
theoretical grounds, cannot be guided in a continuous way after
initiation. This concerns those movements which we may term leap
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movements. Once the leap has been initiated, both the zenith of the
leap and the horizontal distance to be covered are determined, and
cannot be substantially changed. This means that the point of contact
with the ground at the end of the leap must be determined before
initiation of the act, and is expressed in the thrust exerted at take¬
off. After this, the relation of the centre of gravity of the body
follows a pre-determined path; and while minor changes can be
effected by moving the limbs, the landing point of the centre of
gravity of the body as a whole is determined. The smdothness with
which leaping movements normally seem to be executed suggests that
such alterations are exceptional, or at least severely limited in
extent.
Although we may not think at first that leaping is a common mode
of locomotion, it is in fact, a very common mode indeed. It is not
restricted to the kangaroo or frog: the vast majority of antelope and
gazelle locomote by means of powerful leap sequences, the zeniths of
which may reach considerable heights, and may carry the animals over
many metres (Gray, 1968). In animals for which the leap is not the
characteristic mode of locomotion, the leap nevertheless frequently
plays a fundamental role. Its importance to the cat and the flying
fox is obvious. However, its use is necessary to any animal which
should at any point wish to jump a fence, rock or stream. Finally,
and most important of all, whenever locomotion becomes rapid, the mode
of locomotion becomes, in effect, a series of leaps. This applies
equally to man with his bipedal mode of locomotion and to the quadrupeds
who spend remarkably little time in contact with the ground while
running (see, for example, Bernstein, 1967). We are not here dealing
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with a trivial or specialised mode of locomotion, then, but with a
general and typical mode, widely found among the more sophisticated
living organisms.
As we have seen, these actions cannot be altered during execution.
For this reason, the projected point of contact with the ground will
have to be decided in advance, at least in cluttered environments where
locomotion has to be planned with regard to the layout of impedances.
Here, then, is another reason why it is necessary to program actions
ahead. The units by which locomotion is accomplished, like the units
of musical skill, necessitate it. Furthermore, for reasons which have
already been examined, we cannot expect control to be effected at the
end of each successive leap, for speed of movement frequently precludes
this. For example, both the horse and cheetah, when travelling at
moderate speed, take about 2^ strides per second (Hildebrand, 1959).
The reaction time considerations which have already been discussed
would therefore rule out the possibility of control being exerted more
often than once every two or three strides. A good racehorse can
easily cover twenty feet in a stride; the celebrated 19th Century
racehorses Eclipse and Flying Childern, when galloping at liberty,
could cover 25 feet per stride, or approximately 82 feet per second.
Clearly, this sort of behaviour is severely dependent on the ability to
plan series of actions ahead of time.
Timing Events in the External Environment
So far we have concerned ourselves exclusively with the case of
programming as a result of the animal's own movement relative to the
environment. There is, however, an obverse case where the environ¬
ment, or parts of the environment, move towards the animal. These
may be other animals, or pieces of environmental material like rocks
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or boulders. Sometimes these objects may become sophisticated, like
arrows or bullets. Such objects, especially if they are aimed in the
direction of the animal, must be caught or avoided, and occasionally
the skills involved in such activities become highly developed, as in
cricket or tennis. Such skills depend on the programming abilities we
have been discussing. Consider, for example, an object pitched at
a speed of 100 feet per second. In .25 sees., the object will travel
25 feet: in .5 seconds, it will travel 50 feet. This means that the
last point at which a batter can effect a correction to his plan for
striking the ball will be when it is still at a considerable distance.
Considering how much more complicated is the response of a batsman to
an approaching ball than the response of a subject to a stimulus in a
reaction time experiment, it can easily be seen that such responses
will have to be organised well in advance. The question has been
examined in a series of experiments by Whiting (e.g. Whiting, Gill and
Sanderson 1970; Whiting and Sharp, 1974; Sharp and Whiting, 1974). In
these experiments, tennis balls were projected from a mortar-like
machine to subjects standing 22 feet away. The room was always in
darkness when the ball was launched and also when it was caught, but
was illuminated for a period at a variable point during the flight. It
was found that a viewing period of as little as 80 m.sec. was sufficient
to enable subjects to catch the balls if the information was given at
approximately 125 - 160 m.secs. before contact. At both earlier and
later times, the viewing period was of less value. The finding that
visual information available at less than 125 - 160 m.secs. before
contact is of progressively less value to the success of the catch
strongly supports the argument that programming is indeed necessary
for success in these tasks.
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Reading and Speech Perception
There are many other skills in which the intermittent nature of
information pick-up and control is to be found. One such skill is
reading. Although this skill differs from those which have principally
concerned us here in that it has no direct or manipulative effect on
the external environment, it shares with those skills its exploratory
mode of operation which is designed to derive information about the
environment.
A theory of continuous control applied to reading would hold that
the essential elements for reading are letters, and that reading is
accomplished by identifying these. There seems little doubt, however,
that reading is not normally controlled in this way. As early as
1885, Cattell showed that with a tachistoscopic exposure of a tenth of
a second, no more than four unrelated letters can be identified. If
the letters form a word, however, many more than four can be identified,
and all the letters of several words can be identified if they form
a sentence. Clearly, the ability to recognise the word or sentence
does not lie simply with the ability to identify all of the letters.
This conclusion is further supported by the results of Pillsbury (1897)
who gave subjects tachistoscopic presentations of words like FOYEVER
and DANXE. These words were reported by subjects as FOREVER and
DANGER, the subjects failing to recognise the "spelling mistakes" in
the stimuli. Miller, Bruner and Postman (1954) asked subjects to
identify tachistoscopically presented words which varied in their
approximation to normal English. They found that while recall was
better the nearer the word was to standard English, substantial
differences were tolerated without the subjects being aware of these
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differences. Again, these results imply that reading is not dependent
on the ability to identify all the letters of the words. Indeed, when
a letter-by-letter approach is forced on subjects, reading becomes
virtually impossible. Newman (1966) and Kolers and Katzman (1966)
used successive presentation of letters in a tachistoscope. When words
are presented in this way, subjects find it impossible to identify
even familiar words. There seems little doubt, then, that reading is
not accomplished by identifying each letter in a sentence in turn. The
basic chunks can, and apparently often are, larger than this.
There is information that the pick-up of information during reading
involves information chunks of more than the single word. This
information can be derived, first of all, from a consideration of
reading speeds. A person with a reading speed of reasonable size,
say 2,000 words per minute, is hardly likely to be identifying every
word on the page, far less every letter. That it is not necessary to
identify every word on a page to find the meaning of a sentence is
evident from the results of a number of studies. Tulving and Gold
(1963), for example, presented subjects with sentences of the following
kind: "Far too many people confuse Communism with ". When
passages were created with gaps of this sort in each sentence, it was
found that neither reading speed nor the meaning obtained from the
passage was affected suggesting that reading involves cognitive as
well as perceptual anticipation. Levin and Turner (1966) and Levin and
Kaplan (1966) have investigated perceptual anticipation by examining
the distance ahead the eye gets when a subject is reading a passage
aloud. At various points the lights were turned out and the subject
was asked to keep reading. It was observed that he was frequently
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able to continue reading for many words. There was a strong tendency
to read as far as the next phrase boundary, though this was often
enlarged to accommodate a grammatical boundary and fluctuated
according to the degree of structural constraint. These constraining
factors have been reviewed in detail by Gibson (1969). What is clear
from these studies is that reading does not involve the processing of
each constituent letter or even word. Heading involves the processing
of chunks of varying size, the size depending on the conditions under
consideration. When a response to the information is required, as
when the subject is asked to read aloud, it is clear that the
information is being picked up in advance and decisions formulated
before the point at which the words have to be actually uttered. In
reading as in other forms of motor behaviour it is not possible to use
a system of continuous information pick-up and control. The system has
to operate discontinuously.
The intermittency seen in reading has its parallel in speech
perception. The smallest unit in speech perception is usually taken to
be the phoneme CSI.eisser, 1967). We can then ask if perceiving speech
is a process of identifying all the phonemes in a string and con¬
structing speech out of these elementary units. This would, of course,
be analogous to the process of reading by means of identifying all the
letters.
That the concept of the phoneme has some psychological reality has
been demonstrated by Liberman (1957). Using a machine that could produce
sounds, he presented subjects with series of syllables varying from
*ba* to 'da* and on to ,ga*. When listeners were given the task of
discriminating these sounds one from the other, it was found that this
was much easier to do between instances of different phonemes than
between two sounds belonging to the same phoneme class.
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That this constitutes proof that the auditory system is tuned in
terms of phonemes has been attacked, however. Ladefoged (1959) has
pointed out that the sounds presented were in fact syllables rather than
phonemes, and that the results imply nothing about the elements of which
those syllables were composed.
A number of studies exist which support the notion that the
syllable is a basic unit in speech perception. Cherry (1953) showed
that when a message is alternated between the two ears, this has no
effect on shadowing at very slow or at very fast alternation speeds.
At intermediate speeds, however, ability to shadow is grossly affected.
This effect was investigated in detail by Huggins (1963, 1964), who
claimed that the effect was due to the breaking up of critical units
of speech perception. He argued that if it is the case that speech
is perceived in terms of segments of roughly equal size, then it should
be possible to pinpoint a critical rate which maximally disturbs
perception. In fact, the alteration speed which seems to be most
damaging is agreed upon rather closely in different studies (Cherry
and Taylor, 1954; Schubert and Parker 1955; Huggins 1954), and falls
at .36 words, or about..6 syllables per uninterrupted half-cycle
(Neisser, 1967). This data, then, implies that the syllable may indeed
constitute a unit in the perception of speech.
There is, however, evidence that speech can be understood by means
of much larger units than this. Fodor and Bever (1965) and Garrett,
Fodor and Bever (1966) presented subjects with a tape-recorded message
on top of which was placed a click or hiss. The subjects* task was
to identify the point at which the hiss was superimposed. It was
found that subj ects erred by hundreds of milliseconds and several
syllables. The breaks tended to be perceived as occurring at, or
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around, grammatical boundaries in the sentence (Garrett, Fodor and
Bever, 1966). This suggests, then, that subjects are picking up and
responding to the sentence in large chunks. In some cases at least,
the units of speech perception are rather large.
It is clear from these results, as it was in the case of reading,
that there is no single unit upon which speech perception depends. The
units vary according to a number of factors such as the deployment of
attention, and varies from the syllable to the phrase at least. It is
not dependent on the monitoring of a fixed sequence of units. The
process is much more one of intermittent pick-up of information. Any
form of continuous control model therefore does not seem capable of
explaining these facts.
Predicting the Properties of Objects
The two skills we have just considered, reading and speech perception,
differ somewhat in that reading involves the pick-up of stimulus
information in advance of the point at which it is to be used. In
speech perception, the.situation is somewhat different. The listener
cannot "look ahead" in the literal sense, as he can in reading, because
there is as yet no stimulus to be surveyed. In this case, the subject,s
ability to respond to information in chunks must depend on his ability
to anticipate what is to be said, and thus to respond to units larger
than that which is currently being uttered by the speaker. Under¬
standing speech is therefore a case of feedforward in a clearer sense
than we have seen it up till now. There exists another class of
behaviour in which feedforward is seen in a relatively "pure" form,
however. Whenever we lift objects, we use feedforward to judge the
force necessary to get the object off the ground. We do not exert the
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same force when we lift a ping-pong ball as we do when we lift a brick.
That this is true is clear whenever we misjudge the weight of an object,
as when we assume that an empty box contains a heavy object. This feed¬
forward has in fact offered developmental psychologists a means of study¬
ing weight conservation in infants (Mounoud and Bower, 1975). The
infant*s arm can be seen to fly up as he overestimates the critical
force necessary to raise the object, and to fall as he underestimates
the weight. Even at this age, feedforward of this kind is apparent.
In the reading and speech-shadowing studies which we have examined,
we have seen a mechanism with which the subject both responds to
information which has already been picked up by the perceptual system
and simultaneously picks up information for the future. This responding
and simultaneous pick-up has not been thoroughly examined in any of the
studies we have so far considered. There does exist, however, a series
of studies which have in fact examined in a more rigorous way, the
ability of subjects to perform these two functions at the same time.
This has been the aim of a large number of tracking anticipation
studies. These studies address themselves to the following fundamental
problem: how does intermittent pick-up of information nevertheless
render performance smooth and continuous?
Tracking Anticipation Studies
The evidence from these studies suggests that subjects try in
various ways to take RT lags into account by operating "ahead" of the
input. One piece of evidence in favour of this is that if in a
dynamic tracking task the tracking object is stopped when the align¬
ment with the target is perfect, the subject nevertheless goes on for
one reaction time, throwing a correct alignment off course. He knows
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that if the tracking obj ect had continued it would have erred in the
opposite direction and consequently a compensation had been prepared
in advance (Craik, 1948; Poulton, 1953).
There is a number of studies showing this kind of preparation of
responses in advance. The information on which such projections are
based are of various sorts. Poulton (1952, 1957) used tracking tasks
with' constants or statistical properties which could be known. Thus
the target may move in predictable directions at predictable rates.
When these properties are known tracking is greatly improved as against
cases where they are not. Similarly, when a view of the approaching
track is available, time on target increases. Poulton (1954) and
Crossman (1966) found that a .4 second preview of the oncoming track
reduces errors to the same extent as an 8 second preview. A preview of
.3 seconds led to significantly more errors. It should be noted that the
size of the preview will have to increase as a function of the speed of
the course if the accuracy of performance is to be maintained, and this
will at times mean that the degree of preview has to be much larger than
.4 seconds. Ellson and Gray (1948) found that pursuit tracking of
simple harmonic inputs (which are highly predictable) produced errors of
practically zero, even when no preview was available, indicating that
subj ects can learn the structure of the track over a period of time and
match their responses to it very accurately. When the structure of the
track becomes more complicated, so that the subject cannot easily predict
the structure, responses tend to fall at least one reaction time behind
the target (Poulton, 1954; Legge and Barber, 1975). This lag disappears
when preview of the type noted above is made available. Leonard (1953)
has shown that performance with advance information is smoother because
much less time is taken up with pausing, and more with performance.
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These studies all strongly support the notion that behaviour is not
continuously guided, but is executed in chunks on the basis of inter¬
mittently acquired information. They also suggest that subjects are
capable of engaging in the pick-up of information for the control of
future activity while simultaneously effecting decisions already
formulated. It seems quite possible for both activities to proceed
at once.
Temporal Structure
We have so far dealt mainly with programming as a result of limi¬
tations in ability to make responses quickly on the basis of information
picked up, a situation which leads to the need to pick up information
in advance and use it to prepare programs which are then held in
readiness for the point at which they are useful. We must now look
at a rather different set of reasons why programming is necessary.
These reasons have to do with the essential structuring or patterning
of behaviour. This temporal patterning is apparent in most behaviour.
As an example, let us consider language. Any meaningful sentence must
be endowed with an overall structure, namely, a syntactic structure.
Such a structure is not, of course, inherent in the words of the sen¬
tence themselves. It consists of a set of rules for the use of words
which is superimposed on them in order to render the group meaningful.
As Lash^Ley (1951) points out, the word "right" (when spoken) is noun,
adjective, adverb and verb, has four spellings and at least ten
meanings. The meaning of the word in any given sentence cannot there¬
fore depend on anything but a set of broad grammatical relations
which relate it to the other words of the group. In order to issue
a meaningful sentence, therefore, these relations must be invoked in
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advance; the structure cannot be applied as the speaker goes along.
When we consider the great differences which are found in the rules
governing different languages, this fact is doubly strengthened. The
same argument applies to the understanding of language also. Lasheley
gives as an example the Cree word "kekawewechetushekamikowanowow".
The pronunciation of this word provides no difficulty to the Cree
speaker even if he has not seen it before, because he can apply the
structure of the Cree language to it. But this structure is not
apparent in the word (although it is implicit in the word), but
depends on the listener or reader for its extraction. The listener
must bring a plan for interpreting the stimulus, to the stimulus.
That "plan of interpretation" is one type of program, related to
those which are being discussed here.
These structures themselves form a kind of program, then. But
they in fact go further than this. They enable the possibilities of
genuine anticipation of future stimulation (i.e. feedforward). It is
this which gives meaning to the eye-voice span experiments which we
reviewed earlier. The anticipation is expressed in terms of
(principally grammatical) structure, or more correctly, to parts of
that structure. That this is so can be seen if we consider the types
of errors typically made in language production. Spoonerisms, for
example, in which the speaker says "our queer old dean." instead of
"our dear old queen", and typing mistakes of the sort "htis" or "htse",
operating "backwards" in time, indicate that responses are formulated
and being held in readiness until needed. The acts are clearly
patterned in advance, but for some reason the order of production can
sometimes become upset.
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Internalised Programs for Action; Reaction Chains and Vacuum Activities
The importance of an overriding temporal structure which the
subject brings to the stimulation available is apparent also when we
consider what ethologists call "reaction chains" (Tinbergen, 1951).
According to ethologists, many apparently unitary behaviours are in
reality chains of separate reactions strung and bound together by in¬
ternal unifying forces. The animals are thus not responding simply to
perceptual information, but accommodate that information to an internal
plan of action. The reactions of foraging honey bees to flowers, for
example, begins with a response to visual information in which colour
plays a dominant part. At this stage, yellow and blue flowers are
particularly attractive. However, if a model of such flowers is
prepared, bees will very seldom alight on them. The bee will hover
for a short time at a distance of about 1 cm., and will then lose
interest. This is because the model is not appropriately scented.
If such a scent is available, then the bee will alight, and the next
reaction in the chain can be released. What is important here is
that the information has to be available to the bee in the correct
order: a strong odour is no inducement to a bee and cannot be used to
control its chosen path of movement if the appropriate visual infor¬
mation was not available first. Here, then, we see a temporally
ordered plan which determines the information which the bee will
respond to at any time. This structuring force exists within the bee
and is independent of the information available at the eye (von Frisch,
1927).
This kind of temporal structuring can be seen in the hunting
behaviour of the digger wasp Philanthus Triangulum. A hunting female
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flies from flower to flower in search of bees. At this stage she is
totally unreceptive to the scent of bees, even when that scent is strong
enough to be detected by the human nose. Any visual stimulus of the
right size and movement, however, will release the first reaction in the
chain and the wasp will wheel towards the object and -haarever 10 to 15 cms.
away. Only at this point does the animal become sensitive to bee-scent,
for if a dummy is constructed which lacks the scent, the animal veers
away. A scented dummy, however, immediately initiates the next reaction
in the sequence (Tinbergen, "1935). Again, the animal does not respond
simply to perceptual information indicating the existence of bees.
That information is responded to only if it becomes available at the
appropriate point in the chain. Here, then, we see the existence of
internalised •programs* for hunting or for nectar-collecting which
are used for the guiding of these activities. Many other reaction
chains of this type can be found in animal behaviour (see for example,
Tinbergen, 1951; Marler and Hamilton, 1966; Hinde, 1966).
Many other examples of internalised programs for action of one sort
or another are available in the literature on animal behaviour. Excel¬
lent examples of internalised programs of considerable complexity are
to be found in what Lorenz (1957) terms "vacuum activities". Vacuum
activities are responses, sometimes of considerable complexity, which
are seen in the absence of releasing stimuli. Lorenz (1937), for
instance, observed a repeated performance of the whole behaviour pattern
of insect hunting in the starling, beginning with watching the prey
through catching, killing and swallowing, all in the absence of any
discernible stimulus whatever. Kluyver (1942) observed similar
insect hunting behaviour occurring in vacuo in the European Waxwing
during cold and frosty weather when no insects had been available for
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some time. Tinbergen (1951) reports the whole of the complex zig-zag
dance of the stickleback, which is used to attract a female, occurring
in an empty tank. Many further examples of this kind may be found in
the literature. Young cormorants have been observed to go through all
S
the motions of next-building with considerable accuracy while still in
s
the ne*t themselves. The Bengalese Finch will perform all the sequences
observed in nest-building, including gathering the materials, in an
empty cage. Buzzardsccan be seen to go through the motions of digging
out wasps nests only a short time after hatching. Further examples of
such behaviours are widely documented. See, for example, Tinbergen
(1951); Manning (1972).
These examples, then, give credence to the view that behaviour
in animals can be guided by means of internalised programs for action.
Sometimes, these programs are wired into the system, as some of the
programs described above seem to be, and others seem to be developed and
stored. Some of the programs may consist of fairly general "instructions"
rather than a set of precise motor actions. The examples of reaction
chains like insect hunting behaviour may fall into this category. Others,
however, seem to contain within them a much more precise statement of
the motor sequences involved. Examples of this may be found in vacuum
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activities, like the next building programs found in Bengalese finches
and cormorants.
Efference and the Role of Peripheral Feedback in the Control of Acts
The role of proprioceptive information about the ongoing control
of an act has been considered vital, at least since the early work of
Mott and Sherington (1895) and Sherrington (1931). Both these studies
involved the deafferentation of a single limb, and it was found that
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this form of intervention produced total incapacitation in that limb
for any form of purposeful activity. The effect is generally obtained
in studies of this kind (see Taub and Berman, 1968) and the fundamental
role of peripheral feedback seemed established.
However, a series of studies by von Hoist and Mittelstaedt (e.g.
von Hoist and Mittelstaedt, 1950; von Hoist, 1954; Mittelstaedt, 1958)
seemed to indicate that activity might be controlled by means of two
components. These have been succinctly summarised by Gibson (1966)
as follows:
r... Whenever the brain sends out a command for a
certain movement it stores a copy. When the input
of any receptor reaches the brain, it is auto¬
matically compared with the current stored copy.
JLf it matches, the input is taken to be a case
of proprioception - a feedback. If it does not
match, the input is taken to be a case of extero-
ception - a feed-in ...*.
1966, p.39
It will be clear that this is basically a closed-loop theory,
though one with a difference. In it, the motor commands are prepared
in advance and executed. To this extent, it compares to the position
advanced here. It does not, however, assert that these commands are
in themselves sufficient to control behaviour; such control depends
on the existence of f,reafference" from the eyes or the proprioceptive
system and asserts that this is essential for a decision about the
nature of the event to be possible. A number of studies has, however,
attempted to show that a formulated series of commands are in them¬
selves sufficient to control behaviour.
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An early finding in support of this came from a clinical
observation by Lashley (1917) of a patient suffering from gunshot
wounds in the leg. The patient had stiffered proprioceptive loss, yet
still was able to move his leg when asked and to relocate it at
specified points with considerable accuracy, even with the eyes shut.
This would suggest that information about the current position of a
limb is not always essential, at least for decisions about rather
gross acts.
More carefully controlled studies on the same lines have been
conducted, in particular by the Taub-Berman group. For instance,
Knapp, Taub and Berman (1958) trained monkeys in shock-avoidance,
which was accomplished by means of arm flexion. After de¬
af ferentation, the animals* performance dropped somewhat, but
quickly regained the former level. Untrained deafferented monkeys
were quite capable of learning to make the response. A similar
finding was found in food-deprived monkeys who, when the good arm
was straitjacketed, learned to push the deafferented arm through the
cage for food (Knapp, Taub and Berman, 1963). It appears from this
that some form of intentional behaviour is possible without feedback.
Furthermore, tasks of a much more delicate nature can also be per¬
formed by deafferented animals. The monkeys can be trained to grasp
an object to avoid shock. The form of the grasp and the pressure
exerted did not differ from that exerted with the normal limb (Taub,
Ellis and Berman, 1966).
The unilaterally deafferented animal fails to use the injured arm
for any response unless forced to do so, however. The limb is not used
for ambulating, climbing or anything even when the good limb is engaged
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in another task (Taub and Berman, 1968). However, the bilaterally
deafferented animal is not so restricted and such animals make very
extensive use of both limbs. According- to Taub and Berman (1964)
the animals are capable of moderately fast ambulation, of climbing,
of lateral climbing and of performing delicate tasks like lifting
peanuts out of a well. When the animals are blindfolded they
continue to be capable of such behaviour according to Taub and
Berman,
*... the degree to which the movements of these
animals with both forelimbs deafferented approximated
to normal patterns of movement was truly striking and
cannot be overemphasised*.
1968, p.177.
The difficulty in using the unilaterally deafferented limb was
explained by Taub and Berman in terms of inhibitory forces operating
between pairs of limbs, but we need not deal with that here. The
important finding from the present point of view is the extent to
which behaviour could be carried out in the absence of all peripheral
information, and even without visual information, about the position
and changes of position of the parts of the body. These findings
strongly support programming systems of the sort proposed here.
Conclusions
The main argument of this theoretical discussion has been that
behaviour is not controlled on the basis of "current" information
available at the receptors at any given moment, but on the basis of
previously acquired information which is used to construct programs
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for action. It is argued that these programs are themselves sufficiently
accurate to enable fairly complex interactions within the environment
to take place independently of further information during the execution
of the program. However, normally visual and other forms of information
will be used to monitor the execution of the program and to initiate
any modifications necessary, but their role during such periods will
be low-key. It is in the formulating of such programs and in the
subsequent monitoring that vision (and to a lesser extent in man, the
other senses) is argued to play its major role. The evidence reviewed
above seems to be highly consistent with such a theoretical position,
and should be taken as an encouragement to proceed to an experimental
investigation designed to show more clearly the hypothesised program¬
ming abilities and to elucidate their underlying characteristics.
As a final note to this review of the literature, there is the
evidence of the blind. Although the quality of the information available
to the blind is immensely poorer than that available to the sighted, and
this is bound to have a profound effect on their ability to get about in
the world, we may also note that the blind person also shows the example
par excellence of continuously controlled locomotion. The advance pick¬
up of information for the blind person is limited by the length of his
cane, and represents a foreknowledge of about one metre. His ability
to program actions for the future is therefore severely limited. The
inadequacy of such a method for getting about in the world should be
apparent to us all.
PART II
INTERMITTENT PICK-UP AND THE CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION
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INTRODUCTION
It is now necessary to begin an experimental investigation into
some of the more central concepts introduced in Part I. The main
argument, of course, has been that behaviour is not controlled on
the basis of current information at the receptor, but on the basis
of previously-acquired information. More specifically, it is argued
that vision is used only intermittently, and that the information
acquired is used to construct programs for action which can then be
run off independently of further visual information. It is by means
of such programs that behaviour is controlled, rather than through
some "direct" visuo-motor link. The intermittency for which we
have argued, is said to be achieved by means of the two major
elements in the model presented in Fig. Ill; that is, by means of
the absolute distance perception overlay (ADPO) and the programming
system (PS). Our first task must therefore be to test whether
behaviour can indeed be controlled on the basis of intermittently-
acquired information. If it is possible, we may then progress to a
more detailed consideration of the mechanism responsible for it.
8 2
EXPERIMENT 1
CCNTROL OF LOCOMOTION IN THE ABSENCE OF VISUAL INFORMATION
Introduction
When the basic properties of the model being proposed here were
first in the course of elaboration, a large number of pilot studies
were carried out into as many aspects of the problem as possible.
At the end of this series of studies, a short, basic experiment was
conducted to demonstrate the fundamental effect which underlies all
of the research reported below. It concerns itself with the simplest
possible case of the skill in question: namely, can subjects
accurately walk up to and locate a single target placed at a distance,
when no visual information is available from the point at which the
act is initiated. Experiment 1 examined this question.
Method
Design
The experiment was conducted in a large room (a former lecture-
theatre) from which all seating had been removed. Some tables and
other objects were to be found around the edges of the theatre and
some equipment and experimental apparata were situated at one end,
where there was also a stage. The size of the free area in which the
experiment took place measured approximately 14 x 9m. The floor of
the theatre sloped slightly from one end to the other, but this did
not prove to be a disturbing factor as evidenced by the results of
pilot studies in which the subjects were asked to walk both up and
down the slope under the conditions of the present experiment. The
performances did not differ. In the current experiment subjects
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walked perpendicular to the line of slope in any case. No tendency
was found for subj ects to veer downhill as they moved between the
starting-point and the target area. It is likely that the limited
distances used in these experiments were responsible for the lack of
directions bias.
Four locomotor distances were chosen at 2, 5, 8 and 10 metres.
These distances were chosen simply for convenience as constituting a
fairly representative selection of distances in the target from near
to moderately distant space. The target area was indicated by an
easily-distinguishable line drawn on the floor together with a wooden
marker placed on the left-hand side of it. The subject's task was to
line himself up directly opposite the marker, with the feet centred
squarely on the line. However, whenever subjects expressed a pre¬
ference for one method of lining against another, this was allowed.
For example, some subjects wished to line their toes up against the
v
market rather than the centre of the foot. These wishes were always
respected. In general, however, it was considered more natural that
subjects should attempt to line their bodies up with the marker rather
than in any other way. A single line rather than any other form of
target was used because of the accuracy of measurement which the single
line allowed. The result of each trial at the 8 and 10 metre distances
was indicated by means of a small chalk mark, a different colour being
used for each trial. Care was taken that these marks should be invisible
to subjects at the starting-point. Since this could not be guaranteed
at the 2 and 5 metre distances, the scores at these distances were
measured directly, and no marks indicating performance on previous trials
were made at all. This method of recording the data enabled the
experiment to progress fairly quickly.
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In view of the possibility, partially supported by evidence from
the blind, that subjects might gain some cues about the distances
involved by means of echo—location, it was decided that this source
of variance should be controlled. It is true that in the adult human
ear these abilities are rather crude (Bower, 1976); nevertheless, the
availability of any cues about the positions of objects in the experi¬
mental field of activity is potentially disruptive.to the essential
nature of the task. For this reason, auditory information was excluded
throughout the experimental session. This was achieved by recording
a wJiite noise on to an ordinary cassette tape and then playing this to
subj ects through a pair of headphones attached to a portable tape-
recorder slung across the subject*s shoulder. The apparatus did not
prove particularly cumbersome or restrictive and was effective in
almost completely isolating the subject from external sounds: for
example, the experimenter could not make himself understood even by
shouting. The surface on which the experiment was conducted was
smooth and flat and hence no tactual ones which could be used to
gauge distance were available. In this way, with all other sources
of information controlled, the task was rendered a purely visual one.
Two conditions of testing were employed. In condition 1, all visual
information was excluded at the point at which each trial was initiated.
No attempt was made to control the amount of visual information in any
other way, and vision, when available at all, was available under
normal, full-cue conditions. The exclusion of vision was achieved by
means of blacked-out goggles which the subject carried on his head
throughout the experiment.
In the theoretical discussion in Part I, we drew attention to the
need for some definition of "adequacy" in evaluating performances made
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in perceptuo-motor behaviour. Although we could simply consider the
errors made in this experiment and leave it to the reader to decide
whether or not this performance was indeed adequate by using some
"intuitive" notion of adequacy, we have already drawn attention to
the desirability of a more objective definition. It was therefore
decided to run Condition 2, a condition in which visual information
is continuously available during the course of locomotion, to assess
the accuracy normally achieved when the eyes are open during locomotion.
One limitation was placed on subjects* use of vision, however. They
were asked to refrain from looking directly down at their feet as they
approached the target line and guiding them carefully on to the target.
The reason for this was that it is not usual to carefully guide the
placement of the feet in this manner when walking about normally in
the world: and while subjects can, by carefully bringing their feet
into line with the target, achieve virtually zero error, it was con¬
sidered that this would constitute a highly artificial response.
Subjects were therefore asked to refrain from doing this. They were
allowed, however, to glance across at the marker opposite which they
were attempting to line themselves, and no restrictions were imposed in
any other way. Only the careful, visual guidance of the feet on to the
target was disallowed. In this way, the resxilts of the visual condition
are likely to bear a far closer relation to the accuracy normally
achieved whilst moving about in the world than would otherwise be the
case. This method was therefore taken to constitute the correct
control in the present experiment.
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Procedure
Practice Session - Before the experimental session began, subjects were
given a short practice session in order to accustom them to the task.
The amount of practice necessary varied from subject to subject, but in
no case was more than 2-3 minutes of practice required. It should be
remembered that this task, conducted under such isolating conditions,
is highly unusual and a number of subjects were disturbed by it
initially. It proved necessary for the experimenter to establish a
rapport with these subjects to secure their trust that no dangers were
involved. In order to instill that confidence the practice trials were
necessary. The trials were conducted at some distance from the
experimental set-up and did not involve the use of fixed distances.
Instead, a much more casual approach was adopted, with the experimenter
simply indicating a variety of distances and asking the subject to try
to reach them. One important consideration at this stage was to persuade
the subjects to walk in as natural and uninhibited a manner as possible.
This was important, because it had been found in pilot studies that
subjects who used an unnatural and excessively slow gait tended to
make fairly substantial errors; whereas, if the same subjects walked
naturally, they made very small errors. For this reason, it was felt
that the behaviour should be kept as normal as possible. The role of
"unnatural" modes of locomotion and of time restrictions will be considered
in detail below.
It proved possible to "prime" subjects in this way for the experimental
session with only a few minutes practice. Such practice was never carried
on beyond the point at which confidence to walk naturally was instilled.
In this way, it was hoped that no exterior learning effects would
influence subjects1 skill, and that a measure of their "natural"
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ability would be obtained.
Experimental Session - Before each trial began, S stood lined up at
the starting-point. The white noise was turned on and S was allowed
to survey the layout and decide for himself when to commence the trial.
He then pulled the goggles over his eyes and immediately started to
walk. E stood to one side and checked that the goggles were properly
fitted. At the end of each trial, S stopped and waited while E marked
the spot reached (in the case of the 8 and 10 metre distances) or
measured the error (in the case of the 2 and 5 metre distances). E
then turned S, who was still blindfolded, around and walked him back
to the starting-point. In this way, S was denied all feedback about
his performance on that trial. Once returned to the starting-point,
S removed the goggles and surveyed the target again before commencing
the next trial. Three trials were presented at each of the four
distances, making 12 trials per condition for each subject. The
trials were randomised with respect to distance. The non-visual
condition (Condition 1) ra.s always run first in order to avoid the
possibility of unwanted learning effects which might have been
generated if any visual trials were presented before the completion
of the non-visual trials. With the non-visual condition performed
first, any differences between the two performances would only have
been accentuated.
Subj ects
Ten subjects took part in the experiment, five male and five female.
Six were students at Edinburgh University; the others were employed in
various occupations. The ages fell between 21 and 35. None was aware
of the purpose of the experiment or of the predicted results.
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Results
The essential results of this experiment are to be found in
Figure 1.1, which shows the variance of error obtained at each of the
four locomotor distances used. The results of the non-visual condition
(Condition 1) are found in Figure 1.1a, and the results of the visual
condition (Condition 2) in Figure 1.1b.
The results of the experiment clearly support the predictions.
When subjects are asked to walk up to and locate a target placed at a
distance of up to 10 metres, they can apparently do this as accurately
when the eyes are closed throughout the locomotor period, as they can
with eyes open. This is clearly seen from an examination of the
variance of error obtained in the two conditions: in all cases, the
variance in the one condition mirrors that obtained in the other. The
trend was assessed statistically by means of the F-test for homo¬
geneity of variances which was applied to the corresponding distances
in the two conditions. No significant differences were obtained
(2x2, F=1.08; 5x5, F=2.18; 8x8, F=2.23; 10x10, F= 1.47. All insignificant
at =.01, one-tailed test). It appears, then, that the consistency of
subjects* responses is roughly equal in the two conditions.
While the above analysis shows that the subjects were equally
consistent in the two conditions, it is also possible to gauge their
accuracy in locating the target line by calculating the mean error
obtained at each distance. Means and standard deviations of errors






















2m 5m 8 m 10m
i 1 = 5 responses
FIG 1.1 Distribution- of judgments at each distance.
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TABLE 1.1 -
Means and Standard Deviations of Errors in Both Conditions
(Experiment 1)
Distance (metres)
2 5 8 10
Condition 1 1.51 - 7.9 -.72 ± 10.63 -2.28 - 19.03 0.41 - 14.71
Condition 2 9.67 - 7.61 13.92 - 6.72 10.61 - 12.74 .91 - 12.12
Error in cms.
An examination of this Table shows that there is a tendency for
subjects to be more accurate in the non-visual than the visual condition.
At the first 3 distances (2, 5 and 8 metres) the mean error in
Condition 1 is noticeably smaller than in Condition 2, though the
effect is not found at 10m. The trend was examined statistically and
found to be reliable. None of the errors in Condition 1 proved to
deviate significantly from zero (2m, t=.61; 5m, t=.21; 8m, t= .38;
10m, t = .09, all insignificant at o< = .01, one-tailed test). In
Condition 2, the deviations were significant at the first three
distances (2m, t=4.03; p < .01; 5m, t-6.52, p < .01; 8m, t=2.63,
p<.01). The difference at 10m was not significant (t=.24, n.s.).
However, the difference in accuracy between the two conditions is very
small. Table 1.2 shows the percentage of responses falling within
12, 18 and 24cms. of the target. It can be seen that 83% of all
responses in both conditions fell within 18 cms. of the target. No
difference in the accuracy ratio can be found until we examine those
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responses falling within 12 cms. of the target, where performance is
higher in the non-visual condition. But at this level it seems likely
that the error term is capable of absorbing most of the differences
found. Accuracy in both conditions is clearly very high.
TABLE 1.2













2 metres 87 67 100 93 100 100
5 metres 83 53 87 87 100 97
8 metres 50 50 77 70 87 90
10 metres 63 60 73 83 93 93
Total 71 58 83 83 95 95
An examination of Fig. 1.1 and Table 1.1 shows that the variance
of error remains substantially the same between different distances in
the two conditions. However, it can be seen that the variances at 2
and 5m. are somewhat narrower than at 8 and 10m. The effect was
examined statistically atOl-.Ol, one-tailed test, and found to be
reliable in both conditions (Condition 1 - 2x5, F=1.81, n.s.;
5x8, F=3.2, p <.01; 8x10, F= 1.67, n.s. Condition 2 - 2x5, F= 1.28,
n.s.; 5x8, F=3.6, p <.01; 8x10, F =1.11,n.s.). Performance would appear
to be superior at the shorter distances in both conditions.
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Discussion
The two general predictions which the present experiment was designed
to test, were that subjects have the ability to locomote accurately
to locations up to 10 metres away when vision is excluded during the
locomotion and that the errors made under this condition would not
differ substantially from those made when vision is available. These
general predictions seem to be well confirmed by the present experiment.
The vast majority of the responses in both conditions (83%) fell within
18 cms. of the target line, and almost all responses (95%) fell within
24 cms. In fact, only six responses in Condition 1 and 7 in Condition 2
fell outside this 24cm. range. These results therefore strongly support
the prediction that a high degree of accuracy can be attained even when
visual information is excluded during the execution of the act.
The prediction that performance would be as high in the non-
visual as in the visual condition is similarly confirmed. Indeed, we
saw from Tables 1.1 and 1.2 that there is a tendency for performance to
be better in the non-visual condition. The reason for this discrepancy
is not clear. It may be that those subjects who claimed that they were
trying to line their toes up into the target line were in fact orienting
in terms of the centre of the foot. We noted earlier that the centre
of the foot is a meaningful measuring-point to take as it corresponds
to the centre of gravity of the body. Whenever the body as a whole
is being transported through the environment, it would seem sensible
that the accuracy of these transportations would be best expressed in
the positioning of the centre of gravity rather than in terms of some
more arbitrary criterion like the toes. If this were so, then the mean
error obtained in the visual condition when a centre-of-the-foot measuring
criterion was employed, would fall closer to the position of the target
line. Of course, by the same token we would expect the mean error in
the non-visual condition to shift downwards. But it is unlikely that the
mean error obtained in either condition would then differ significantly
from zero. It will be possible to examine this issue in subsequent
experiments by taking a measure of the position at which the centre of
the foot falls relative to the target line in the case of every subject,
and seeing if the effect obtained in Experiment 1 persists. At any
rate, this finding clearly substantiates our prediction that performance
in the non-visual condition would reach the same standard of accuracy as
performance in the visual condition. We may justifiably conclude that
performance in the non-visual condition is "adequate" by this criterion.
We may use the results of Table 1.1 to examine another aspect of
subjects9 performance in this experiment. A widely held belief in
perceptual psychology is that error in perceived distance increases
with increasing physical distance and that at distances of only 2-3
metres the error is already substantial (Gilinsky, 1951; Kttnappas, 1962;
Legge and Barber, 1975). The results of the present experiment contra¬
dict such accounts. Firstly, as we have already seen, subjects' per¬
formance with vision excluded was as good as when vision was available.
Since subjects in the former condition have no possibility of re-
gauging the distance to the target on the basis of visual information
after locomotion is commenced, and since the resulting performance is
as good as when such visual information is available, this implies
that the subjects were indeed able to accurately apprehend the distance
of the target in advance of the point at which the act was initiated.
Secondly, we have seen that the mean error in Condition 1 falls very
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close to the position of the target line. Ii we had found the mean
error to fall at some fairly substantial distance from the target, and
if that distance increased as total distance to the target increased,
we would have been forced to consider the possibility that the error
contained a component of perceptual error. However, the distribution
of error fell squarely across the target line, and did not show any
tendency to increase as total physical distance increased. This finding
therefore implies that relatively little error accrued to subjects*
ability to perceive the distances involved. It would appear that sub¬
jects have the ability to apprehend distance in fairly exact terms, at
least at distances of up to ten metres.
An important finding in the present experiment is the small but
significant increase in variance obtained at 5 metres. The effect was
obtained when we examined both the variance of error at the different
distances (Fig. 1.1) and the range of error (Table 1.2). It is not
yet clear what is responsible for this "threshold", but if the effect
were to prove reliable, it might offer a way into the mechanism under¬
lying the ability.
A finding which is of immediate concern, however, is the fact that
the effect is obtained not just in the non-visual condition, but in the
visual condition as well. There seems no reason to expect the accuracy
obtained at 2 and 5 metres in Condition 2 to break down at 8 and 10 metres
however, since visual information is as readily available at these
latter distances as it is at the former. An important possibility
suggested by these results is that subj ects were functioning in the
same way whether vision was available or not; that even when vision
is available during locomotion, subjects continue to construct programs
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for action in advance which could then be run off independently of
further visual information about the location of the target; that
functionally-speaking, subjects may at times be "blind" during the
locomotion period even when vision is available. This important
conclusion will require far stronger evidence before being readily
acceptable but such an explanation is certainly consistent, and
indeed the most consistent explanation of the data obtained in
Experiment 1.
One final point must be made concerning the analysis of the
results. It will have been noticed that one per cent, was the minimum
level of significance accepted in this experiment. Although the five
per cent, level is frequently taken as the minimum acceptable, it was
decided that a higher level should be chosen in the present study.
The reason for this was simply that it was felt that any effects of
the importance of those predicted here should evidence themselves
far more clearly than at the 5% significance level. Although in some
research it is difficult to get control over all the relevant variables
and hence to maximise the desired effect, making 5% significance
acceptable, it was considered that no such argument could be made about
the present research. Consequently, results failing to reach signi¬
ficance at the 1% level were not considered. The reader may judge
for himself the justice of this strategy as he reads through the
experiments.
Conclusions
From the results of the present experiment, it seems we can draw
positive conclusions with respect to the stated hypotheses. It seems
that subjects do indeed have the ability to program behaviour in
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advance of the point at which it is needed and in a form sufficiently
precise to rule out the need for further information after the act is
initiated. Whether or not vision can normally be "turned off" as
completely as it was in Condition 1 is debatable but seems unlikely.
We know, for example, that locomotion over uneven ground is hazardous
and difficult in the dark, and it is unlikely that a program could
take into account all the undulations of the surface in order to smooth
out these difficulties during the period when vision would be excluded.
It seems probable that control of variables of this sort would frequently
have to continue during the execution of a programmed act and that we
could not therefore really expect a subj ect to operate completely
"blind" during the execution period. Nevertheless, it is clear that
a subject in this condition can achieve a great deal with no vision at




THE RANGE OF DISTANCES OVER WHICH LOCOMOTION CAN BE
CONTROLLED IN THE ABSENCE OF VISION
Introduction
In Experiment 1, we obtained evidence which strongly suggested that
subjects have the ability to control their behaviour on the basis of
intermittently acquired information. It appeared that control on the
basis of such information could be as effective as when vision is
freely and continuously available. Two questions follow naturally
from this finding: firstly, we can ask what the total range of
distances over which this ability can be extended are; secondly, we
can ask in what form a breakdown in the ability will manifest itself.
Experiment 2 is designed to answer these questions.
Method
Design
The design of Experiment 2 followed closely the basic design of
Experiment 1. The experiment was conducted in a large area of open
ground (a temporary car park). The experiment was conducted out of
doors for two reasons: firstly, because it did not prove possible to
find an indoor area sufficiently large to accommodate the long
distances used in Experiment 2, and secondly, because it was felt
desirable to perform the experiments under as natural conditions as
possible. One important factor, for example, was felt to be the surface
on which the experiment took place. It was felt desirable that the
surface should not be too smooth or artificial and the one chosen,
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which was rough and rather stony, was thought to fulfil this condition.
The area on which the actual experiment took place formed a wide runway
for purposes of access to the parking spaces. Since the park was for
long-term parking, interruptions were rare, but the park was usually
sparsely populated in any case, testing times being chosen in accordance
with low usage.
The locomotor distances chosen were 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 and 21
metres. The distances were laid out along two pathways which lay in
parallel and approximately 6 metres apart. The total number of trials
were divided equally between these pathways in order to rule out as
far as possible any possibility of the subjects gaining tactual cues
from the variations in surface texture and consistency which could then
be used to gauge the distances. The target position was always indicated
by a wooden marker, which was placed about 1 metre to the subject»s left,
and the subject*s task was defined as in Experiment 1, as being to
line himself up directly opposite the marker. Unlike Experiment 1,
however, no target line was painted on the surface opposite the marker.
This was simply because target lines would not have been visible at the
longer distances. Each attempt at locating the target was indicated by
coloured markers, different colours being used for each trial, which
were pushed into the ground. Because subjects could see the markers
at the 3 metre distance, responses at that distance were measured
directly.
As in Experiment 1, auditory information was excluded by means
of white noise played through a pair of head-phones attached to a
portable tape-recorder. The procedure was effective in eliminating
almost all auditory information (see Design, Experiment 1).
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Two conditions were employed. In Condition 1, all visual
information was excluded during1 locomotion. However, in Experiment 2
this was not achieved by means of blind-folding: instead, subjects
were simply asked to shut their eyes. There was a number of reasons
for this change of procedure. First of all, there was the very real
danger that subjects, walking for such long distances over such a rough
surface, might stumble and fall. It was felt that if this did happen
subjects must be able to use their eyes to right themselves, or to
protect themselves as they fell. If a blindfold were worn, this would
not be possible. In fact, it was discovered early on that subjects
were not prepared to tolerate blindfolding under these circumstances
for these very reasons, and that when they were blindfolded, their
locomotion became slow and hesitant. For these reasons, it was decided
to dispense with the blindfold in experiments of this type. It was
considered, however, that the subjects chosen were sufficiently mature
to conduct the experiment as instructed.
Condition 2 was exactly the same as Condition 1, except that in
this condition the subject kept his eyes open as he walked up towards
the target. As in Experiment 1, this was considered to represent a
"control" case of simple visual guidance.
Procedure
Practice Session - As in Experiment 1, subj ects in Experiment 2 were
given a practice session to accustom them to the task. This practice
session was kept to a minimum, however, and never amounted to more
than a minute or two. In fact, it proved easier to prime subjects
for Experiment 2 than it did for Experiment 1, in spite of the
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greatly increased distances involved. This was principally because of
the increased space around the subjects, with the consequent lessening
of the dangers of collisions. The practice trials were always conducted
at some distance from the experimental set-up to prevent learning of the
distances involved. Subjects were encouraged to walk in as natural and
uninhibited a manner as possible. Practice was given at a group of short
distances, and also at long ones.
Experimental Session - Before each trial began, S stood lined up at
the starting-point while the marker was placed in position, one marker
only being used. E was careful never to inadvertently provide S with
distance information by walking along the locomotion path, but rather
approached in a circumventory manner. Similarly, E always withdrew
before the trial began. S was fitted with the white noise apparatus
at the beginning of the session and, with the exception of short rest
periods, this was not then removed until the end of the entire session.
S was allowed to survey the layout at thfe< beginning of each trial, and
decide for himself when to commence. At the end of each trial, S
remained with his eyes closed until E marked the spot with a marker pin
or measured the error (in the case of the 3m distance). E then turned
the subject, who remained blindfolded, around and led him several
metres back towards the starting point before allowing him to open his
eyes. It was for this reason that a single target market only was
used. Had a series of markers been used, S could have gauged some of
the distances as he walked back to the start. It did not prove
practicable to lead S all the way back to the start at the end of
each trial, as this would have further increased the length of an
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FIG. 2,1 Di stribution of judgments g -
at each distance (non-vjsual
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= 5 responses
FIG 2,2 Distribution of judgmentsat each distance
( visual condition)
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The first point which should be made about these results is that
they confirm the results obtained in Experiment 1. Figs. 2.1 and 2.2
show that the errors made at the 3, 6 and 9 metre distances in
Condition 1 closely reflect those made in Condition 2. F-tests
performed on the corresponding distances in the two conditions
revealed no significant differences in the variances (3x3, F=1.5;
6x6, F=1.87; 9x9, F=2.61; all insignificant at = .01, one-tailed
test). As in Experiment 1, subjects appear to perform equally
consistently whether vision is available or not. The average deviation
from the target can be gauged from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 which show the
mean error obtained at each distance in each condition. It can be
seen that the mean error, as in Experiment 1, is somewhat larger in the
visual than in the non-visual condition, but in neither case did the
error deviate significantly from zero (highest deviation = 7.09 - 22.42
t = 2.13, n.s. at c< - .01, one-tailed test). The general accuracy in
the two conditions can also be gauged from Table 2.3 which shows the
percentage of responses falling within 12, 18 and 24 cms. of the target
line. It can be seen that 84% of all responses in both conditions fall
Q '
within 24 cms. of the target. No differences in accuracy ratio were
found at any of the distances used. These results in general, then,
provide strong support and confirmation of the results obtained in
Experiment 1.
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to find if there is an
identifiable limitation to subjects8 ability to control their activity
in the absence of visual information during the course of the activity,



























































1 2 1 2 1 2
3 metres 56 60 78 75 91 95
6 metres 47 60 62 68 78 80
9 metres 42 57 62 72 82 90
Total 48 59 67 71 84 88
down. The results of Experiment 2 enable us to give an unequivocal
answer to this question. It can be clearly seen from Figure 2.1 that
the variance remains quite stable up to 9 metres, but then rises
dramatically between 9 and 12 metres, stabilising again at 12 metres
and above. This would allow us to pin-point the limitation in ability
at somewhere between 9 and 12 metres. These trends were examined
statistically by means of the F test for homogeneity of variances and
were strongly confirmed. No differences were found between consecutive
distances at 3, 6 and 9 metres (3x6, F=1.57; 6x9, F=1.13, both
insignificant at<X= .01, one-tailed test). At 9 and 12 metres, the
difference was significant for above the one per cent, level set
(F=26.63). No differences were found between consecutive distances
at 12, 15, 18 and 21 metres (12x15, F=1.33; 15x18, F=1.44; 18x21;
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F= 2.03, all insignificant at ot = .01, one-tailed test). It should be
noted, however, that there is a gradual increase in the variance over
distances on either side of the threshold. Thus, while no differences
are found between the variances at successive distances, over a wide
range the variances become larger (3x9 metres, F=2.24, p <C.01; 12x21
metres, F=3.88, p<.01; 15x21 metres, F 2.91, p<.01). These results,
then, appear to show that there is a gradual increase of variance to be
expected as physical distance increases on either side of the threshold.
The dramatic increase obtained at 12 metres, however, is clearly of a
different order, and seems to represent a much more profound limitation
in the ability to locate the target. The results in general point
strongly to a sharp threshold in the accuracy with which activity can
be controlled under the conditions employed in Experiments 1 and 2,
when the distances involved exceed 12 metres.
An examination of the variance obtained in Condition 2 also
confirms the experimental predictions. It was hypothesised that in
Condition 2, the variance obtained would remain relatively stable over
all distances. An examination of Figure 2.2 confirms this hypothesis.
No significant differences were obtained between the variances at any
of the locomotor distances (251.86, highest variance x 149,82, lowest
variance, F=1.68;n.s. at = 0.1, one-tailed test). The hypothesis
that in Condition 2 performance would remain stable throughout seems
confirmed.
An examination of the results of individual subjects reveals a
close conformity to the pattern of results obtained for the group.
Fig. 2.3 shows the errors made at each distance by each subject in
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FIG. 2,3 Distribution of judgments in Condition 1.
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is repeated here. In all but one case (subject 3) it can be seen that
error remains low at the first three distances, mirroring that of the
group as a whole. At 12m. the error rises greatly, stabilising off at
a high level. The threshold is seen in all subjects though the clarity
varies. The thresholds were examined statistically by means of the
Mann Whitney U test, the results of which are presented in Table 2.4
'In all but two cases (subjects 3 and 8) the effect was found to be highly
significant. In the case of subject 8 the trend, although not reaching
significance, can be clearly seen. In subject 3, the increase in error
seems to be more gradual with error beginning to accumulate as early
as 6m. Here too, however, the trend towards increased error at 12m.
is apparent, and at 15m. the threshold effect is clearly seen. These
results in general then, conform closely to those of the group as a
whole.
TABLE 2.4
Mann-Whitney U-values for Error Scores of Individual Subjects
Distance Comparisons
Subject 3x6 6x9 9x12 12x15 15x18 18x21
1 10 5 0* 6 11 13
2 5 11 0* 8 13 7
3 2 10 9 8 12 5
4 8 10 0* 8 4 9
5 12 10 1** 12 - -
6 8 3 0* 9 12 10
7 13 11 0* 9 10 11
8 5 7 6 9 9 5
9 13 11 1** 11 10 4
* - p < .004 one-tailed test; ** - p <. .008 one-tailed test
All other cells insignificant at p = .01, two-tailed test.
A
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We have so far considered only differences in the variance of
errors around the target line and hence the consistency of subjects*
performance. However, it is possible to calculate the mean error
obtained at each distance and hence the mean position where subjects
judged the target to be. If in the group as a whole or in individual
subjects there were any tendency to consistently err in one direction
or another, this might well prove to reflect certain characteristics
of the system. For this reason, the mean error obtained at each
distance has been calculated and presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. An
examination of this task shows that the mean error in all cases falls
only marginally short of zero (the target position), with all but one
mean falling at less than 15 cms. from the target. A statistical
analysis was carried out, the results of which are presented in Table
2.5.
TABLE 2.5
t-values from Data in Tables 2.1 and 2.2
Condition 1 Condition 2
Distance t Distance t
3 .91 3 2.02
6 . 58 6 1.36
9 2.13 9 1.74
12 .10 12 1.30
15 .27 15 .94
18 1.27 18 1.23
21 .55 21 1.47
all insignificant at = .01, one-tailed test
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No mean in either condition was found to deviate significantly from
zero. It appears that there is no tendency for subjects as a whole
to consistently over- or underestimate the distances.
The position is somewhat more difficult to evaluate in the case
of individual subjects. In some cases (subjects 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8)
there does not appear to be any strong1 tendency to err in one direction
more than the other. In two cases, however, (subjects 3 and 9) there
does appear to be some tendency to overestimate, and in three further
cases (subjects 4, 5 and 7), there seems to be a tendency to under¬
estimate (see Figure 2.3). The small number of trials at each
distance makes it impossible to assess the tendencies at any one
distance statistically, nor is it possible to consider responses
occurring on either side of the threshold. A crude assessment of the
significance of the tendencies to over or underestimate the distances
can be made by considering all over-estimations against all under-
estimations without taking distance into account. A sign-test
analysis was conducted in this way. In no case did the tendency
to err in a particular direction reach significance. The results
of this analysis therefore fit well with the results for the group
as a whole.
Discussion
We stated earlier two essential purposes of Experiment 2. Firstly,
it was intended to use this experiment to check the basic results of
Experiment 1 and to check certain anomalies in the results of the first
experiment. Secondly, it was intended to establish if possible the
range of distances over which the results of Experiment 1 could be
obtained and to discover the nature of any limitations to this ability
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which there might be. Experiment 2 seems to have been effective in satis¬
fying both these conditions.
An examination of the results obtained at the first three distances
used shows a clear correspondence with the results of Experiment 1. In
all cases, performance in Condition 1 matches that of Condition 2. It
0
can be seen that 84% of responses in Condition 1 fell within a radius
of 24 cms. from the target, and that percentage remained stable between
conditions. No differences were found between the variances in the two
conditions. In no case did the mean error fall at a significant
distance from the target line. These results therefore present a strong
confirmation of the results obtained in Experiment 1. It appears that
subjects can indeed move from one spatial location to another when vision
is not available during the walking period, and can do so as accurately
as they can when vision is available.
It will be remembered that in Experiment 1 the mean error obtained
in the visual condition was significantly greater than it was in the
non-visual. A potential explanation of this discrepancy offered, was
that the system of measurement used may not have been completely
appropriate. It was argued that the centre of the foot is the most
meaningful measuring-point to take since it corresponds to the centre
of gravity of the body. It was felt that when the body is moved
through the environment, the success of these movements would be best
expressed in the positioning of the centre of gravity (i.e. the centre
of the foot). However, some subjects claimed a subjective desire to
line the toes up to the target, and this desire was respected. It was
suggested in the discussion to Experiment 1 that had the centre of the
foot been adopted as criterion instead of the toes, then the mean error
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in Condition 2 would have moved down and the difference from zero
become insignificant. It was decided to employ this procedure in
Experiment 2 to test the possibility. The results seem to confirm the
hypothesis. An examination of Tables 1.1 and 2.2 shows that the mean
error has shifted downwards in Experiment 2 and that the differences
from zero in this experiment are not significant. The mean error in
Condition 1 has remained roughly stable and similarly does not differ
significantly from zero. These results, then, confirm on the one hand
the prediction that performance in the two conditions would be equal,
and secondly, supports the claim that the centre of the foot consti¬
tutes the best measure of accuracy which can be used. This procedure
was therefore employed in all subsequent experiments.
There is a second discrepancy between the results of Experiments
1 and 2 which must be noted at this point. An examination of Eigs. 1.1
and 2.1 reveals that the variance in Experiment 2 is greater than in
Experiment 1. If we examine the distances corresponding most closely
in the two experiments we find that the effect is statistically
reliable (2x3, F=3.6, p < .01; 5x6, F=3.91, p < .01; 8x9, F=3.1, p < .01).
One possible explanation of the discrepancy is the difference between
the targets used in the two experiments. In Experiment 1, the target
took the form of a narrow marker and a line drawn on the floor. In
Experiment 2, by contrast, no line was drawn on the surface, and the
target marker was much larger (because of the longer distances used).
In fact, the edge of the marker opposite which the subjects were asked
to line themselves measured approximately 5 cms. and this alone would
be likely to reduce the accuracy. This, together with the lack of a
1 1 6
target line, means that the target was defined much more broadly in
Experiment 2. In view of these two discrepancies between the experi¬
ments, it is perhaps not surprising that the variances between them
differed. However, in both cases the responses in the non-visual
condition were found to correspond to those of the control condition
in that particular experiment, irrespective of the differences as a
whole in the results of the two experiments. The general results of
the two experiments are therefore clearly in close agreement.
The main purpose of Experiment 2 was to see how far the ability
evidenced by Experiment 1 could be extended, and to see in what way
the ability broke down. The dramatic threshold seen in Fig. 2.1
shows clearly that the ability breaks down somewhere between 9 and
12m. at a point not far in advance of the distances we have been
examining already. The results of Experiment 1, which showed that
the performance could be maintained at 10m. would suggest that the
break-point occurs somewhere between 10 and 12m. This would seem
to rule out the possibility of a gradual increase in error across
distance: the limitation seems to express itself in a rather sharp
threshold. The result of the group as a whole is supported by the
results of the individual subjects. Fig. 2.3 shows the sharp threshold
of the group results in the individual profiles of seven out of the
nine subjects, with the results of the other two subjects, while not
satisfying a statistical criterion, lying clearly in the right
direction. These results, then, strongly suggest that under the
conditions employed in Experiments 1 and 2, the ability under consider¬
ation is limited to distances of less than 12m.
The fundamental problem posed by Experiment 2 is to discover what
is responsible for the threshold obtained there. One possibility which
may be considered is that the threshold is caused by perceptual error.
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It is possible that at the critical distance of 10-12m. some critical
element of perceptual information ceases to be available, producing a
corresponding increase in error.1 This possibility seems unlikely,
however, for reasons which were first considered in Experiment 1. We
have already seen, in the group results of Experiments 1 and 2, that
the mean error obtained at each distance does not deviate significantly
from zero. This finding holds for the distances between 12 and 21m.
as it does for the distances below the threshold. The error at the
longer distances takes the form of an increased variability in the
positions which the subjects take to be the position of the target.
This finding strongly detracts from any explanation in terms of
perceptual error, since such an error would be expected to reveal
itself in the form of a change in the mean position to which subjects
oriented, with relatively little change in the variance. The evidence
normally taken as evidence of perceptual error is of this sort. The
fact that no significant changes, in the mean error are found above
the critical distance therefore militates against any such inter¬
pretation of the present results. A consideration of the results
of individual subjects reinforces this point. It can be seen in
Fig. 2.3 that there is little consistency in the responses of different
subjects at distances above the threshold. For example, the response
profiles for subjects 6 and 8 show a tendency for responses to be
distributed on both sides of the target line, and consisting of both
over and underestimations. In the case of subjects 3 and 9, there is
a tendency to over-estimate the distances and in the case of subjects
4 and 5, a tendency to under-estimate. This diversity of responses
between different subjects seems to rule out the possibility that the
error is the result of a missing critical perceptual component, because
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the direction of error varies so widely between subjects. The limiting
factor, whatever it is, does not appear to be exerting a uniform effect
on all subjects. The fact, in particular, that different subjects err
in different directions, seems to rule out perceptual error as an
appealing explanation of the results.
One possible explanation of this effect has to do with reports
frequently given by subjects about their attempts to orient to targets
at distances of more than 12m. They commonly report that, when they begin
to walk towards the target, they "know" where it lies, but that by the
time they have begun to reach its general vicinity they have lost that
awareness. At that point they begin to make inferences about its likely
position, based on any form of information available; that in fact
they begin to use cognitive strategies to make up for the lack of
other means of knowing where the target lies. This type of explanation
of the response obtained at these longer distances does seem to
accord quite well with the results. We saw in Fig. 2.3 that subjects
react in rather different ways at distances greater than 12m., some
apparently over-estimating the distances and others under-estimating.
At the same time, there is no clear consistency in their responses, and
the variances among their scores is very high. These results accord
quite well with the view that they are caused by the adoption of rather
vague and general strategies on the part of the subjects to cope with
the situation as well as possible. It would be just such general coping
strategies that would be expected to generate the kind of vague con¬
sistency found in the profiles of individual subjects.
Finally, it will be remembered that in Experiment 2 subjects were
not blindfolded, but were merely asked to shut their eyes. It was hoped
that the subjects chosen were sufficiently mature to perform the task
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as directed and to keep their eyes closed during the experiment. The
results show that subjects were indeed honest about this. The dist¬
ances were presented to subjects randomly, yet the further distances
were consistently misjudged while the nearer ones were not. This is,
if anything, the opposite of what would be expected if the subjects
were malingering, because it is at the longer distances that they
would undoubtedly be most tempted to open their eyes. The consistent
pattern of results obtained, indicates that the subjects did not cheat.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 2 seem to confirm the results of
Experiment 1 and indicate very strongly that the ability is limited to
distances of less than 12m., at least under the conditions employed in
these experiments. The limitation is very clear and can be seen in
the profiles of individual subjects and not merely in the pooled data
of the group. The limitation seems to take the form of a sharp
threshold rather than a gradually increasing error with increasing
distance. The causes of this limitation will be examined in depth at
a later stage, for they offer a key to a deeper understanding of the
basic mechanisms. However, this will be deferred till a later stage.
At present, we will continue with the problem of demonstrating the
systemrs capabilities and limitations. Once these have been dilineated
in greater detail we will be in a better position to delve beyond to
the underlying mechanisms supporting the abilities.
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EXPERIMENT 3
CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION IN A CLUTTERED ENVIRONMENT I
Introduction
So far we have concerned ourselves with only the simplest possible
case of the skill in question: namely, with walking up to a single
target placed at a variable distance. However, it is obvious that if
the skill is to be useful in the natural environment, it should be
more extensive than this. For example, when the environment is
cluttered it may be necessary to take into account more than a single
obstacle or target when formulating the program. Indeed, it is in
such cluttered environments that programming would be of greatest
importance, since in open territory the need for it is markedly reduced.
Since the environment with which animals interact is indeed normally
filled with impedances of one kind or another, it would seem that
animals would have to be capable of formulating more complex programs
than we have concerned ourselves with up till now. Experiment 3
therefore increases the complexity of the task by placing four
obstacles in front of subjects and asks the following question; when
accomplishment of an act entails the circumvention of a number of
obstacles placed in the path of locomotion, to what extent can this
group of obstacles be taken into account in the formulated program?
Method
Design
Experiment 3 was conducted on the same location as Experiment 1,
that is, in a large lecture-theatre from which all seating had been
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removed. Some tables and chairs and various pieces of experimental
equipment were distributed around; the edges of the theatre, but this
left a free area measuring approximately 14x9m. where experiments could
take place.
Figure 3.1 shows the general layout of Experiment 3 . A partial grid
measuring 7 by 4m. was laid out on the floor and two layouts of
obstacles placed within it. The distances between the obstacles were
uneven, and the obstacles were laid out in such a way that subjects
were forced to re-orient their bodies as they circumvented one obstacle
in order to get into position for the approach to the next. The layout
of obstacles was deliberately chosen to form a task of fairly extensive
complexity. The partial grid was designed to provide a metric for the
examination of the subjects* responses during subsequent analysis, but
was restricted to the form seen in Fig. 3.1 to avoid giving subjects too
artificial a surface to walk on, and also to minimise the possibilities
of subjects using the grid to try to gauge the distances to the
obstacles. Since two layouts of obstacles were used, with the distances
between the different obstacles varying, this gave four locomotor path¬
ways on which the experiment could be conducted. It was considered that
a reasonable number of tracks was desirable because of the reduced
likelihood of subjects picking up special cues about a particular
pathway which might then be used to improve performance. With four
pathways in use, this meant that no more than six trials were ever
given on one pathway during the course of the whole experiment. The
obstacles were represented by coloured patches measuring approximately
30x30cms. which were taped to the floor. The purpose in using patches
rather than real objects was obviously to avoid the cues about per¬



























(or indeed, did not strike) an obstacle.
Subjects* responses were filmed by means of a Sony Rover TCR2
portable video recorder andcamera for subsequent analysis. The
apparatus was set up on a platform situated at the bottom end of the
lecture theatre at a height of approximately 15ft. and at a distance
of some 18-20m. from the far end of the grid. The camera zoom was
adjusted so that the grid just fitted into the viewfinder, thus
providing maximum definition. The entire session was recorded for
each subject and stored as a permanent record.
Because of the possibility that subjects might gain cues to
distance by means of the auditory system, this source of information,
as in other experiments, was controlled. This was achieved by means
of the white noise apparatus which has already been described in
Experiment 1, and which was effective in eliminating almost all
auditory information.
Two conditions of testing were employed. In Condition 1, all
visual information was excluded at the point at which each trial was
initiated. As in Experiments 1 and 2, no attempt was made to control
the amount of visual information in any other way. Condition 2 was
exactly the same as Condition 1, except that vision was not excluded
during the course of the trials. This condition was thus meant to
represent a case of simple visual guidance, and performance under these
"normal" conditions was used as a control performance against which to
evaluate orientations executed "blind".
Procedure
As in previous experiments, S was given a short instruction period
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before the experiment proper began followed by a short practice on a
layout of objects set aside from the experimental layout. This practice
was merely to make sure that S knew how he was to go about circumventing
the obstacles, and to let him try the routine for himself. S performed
these circumventions with eyes open, so there was in fact no true
practice session in this experiment. This preliminary period took only
a few minutes.
At the beginning of each experimental trial S stood lined up at
the starting-point. The white noise was turned on and the filming
commenced. S was allowed to survey the layout and choose for himself
when to begin the trial. When the trial had been completed, S was
allowed to use vision to line himself up for the next trial. This
procedure continued until all trials in Condition 1 had been completed.
Three trials were given on Tracks 1 and 3 and two on Tracks 2 and 4,
making ten trials in all for each condition. The trials were presented
on each track alternately. Condition 1 was always run first to avoid
any unwanted learning effects generated by subjects seeing the results
of their behaviour in Condition 2. The entire procedure took
approximately 30-40 minutes.
Subjects
Eight subjects took part in Experiment 3, five male and three
female. All subjects were students at Edinburgh University and were
aged between 19 and 28 years. No subject understood the purpose or




The information recorded on video-tape was played on to a
television monitor with a 19 inch screen. The image on the screen
simply showed the outline of the grid and the obstacles, with the
subject visible at the top of the track concerned. A sheet of trans¬
parent paper was fixed to the screen and the outline of the grid and
obstacles traced on to it. The film was then run through in slow
motion. As the subject moved through the layout of obstacles, the
position and direction of each footfall was recorded by drawing onto
the paper a line running along the length of the subject*s foot. This
method made it possible to record the position of each footfall relative
to the obstacles. At the end of each trial the tape was wound back to the
beginning and replayed at normal speed. This made it possible to check
that the data had been properly recorded from the tape. A new sheet
of paper was used for each trial and these were carefully coded. This
method of transcription enabled a detailed pictorial record of subjects*
behaviour to be obtained which could then be used for subsequent quanti¬
tative analysis. In addition to this record, however, the tapes were
played through at normal speed and scrutinised for any information which
could be obtained to supplement the transcribed data. These viewings
were particularly used to check dubious effects in the pictorial
records.
Analysis of Results
A very gross measure of subjects* success at overcoming the
obstacles in Experiment 3 is given in Table 3.1 which shows the per¬
centage success at circumventing each of the four obstacles. It can
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be seen that the success rate in the visual condition is virtually
100%, as is performance at the first two obstacles in the non-visual
condition. At the third obstacle in the non-visual condition,
however, performance is substantially reduced and at the fourth
obstacle is very poor.
TABLE 3.1
Percentage successful circumventions at each obstacle
Obstacle
Condition 12 34
Visual 100 98** 100 96*
Non-Visual 100 96 64 50
** - all on Track 1
* - all on Track 4
This analysis gives only the vaguest and least satisfactory
account of performance, however. In the first place, we cannot accept
the fact that the subject has circumvented an obstacle as evidence of
"successful" performance. To do this we would have to know in more
detail the relation of the subject*s path of locomotion to the obstacle.
Secondly, it is obvious that a proportion of the errors at a given
obstacle are affected by, and may even be due to, errors at the previous
obstacle. For these reasons, the basic circumvention figures shown in
Table 3.1 give only a rough indication of performance.
An essential problem in Experiment 3 is to reach some general
definition of the task which faces subjects. This analysis of the
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results may begin by attempting to reach such a definition. One outline
of the problem is shown in Figure 3.2, which defines the problem in terms
of two components. Firstly, the subject has to walk through a certain
set of distances defined by the separation of the obstacles and the
space needed to clear them. Secondly, these distances must be linked
by a series of angles through which the subject must turn in order to
set himself up for the approach to the next obstacle. If the subject
gets both of these components right, he will negotiate the obstacles
successfully. It is argued, then, that errors can be of two sorts.
Subjects can misjudge the distances between objects, or they can
misjudge the angles to be turned through in order to meet them.
This outline seems to represent the most likely definition of the
task facing subjects in Experiment 3. The critical problem now is to
define what these distances and angles should be. An approximation to
the optimal distances and angles could be reached by a process of
simply trying to estimate what these should be, but in line with the
methods adopted in previous experiments, these can be more objectively
defined by the results of the visual condition which constitutes a
control in this respect. The results of the non-visual condition can
be compared to these and the types of discrepancies scrutinised.
The process by which the distances and angles were calculated
was as follows: at each obstacle, subjects tend to take two, or
possibly three paces to complete a circumvention. These circum¬
ventions are linked by a series of paces leading from one obstacle
to the next. The best and most accurate way of assessing both angles
and distances seems to be to join the most extreme foot placements at
each successive obstacle. When this is done, the resultant path is
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found to run very close to the actual path taken by the subject, but
offers a far more adequate unit than the "raw" path for quantitative
analysis. The estimates form a series of simple zig-zag lines which
can then be used for quantitative evaluations.
In the case of the non-visual condition, the situation is some¬
what more complicated since the pathways do not always run between the
obstacles as in the visual condition (because of angular errors).
However, the same essential procedure was followed. The most extreme
foot positions were linked through the pathways which the subjects
followed. This produced the same form of results as in the visual
condition, but in this case the points oriented to represent where
subjects apparently thought the correct turning points to be. Examples
of the process for each condition are shown in Fig. 3.2
When the procedure described above was followed, the results
shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 were obtained. Table 3.2 shows the
means and standard deviations of the lengths of the path segments
in the two conditions: Table 3.3 shows the means and standard
deviations of angles. No estimate has been calculated for the final
distances and angles as the subject's task after reaching the final
obstacle was defined as being simply to leave the grid area, and the
diversity of angles and distances would therefore be high and of no
real interest.
It can be seen from Table 3.2 that the differences in distance
walked in the visual and non-visual conditions are very slight.
Distances in the non-visual condition are generally shorter, but the























































































































in the two conditions showed all differences to be insignificant
(see Table 3.4). The distances walked do not seem to differ in the
two conditions.
By comparison, it can be seen from Table 3.3 that the angles
through which subjects turned to approach the next obstacle in the
series varied greatly between conditions. Gfci all four tracks, the
second and third angles turned through are much larger than in the
visual condition, though this effect was noticeably absent at the
first angle. The statistical analysis shown in Table 3.5 confirms
this: subjects clearly tend to stretch the length of the path out
like a concertina. The general effect is shown in Fig. 3.3 which
shows the mean paths followed by subjects relative to the obstacles
in each condition. The influence of the angular errors is clearly
seen in the stretching of the pathways in the non—visual condition.
It is clear, however, that the distances have remained remarkably
constant in the two conditions.
The most interesting finding to emerge from Experiment 3, then,
is that error seems to accrue principally to the angles and not to the
distanoes. This resul-tcwould suggest that subjects are able to assess
a group of distances even when these are laid out in a rather complex
way as in Experiment 3. However, it would seem that subjects have
some difficulty in re-orienting the body axis as they pass one
obstacle in order to get lined up for the next.
The general result of this analysis, namely that errors are due
mainly to angular and not distance misjudgments, can also be seen from
a careful analysis of the individual response records.
Each response was examined individually and those in which errors










FIG 3,3 Mean paths followed by subjects in each condit
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TABLE 3.4
t and F Values from Comparisons of Distances Walked
in Each Leg in the Two Conditions
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4
t F t F t F t F
Leg a -.93 2.00 2.60 1.88 1.44 . 1.03 1.64 1.82
b 1.70 1.03 1.09 1.16 .71 1.61 1.47 1.07
c 2.51 3.07* 2.32 4.57* 2.32 2.15 1.59 1.63




t and F Values from Comparisons of Angles Turned
Through at Bach Obstacle in the Two Conditions
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4


























* p < .01
** p < .001
all other cells insignificant
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classify these errors into four basic categories:
(1) angular error
(2) distance error (over or under-estimation)
(3) angular and distance error
(4) errors (distance or angular) due solely to error at the
preceding distance. -
Examples of each of these errors are shown in Fig. 3.4. The
method of determining which of these categories a particular error
fitted was fairly simple. In each case, the angle turned through
and the subsequent distance walked were measured. The angle was then
adjusted to bring the subject into the correct relationship to the
obstacle. If, after this angular adjustment, the path now led the
subject round the obstacle, and if the distance walked was in
reasonable correspondence with the mean distance in the visual
condition, this was taken as a case of angular error.
Sometimes the errors were due, wholly or in part, to distance
misjudgments. Detecting distance errors involves a problem; an
apparently underestimated distance (evidenced by the fact that the
subject stops short of the target) may in fact be a "correct"
judgment executed after an overestimated preceding distance. The
problem also works in reverse. It is not always clear, therefore,
which type of distance error is operating. To control for this
ambiguity, whenever a distance was apparently over or underestimated,
that distance and also the preceding one was measured and compared
to the mean result of the visual control. The extent to which the
distances obtained corresponded to the control mean, dictated the











was always very clear.
It is obvious that if errors are made at a particular obstacle,
then that error may well carry forward to the next obstacle in the
series. In order to obtain evidence on "genuine" errors made at
that distance, it would therefore be necessary to control for these
'errors carried forward. For this reason, whenever an error was made
at the third obstacle, an angular and/or distance correction was
effected at that obstacle. This allowed determination of whether any
error had actually been made at the fourth object, and if so, to
determine its extent more correctly.
The method for determining and correcting distance errors has
already been explained. The method of adjusting the angles was to
transcribe that path taken on to a piece of tracing paper, and then,
keeping the axis of rotation the same in both cases, to rotate the
path until the best fit to the obstacles was obtained. The original
path, together with the adjusted path could then be traced onto a
third piece of paper. It is the results of this process which are
shown in Fig. 3.4.
Once the errors made in Experiment 3 have been examined in this
way it is found that the four categories suggested above account for
all the errors made. The result of the analysis is shown in Table 3.6.
The first result in this Table to be noted is the decrease in
the number of "real" errors at obstacle 4 after correction. In
Table 3.1 we show that only in 50% of cases did subjects succeed in
circumventing the obstacle. After the correction procedures discussed
above have been applied, the success ratio rises to 70%.
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TABU! 3.6






Error due solely to error at previous obstacle 0 20
Angle error 17 24
Angle and distance error 14 2
Distance error 5 4
Total error 36 50
It can be seen from Table 3.6 that the vast majority of errors are
angular or have an angular component. The results of this individual-
response analysis therefore confirm and amplify the results of the
general analysis shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. It would appear that
subjects are highly accurate at judging the distances involved in
Experiment 3. Most of the errors which were obtained seem to have
been the result of misjudgments of the angle to be turned through
in order to be adjusted for the approach to the next obstacle.
Discussion
Experiment 3 began by asking if the accuracy attained in earlier
experiments, where subjects were told to locate a single target with
vision excluded, could be matched when he is forced to locate a number
of targets. From the results of Experiment 3 it seems possible to say
that subjects can indeed respond to a group of obstacles or targets
with a very substantial degree of accuracy. After corrections are made
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for errors due entirely to errors made at earlier obstacles, the total
success at each obstacle is as follows: obstacle 1, 100%; obstacle 2,
98%; obstacle 3, 67%; obstacle 4, 70%. This result indicates quite a
degree of accuracy in the task.
The hypotheses in Experiments 1 and 2 were formulated with respect
to distance only, whereas in Experiment 3, the hypotheses considered
both distance and a series of angular re-orientations of the body.
If we begin by considering only the distance responses shown in
Fig. 3.3 it can be seen that it is equally possible for subjects to
respond to four targets as it is to one. The statistical analyses
shown in Table 3.4 confirmed this: in no cases were the differences
between the two conditions statistically significant. The variances
remained fairly constant between the conditions, indicating that sub¬
jects were equally consistent in the two cases, though in one or two
cases the differences were significant. Similarly, the means did not
differ. This result is supported by the findings of the individual
response analysis shown in Table 3.6, which shows that only a small
proportion of all errors made involved distance misjudgments. These
findings suggest a considerable degree of accuracy in identifying
the distances which have to be covered to locate the targets.
As we noted above, there are two components of performance in
Experiment 3, one concerning distance and the other angles. The
most interesting finding of this experiment, shown in Table 3.3, is
that most of the error obtained is due to angular errors and not
distance ones. It can be seen very clearly from Table 3.3 that
subjects tend to strongly over-estimate the angles in the non-
visual condition, a finding confirmed by the statistical analysis
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shown in Table 3.5. The mean angles turned through are significantly-
greater in almost every case. It can also be seen that the variance
of the angles tends to be greater in the non-visual than the visual
case, showing that subjects are less consistent in their responding
in the non-visual condition. These findings, too, are supported
by the results of the individual response analysis, which shows that
the greater part of the errors made involve angular misjudgments.
The influence of angular errors on performance is best seen in Fig. 3.3
which shows the mean paths followed in the two conditions. It is
"
apparent that angular deviation is responsible for the greatest portion
of the error. The basic result of Experiment 3 therefore seems to be
that subjects are able to identify the set of distances involved very
*
well but have considerable difficulty in negotiating the angles. The
question then arises as to why this should be.
There are two possible general causes of the differences in angle
between the two conditions which are immediately evident. The first
is that some perceptual information necessary for correct determi¬
nation of the angle is missing which, if available, would have enabled
the subjects to circumvent the obstacles more accurately. The second
possibility is that subjects know what angle to turn through, but for
some reason are unable to execute the turn as intended. This then
would not be a perceptual error, but an error in translating
information into a plan of action.
The latter interpretation of the results has relatively little
evidence to support it. It is true that the variance among angles in
the non-visual condition is higher than in the visual, suggesting an
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inconsistency in executing whatever plan is guiding the behaviour, and
this would support the notion that the error is partly due to some form
of execution problem. However, the fact that the mean angular turn at
the second and third obstacles deviates so much from the angles found
in the visual condition argues against this sort of interpretation.
Although it is possible that subjects might make a constant execution
error producing the larger angles found, the fact that these are found
only at the latter obstacles militates against such an interpretation,
for as we saw in Table 3.3, no differences in angle were found at the
first obstacle. By contrast, this finding strongly supports the
hypothesis of perceptual error. The hypothesis of perceptual error
would predict that when the obstacle is located close to the subject
(with the possibilities of perceptual misjudgments thereby minimised)
the performance should be relatively good, whereas when the obstacles
are at some distance, performance should be poor. This is in fact
just what was found. At the first obstacle, which lay only a short
distance from the subject, it appears that the angle can be judged
rather well. At the subsequent distances, however, the angular error
is very large and this would support the argument that the effect is
largely perceptual. Just why the effect takes the form of an over-
estimation is more difficult to answer, and this question will require
investigation at a later date. But it seems a not unreasonable
hypothesis on the basis of the results of Experiment 3 that the errors




The results of Experiment 3, then, seem to fit rather well into
the theoretical position advocated in the present thesis. It seems
that subjects are capable of apprehending- a group of distances and
not just a single one. It also appears that this information can
then be used to guiae behaviour with considerable accuracy as
compared with the corresponding accuracy obtained in the visual
condition.
It appears, however, that this ability to apprehend distance
does not generalise to the ability to re-orient the body directionally.
When subjects are asked to do this, the performance after the first
turn is very low. It appears that these errors may have a perceptual
component responsible for them, though the precise nature of the
perceptual error is unclear. Novel experimentation would be required
to answer this problem satisfactorily.
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EXPERIMENT 4
CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION IN A CLUTTERED ENVIRONMENT II
Introduction
The results of Experiment 3 seemed to suggest that subj ects have
the ability to take at least four obstacles into account when formu¬
lating a program for action. This result was somewhat confused,
however, owing to the fact that subjects were asked to walk through
a layout of obstacles demanding major re-orientations of the body
at each one. This re-orienting proved difficult and the source
of the error in the resulting performance was somewhat unclear. For
this reason, a further experiment was conducted which bore a close
resemblance to Experiment 3 but where distance and angles as sources
of error were separated as far as possible. This was done simply by
eliminating the major directional re-orientations made in Experiment 3
so that the task involved mainly distance judgments. Of course, the
circumvention of obstacles always entails some form of angular adjust¬
ment, but in the present experiment these adjustments were minimised.
The hypothesis which Experiment 4 was designed to test may therefore
be stated as follows: when a subject is asked to circumvent a group
of obstacles in the path of locomotion, so long as no major directional
re-orientations of the body are necessary at each obstacle, the subjects'
performance when vision is excluded will closely mirror that obtained
when vision is continuously and freely available. Experiment 4 was
designed to test this hypothesis.
Method
Design
The design of Experiment 4 followed rather closely the design of
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Experiment 3. The experiment was. conducted in the same large lecture-
theatre in a free space measuring approximately 14 x 9 metres. A partial
grid was laid out on the floor and two layouts of obstacles were placed
within it. The distances between the obstacles were exactly the same
as those the subjects had to walk in the different legs of Experiment 3
so that, in terms of distance, the two experiments were equivalent.
However, in Experiment 4 the obstacles were not laid out so that the
subjects would have to re-orient the body axis in order to reach the
next obstacle. Instead, the obstacles were laid out in a straight line.
In this way, the angular re-orientations necessary at each obstacle in
Experiment 3 were eliminated. Of course, subjects still have to turn
through an angle at each obstacle, but perceptually these lie along a
straight line and there are therefore no angles to be discerned for
performance to be successful. It is also unnecessary for subjects to
alter the general orientation of the body axis throughout the present
trials. In this sense, angular deviations are eliminated in the present
study. The general layout of the experiment is shown in Figure 4.1
In all other respects, the design of Experiment 4 was the same as
in Experiment 3.
Procedure
The Procedure in Experiment 4 was exactly as in Experiment 3.
Subj ects
Nine subjects took part in Experiment 4, 5 male and 4 female.
Eight of the subjects were students at Edinburgh University, the ninth
was a medical technician. The subjects were aged between 18 and 25 and
























The method of transcribing data was exactly as employed in
Experiment 3. For a description, see the results section of that
Experiment.
Analysis of Results
As in Experiment 3, we can obtain a rough indication of subjects*
success in each condition simply by calculating the percentage of
circumventions at each obstacle. The results of such an analysis are
shown in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1




Visual 100 100 100 100
Non-Visual 100 99 92 93
It can immediately be seen that the success ratio in Experiment
4 is markedly higher than in Experiment 3. As in Experiment 3, how¬
ever, this analysis offers only a rough account of performance. It is
obvious that errors made at a given obstacle may well lead to errors at
subsequent obstacles, thereby over-estimating the "real" error; though
in this case we could claim that a "true" estimate of performance
would only be higher than that which has already been seen in Table 4.1.
However, circumvention of an obstacle does not in itself imply adequate
or good performance. Adequacy must be more closely related to per¬
formance under the control condition of normal visual guidance.
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A more detailed analysis of the results is possible if the method¬
ology employed in Experiment 3 is followed. It will be remembered that
in that experiment, the subject's essential task was to walk through a
certain set of distances linked by a certain set of angles. It seems that
a similar definition of the task can be employed here,also. The only
difference concerns the angles to be turned through. In the earlier
experiment, these forced subjects to make major re-orientations of the
body axis after each obstacle. In the present case, the angles do not
involve such major re-orientations. Nevertheless, some form of angular
deviation is necessary. The task can therefore be described as essentially
the same in both cases.
The best way of deciding whether or not performance in the non-
visual condition is adequate is to adopt the procedure followed in
Experiment 3 and compare the distances and angles produced in the two
conditions. The method by which this was done has already been
described and need not be reiterated here. Table 4.2 shows the mean
distances walked by subjects in each leg in each condition, and Table 4.3
shows the mean angles turned through at each obstacle. It can im¬
mediately be seen that the differences between the distances in the two
conditions are small, though there is a tendency for these to be some¬
what larger in the non-visual condition. Table 4.3 shows a similar
result for the angles. A statistical analysis was conducted and
confirms that the differences between both distances and angles ,
excepting three cases, are insignificant. Performance in the two
conditions seems to be roughly equal. The results of the statistical
analyses are shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. The mean pathways followed
in the two conditions are shown in Fig. 4.2.
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TABLB 4.4
t and F Values from Comparisons of Distances Walked
in Each Leg in the Two Conditions
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4
t F t F t F t F
Leg a 2.00 1.67 0.40 4.00 2.50 1.52 0.70 1.51
b
0
2.64 1.02 2.14 2.80 1.23 1.39 2.44 1.87
c 2.29 2.21 1.73 1.61 2.18 1.11 0.92 3.22*
d 1.35 1.39 2.48 1.25
*<
5.75 1.62 0.85 2.11
TABLE 4.5
t and F' Values from Comparisons of Angl es Turned
Through at Each Obstacle in the Two Conditions
Track 1 Track 2 Track 3 Track 4
Angle t F t F t F t F
a 2.65 1.37 2.37 1.22 2.54 1.14 2.63 3.03
b 2.32 1.16 2.36 1.52 2.29 1.11 2.27 1.55
c 1.99 1.21 1.95 1.47 2.67 2.12 0.24 5.97*
*
p < .001
all other cells insignificant
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FIG. U , 2 Mean paths followed in eac h condit ion.
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In Table 4.1 we saw that in only a very few cases did subjects
fail to circumvent an obstacle, a finding in agreement with the
results of the main analysis shown on Fig. 4.2 When the response
profiles are examined,individually, it is found that the errors
obtained fall into the same kind of categories as in Experiment 3.
The total number of errors made was 14. Six of these were due to
angular errors, 4 to distance errors, 3 to a combination of distance
and angle errors and 1 was due solely to an error at the previous
obstacle. Angular errors were therefore involved in nine cases and
distance errors in seven cases. Examples of the different types of
errors are shown in Fig. 4.3. The analysis of the individual errors
was accomplished by means of the same method as was employed in
Experiment 3.
Discussion
The-purpose of Experiment 4 was principally to back up the results
of Experiment 3, which argued that subjects have the ability to find
their way around a series of obstacles when vision is excluded during the
course of the act. In Experiment 3, it appeared that subjects could
estimate the distances rather well, but their overall performance did
not reflect this completely clearly because large errors accrued to
the angular re-orientations of the body which were demanded in that
experiment. In Experiment 4, the large-scale re-orientations were
eliminated by placing all the obstacles to be overcome in a straight
line. This also eliminated the need for a capacity to discriminate the
angles to be turned through, which was suggested might be the funda¬
mental cause of the angular errors obtained in Experiment 3. In this





















The results of Table 4.1 suggest that subjects can indeed judge
the distances involved to a high degree of accuracy. In no case was
an obstacle circumvented less than 92% of the time. Furthermore, when
a more detailed analysis is made of the distances and angular turns
taken by subjects, it is clear that performance in the two conditions
is very similar. These findings strongly suggest that subjects are
indeed as capable of apprehending the distances of four obstacles as
they are of apprehending one, and that on the basis of this a performance
can be achieved which is as good as would be achieved when vision is
continuously available. The results of Experiment 4 therefore strongly
confirm the predictions.
One possibility which must be taken into account is that subjects
might be setting up a program to take them round the first obstacle only,
and then simply repeating this program at each subsequent obstacle. This
argument would claim that the distance of only one obstacle (the first)
is apprehended, and that success at the subsequent obstacles is an
artefact. In fact, such a possibility was considered while both
Experiments 3 and 4 were being designed, and the distances separating
the obstacles were chossi specifically to exclude spurious "abilities"
of this sort. This is particularly noticeable on tracks 2 and 4, where
two of the obstacles are much closer together than the other two.
However, it might be argued that an artificial strategy of the kind
described above might produce successful circumventions at some
obstacles. That subjects are not operating by means of such strategies
can be seen quite readily, however, from Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both the
mean distances and the mean angles differ substantially at the different
obstacles, yet show consistency with other trials at the same distance
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even when these are made by other Subjects. The fact that these vary
consistently according to the obstacle in question suggests that
subjects are not repeating a single set program at each of the
ohstacles in the series. It appears that subjects' responses are fitted
to the series of obstacles as a whole.
An interesting finding which should be considered is the percentage
of errors which are attributable to distance and angular misjudgements
in the two experiments. In Experiment 3 only 20% of the errors made
involved distance misjudgments. In contrast, 54% of the errors made in
Experiment 4 involved distance errors. Again, this fits well with the
hypothesis that the main source of error in Experiment 3 was the
angular re-orientations which subjects had to make. In Experiment 4
where such re-orientations are less complex it would be expected that
errors, where they occur, would be more likely to be caused by distance
misjudgments. The fact that this is what was found adds further weight
to the claim that it was indeed the angles that caused the errors in
Experiment 3. It should also be remembered that a small number of
angular errors occurred in the visiual condition of Experiment 3. This
again supports the notion that angular re-orientations are difficult and
constitute a strong source of error.
One final point may be made. In Experiment 3, we said that per¬
formance was good except for the angular errors. However, this may be,
the results of that experiment indicated that it would be an unwise
strategy to attempt to circumvent such a layout of obstacles in the
real world in the absence of vision during execution of the act. Under
the conditions of Experiment 4, however, where the task is less complex,
such a strategy becomes markedly more feasible. On only a small number
of occasions is collision likely to ensue. Of course, this does not
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mean that vision can be completely excluded oncsuch occasions; but it
does allow the possibilities of diverting vision to other tasks, with
the role of vision in control being temporarily minimised. It appears
that under the conditions of Experiment 3 this cannot be done with the
same degree of surety. When major re-orientations of the direction of
locomotion are necessary, it appears that visual information must be
obtained and used.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 4, then, do seem to confirm the experimental
predictions. It seems that subjects do indeed have the ability to program
a group of four distances with as much accuracy as they can program a
single distance, and that such a program can be executed as well as when
vision is available. The limitations of such an ability are as yet un¬
known. We cannot place a limit on the number of obstacles which can be
taken into account in the formulation of the program, nor can we be
sure of the range of distances over which they can be executed, though
obviously the result of Experiment 2 has an over-riding bearing on this
last question. These are problems which must be faced in future
experiments. But that subjects do have the ability to circumvent a
group of obstacles placed in the path of locomotion when vision is




PROGRAMMING AND VISUAL CONTROL IN NATURAL BEHAVIOUR;
AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDY
Introduction
Up until this point the experiments which have been conducted have
involved a degree of artificial manipulation of normal conditions to
produce the effects observed: though a primary consideration throughout
has been to keep the conditions as natural as possible and to avoid any
form of manipulation which was not essential. A great advance, however,
would be to demonstrate that the effects obtained under experimental
conditions can also be obtained under natural conditions in the "real
world". This would be doubly desirable in the present case, as it has
been explicitly hypothesised that the abilities and strategies observed
in Experiments 1-4 are actually used in the real world, even when visual
information is continuously available and could be consulted at any
time if desired. An important problem would therefore be to demonstrate,
not only that such programming is possible as we have shown in the
preceding experiments, but also that it actually operates under normal
circumstances. Experiment 5 represents such an attempt to demonstrate
programming under normal conditions.
The ideal demonstration that programming operates in natural
behaviour would be to observe subjects performing some everyday task
and then to analyse this performance with a view to showing the hypo¬
thesised mode of operation. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult
to find totally natural behaviours which can be examined in this way.
There is, however, one large class of behaviours which can be described
as at least semi-natural which can be studied. These behaviours are to
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be found in sports. These activities are quite natural in the sense
that no manipulation is exerted on sensory input, or in the athlete*s
ability to pick up such input. Nor are any constraints put on the
athlete*s use of their motor system, though normally they are trained
to maximise its efficiency. Sporting activities can sometimes be said
to be artificial, however, in the sense that the task does not always
correspond to tasks which subjects are normally faced with in their
daily lives. However, allowing for this degree of artificiality, it
is clear that sports offer the possibilities of investigating perceptuo-
motor behaviour in a more natural form than is otherwise possible. The
study of sports also offers certain advantages to studying other forms
of behaviour, since sportsmen are normally trained to use their bodies
in the most effective manner. It would be expected from this that the
characteristic mode of operation of the perceptuo-motor system would be
more clearly seen in such subjects than in others, because the athletes
are trained to eliminate peripheral, random or unnecessary aspects of
their behaviour and in this way "purify" the act. Consequently,
whatever effects are observed in such subjects are more likely to
reflect basic features of the underlying system than would be the
case with untrained subjects. For these reasons, the study of
sporting performance seems likely to be valuable.
There ±s a number of sporting, and particularly athletic,
activities which could be studied in an effort to demonstrate the
hypothesised nature of control. A number of these will be considered
below, but the specific event selected for detailed study was the long-
jump. This event was considered especially suitable for study for a
number of reasons. Firstly, it proved much easier to obtain data from
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the long jump which could be subjected to detailed quantitative
analysis. Other events which might have proved to be reasonable
alternatives were less suitable from this point of view. The second
reason was that the long jump seemed, on grounds which we will outline
below, to be an event which was more likely than most to demand
considerable motor programming for performance to be successful on a
consistent basis. For these reasons, the long jump seemed the most
reasonable event in which to try to find evidence of the programming
strategies seen in earlier experiments.
The Long Jump
Obviously, the primary task of the long jumper is to obtain as long
a jump as possible, while at the same time making no faults. However,
we are not concerned here with the jump itself. Our concern is with
the considerable accuracy with which a skilled long-jumper can reach
the launching board. The athleters task is to get as close as possible
to the front of the board while, at the same time, never going beyond it.
This must furthermore be accomplished whilst maintaining maximum speed
from the run-up. For example, an athlete who, after a 40 metre run,
can get to within 10cm. of the front edge of the board two-thirds of
the time has an accuracy of 0.25%. The question is how such accuracy
is achieved.
Most long jump coaches stress the importance of developing a
stereotyped run-up. This run-up starts with an accelerative phase,
sometimes followed by a coasting phase, and ends with a few strides,
often referred to as the "gather", the purpose of which is to get the
athlete into a good posture for the jump while, at the same time,
maintaining speed. Coaches usually regard the run-up as a completely
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pre-determined act which is executed independently of visual information
during the course of the act, and further argue that this is a desirable
situation on the grounds that the process of picking up visual information
and initiating adjustments to the stride pattern on the basis of it
could only reduce fluency and hence the effectiveness of the run-up. The
run-up in their view then, consists of an entirely pre-determined series
of motor actions, run off open-loop with no attention paid to visual
information during the course of the act.
That the run-up to the long jump is executed in precisely this way
seems unlikely, however. It seems indisputable that error is bound
to creep.in to the program is executed because of varying internal and
external conditions. Considering the accuracy which the athletes are
required to achieve, it seems unlikely that very much variation could
be tolerated before performance would deteriorate below the level of
acceptability. For this reason, it seems certain that the athletes
do use visual information to control performance. If this is so, there
are three fundamental questions we can ask;
(1) What is the form of an athlete's pre-determined
run up for the long jump?
(2) When, if at all, during the run-up does an athlete use
visual information about the distance from the board to make
adjustments to the remaining studies?
/
(3) What type of adjustments are made?
From the results of our earlier experiments, it is possible for
us to make certain predictions about the answers which we will find to
these questions. It will be remembered from Experiments 1 and 2 that
subjects were able to control their behaviour over distances up to ten
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metres when vision was excluded during the execution of the act. This
was taken to imply that the subjects were able to appreciate in motor
terms their distance from the target when the distances involved were
of this order but not when they were longer. It might be hypothesised,
then, in the case of the long jump, that no adjustments on the basis
of visualinformation could be made until the subject is within the
distance range of approximately ten metres. At this point, however,
we should expect considerable adjustments to be observable as the
athlete identifies his relationship to the board and attempts to
correct the error which has crept in. From the results of our
earlier experiments, we would predict that the athlete would use
the information now available to him to formulate a prggram to get
him to the take-off board with as much accuracy as possible. Experi¬




Three athletes were filmed during normal training sessions at
Meadowbank Stadium, Edinburgh, where the Tartan long jump track runs
along the foot of the stand. A 16mm movie camera was mounted at the
back of the stand, about 30m from the track, and was panned' to
follow the athlete down the track. The films were shot through a
telephoto lens of 50mm focal length at 48 frames per second, with
a 1/300 sec. shutter speed.
To record the positions on the track of athlete's footfalls,
hence giving information about stride length, measuring strips were
placed down the two sides of the track. These marker strips were
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painted black, with white stripes at 10cm. intervals and. larger
stripes at 1.00m. intervals. The positioning of the athlete's
footfalls could then be measured from single frames of the film by-
lining the athlete's toe with the corresponding points on the two
marker strips. This method was effective in controlling the influence
of linear perspective which was apparent as the camera was panned
round. A simple test showed the accuracy of the method of measurement.
Shoes were placed on the track at irregular intervals and their position
carefully measured. Later, their positions were measured by experimenters
who were unaware of the results of this measurement from the films. The
results of this test showed that the measurement from the film was
accurate to about one centimetre.
The duration of a stride was estimated by counting the number of
frames between successive footfalls and multiplying by the mean time
interval between frames, as determined by a calibration check on the
camera. The accuracy of measurement of the stride duration was about
7%.
The Athletes
Three athletes took part in the study; Myra Nimmo, a 22 year
old British International long jumper of Olympic standard, whose
best jump was 6.54m; Valerie White, a 19 year old Scottish Inter¬
national long jumper, whose best jump was 6.03m; and Fiona Macaulay,
an 18 year old Scottish International 100m. hurdler and good club long
jumper, whose best jump was 5.78m.
Each athlete was filmed during two training sessions a week or
more apart. A session consisted of either six jumps or six run-throughs.
Each athlete used a standing start from a measured mark and jumped from
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her right foot. None used any check marks down the track. Myra
started about 40.00m. from the board and used a 21-stride run,
which she reported to be eight strides "drive", eight strides
"coast" and five strides "gather". Valerie used an 18-stride run
starting at about 32.10m. and Fiona a 19-stride run starting at
about 34.40m. Myra and Val used a hitch-hang technique, Fiona a
hang technique.
While each athlete had developed a consistent run-up, their
coaches had not observed any sign of them making visual adjustments
to their strides when approaching the board. Indeed, their coaches
were somewhat sceptical about the possibility that they were making
adjustments, as were the athletes themselves.
Results
The Acceleration Phase of the Run
The mean stride patterns for each subject are shown in Fig. 5.1.
The strides are numbered backwards from the board; for example,
stride number 1 is the final stride to the board, number 2 is the
penultimate stride and so on. In this system, the board is represented
by 0. The points in Fig. 5.1 represent the mean stride lengths over
six runs, the vertical bars the standard deviations of the stride
lengths. Data was not obtained on Myra's first two strides.
It can be seen that during the accelerative phase of the run, up
to about six strides from the board, the stride lengths were reasonably
consistent across runs and progressively increased down the track,
except for Myra who levelled off after stride 10, during her planned
"coasting" phase. Furthermore, each athlete maintained a fairly
constant tempo; about 4.1 strides per second for Myra and Valerie
and 4.4 for Fiona.
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FIG, 5 ,1 Mean stride lengths for each subject,
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These results, then, are indicative of the pre-determined
program which the athletes are trained to develop during their career.
This program is obviously designed to take account of the accelerative
phase of the run by systematically increasing stride length at a constant
tempo. The best estimate of the stride pattern of this program is given
by the mean stride lengths shown in Fig. 5.1. The theoretical curves
which have been added to the figure show how the stride pattern might
have been generated. They correspond to an athlete exerting a constant
effort against a force that increases with the athlete*s speed, as
muscle resistance apparently does. It can be seen that the curves fit
the data points of the accelerative phase of the run rather well. It
is clear, however, that the final strides do not conform to this
pattern.
Visual Adjustments to the Strides
Though the stride lengths during the accelerative phase were
reasonably consistent across runs, they were not perfectly so. As
was predicted, a fair degree of error occurred during the execution
of the program. It appears that this had a cumulative effect on foot¬
fall position down the track.
Figure 5.2 shows how the athlete's footfalls tended to deviate
more and more from their mean as she moved down the track. It can be
clearly seen that the variance builds up until the last few paces from
the board where it suddenly began to -deteriorate- and the footfalls
converge on the board. For example, in her six jumps, the position of
Myra's footfall 4 varied considerably with a standard deviation of
40cm., while at the board the standard deviation was only 8cm.
The curves of Fig. 5.2 are summarised in Fig. 5.3 which shows the
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standard deviations of footfall position down the track for each
athlete and each session. In all cases, the standard deviation
increased down the track until the athlete was a few strides from the
board, when it rapidly decreased.
There seems to be only one explanation for this sudden decrease
in the variance of foot position: the athletes were visually adjusting
their final strides to zero-in on the board. This explanation has
further evidence in support of it. Correlations were calculated
between each stride length and the distances of preceding footfalls
from the take-off board. The correlations were high and positive only
for the last few strides. In other words, the lengths of the last
few strides were highly correlated with the distance to the board,
whereas the preceding stride lengths were independent of the distance.
This finding, then, also supports the argument that the athletes were
adjusting the pace lengths on the basis of visual information during
the last few strides, but not at any of the earlier ones.
The visually-adjusted strides, as evidenced by the correlational
analysis, are shown in Fig. 5.1. The number printed over each stride
is an estimate of the percentage of the total adjustment which was made
on that stride. These percentages were derived from linear regressional
analyses of the length of each adjustment stride on the total length of
the adjustment strides.
Myra, in her six jumps of which three were no-jumps, appears to
have started her gather for the jump with stride 6, which was slightly
longer on average than the preceding strides. The stride pattern of
her gather became most pronounced as she approached the board, taking
the form of alternating longer and shorter strides. This holds for
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each of her jumps as shown in Fig. 5.4. The pattern over these final
strides looks like a kind of rehearsal for the jump, taking the formj
long, short, long, short, long, this final "stride" being the jump.
Visual adjustment seems to take place over the last three strides with
about 50% of the total adjustment being made on the final stride, which
varied considerably in length from 1.81m. to 2.23m. with a mean of
1.99 and a standard deviation of 16cm.
Her gather pattern did not emerge in her six run-throughs, however,
of which two were "no-jumps". In fact, no consistent pattern was
evident (see Figure 5.4). She visually adjusted over the last two
strides, as compared with the last three in her jumps, with about 85%
of the total adjustment being made on the last stride, which again
varied considerably in length from 1.92m. to 2.40m, with a mean of
2.18m. and a standard deviation of 19cm. (It should be mentioned
that she was recovering from a left foot injury at the time of her
run-throughs, but it is unlikely this had much bearing on the different
gather and adjustment patterns she showed).
Valerie, in her six jumps, of which one was a no-jump, appears to
have started her gather with a shorter stride 6 followed by steadily
increasing strides up to the final shorter one to the board. She
visually adjusted on strides 3 and 2, but kept her final stride more or
less constant (mean 1.99m., standard deviation 5cm.). While her gather
pattern was somewhat similar in her six run-throughs, of which five were
"no-jumps", there was one important difference. In the run-throughs
she visually adjusted over all the last three strides and particularly
the final one, on which 65% of the total adjustment was made and which
varied considerably in length from 1.82m. to 2.18m. with a mean of
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2.03m. and a standard deviation of 13cm. The pattern of her run-
throughs, with the greatly increased share of the adjustments
loaded on to the last stride, is in clear accord with Myra*s.
Fiona showed a similar gather pattern to Myra in her two six-
jumps sessions which involved four and one no-jumps respectively. The
pattern was a longer stride 4, a shorter stride 3, a longer stride 2,
and a much shorter final stride. In her first session, she visually
adjusted over the last three strides about equally. However, in her
second session she adjusted over the last two strides only, with about
the same percentage of the adjustment on the final stride as in the
first session.
This difference between the sessions is interesting. It is
probably related to the fact that the peak standard deviation of footfall
position in the first session was about twice that in the second. This
difference seems to have been due mainly to the higher variability in the
starting position in the first session (see Figure 5.3). In other
words, her positional errors when approaching the board were on average
greater in the first session. It is therefore likely that she was able to
detect her error further from the board and so adjust her strides earlier.
From these results, then, it seems that all three athletes begin
their run-up with an accelerative phase which is largely pre-determined
and which seems to be run off independently of visual information about
the distance of the take-off board. At about 6 paces out, they begin
a "gather" phase in preparation for the jump and this is seen in the
changed characteristics of the stride pattern at this point (see Fig. 5.1).
Although it might be concluded from this that visual adjusting is already
taking place, this does not seem to be the case. According to the
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correlational analyses, visual adjustments take place over 'the final
three paces only, though the preparation of these paces (certainly
pace 3 itself) would have to take place somewhat earlier. It is
possible that the "gather" phase represente the formulation point for
these final strides.
Discussion
At the beginning of this study, we stated that its major purpose
was to show in behaviour which was as natural and unmanipulated as
possible, the basic strategies which were seen in Experiments 1-4 and
which we claimed operated in all normal behaviour. In particular we
wished if possible to show:
(1) that visual information about distance from the launching-
board can only be used to adjust the athlete's stride-
pattern at distances of approximately 10 metres or less.
(2) that this information is used to formulate a program to
bring the athlete onto the launching-board.
The results of Experiment 5 seem to have some bearing on these
questions. With regard to the first question, it does indeed seem that
information can only be used at fairly near distances. We saw in Figs.
5.1 and 5.3 that the stride patterns of the three athletes remain
reasonably consistent up until the last six paces or so, where the
characteristics of the pattern change. It can be seen from Fig. 5.1
that six paces represent a distance of approximately 12 metres from the
launching board for all three athletes. This, then would be in fairly
good agreement with the results of preceding experiments.
However, we cannot accept that simply because the characteristics
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of the stride-pattern change at 6 strides out, this represents the
point at which visual information begins to be used. We saw from the
correlational analyses that visual adjustments seem to be made only to
the last three strides, with the largest part of the adjustments
coming on the penultimate - and in the case of Myra - the ultimate
stride. This finding would suggest that adjustments are made over the
last 6 metres or so. Although this is less than the 10 metre limit we
find in Experiment 1, it is consistent with the first hypothesis
formulated, namely that the possibilities of visual adjustment are
restricted to distances fairly close to the take-off board. It
should be clear, however, that the decisions about the lengths of these
strides would have to be taken at least one stride in advance. This
would bring the decision about stride 3 back to stride 4 at least, and
therefore to a distance of approximately 8 metres. Since we find the
athletes to be running at a speed of some 4 to 4.5 strides per second,
it would seem likely that a decision would have to be formulated even
earlier than this, at perhaps 2 strides distance (.5 seconds) at least.
This might place the beginning of the formulation of visual adjustments
at 10 metres quite easily. This finding would seem to fit rather well
with the results of earlier experiments.
The second hypothesis, that the visual information once picked
up would be used to formulate an accurate program for action which could
then be run off as a whole is more difficult to demonstrate. In the
case of Valerie*s six j.umps (see Fig. 5.1) there is evidence that some
form of program was in existence at pace 3, because the largest part
of her adjustments were made on stride 2, with virtually none occurring
on stride 1. This would imply that these two strides had been planned
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in advance at a point no earlier than stride 3, or some 6 metres
from the board. It is also clear, however, that some adjustment was
made to pace 3 itself. Whether this adjustment and the subsequent
adjustment at pace 2 were planned at the same time cannot be determined,
but one might expect that if this were the case the adjustments would
be more equally shared out between the strides. On the other hand,
we saw from Fig. 5.4 that the athletes' final paces took the form of
a kind of gallop; long, short, long, short. It might be that this was
a deliberate strategy for making adjustments through the long paces
and with the preferred leg. If this were so, it might not be so
unlikely to find the adjustment load shared out unequally after all.
At any rate, there is clearly evidence from Valerie's jumps that
some form of program was determined, at least as early as three paces
out, which remained unchanged.
The results from Fiona's jumps are in rather good agreement with
those for Valerie's. Again, it can be seen that the large part of the
adjusting is done on the penultimate stride, though in Fiona's case,
a fair proportion of adjustment is carried on to the final pace. In
the case of her first jumps, however, the load is more or less equally
shared over all three strides; which does fit with the programming
argument. The effect is not obtained on her second session, however.
In Myra's case, the largest adjustment is not made on stride 2 but on
stride 1, with only smaller adjustments occurring in the two
preceding strides. Again, we cannot be certain where the planning of
these visually adjusted strides took place.
Although it is clear from these results that some form of visual
adjustment begins to be exerted on stride 3, it is very difficult to say
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whether these strides were executed as a programmed whole, with no
further visual adjustment, or not. It certainly seems from the results
of Valerie*s six runs that a program to take her through the last 2 paces
at least had been planned, but in other cases it is more difficult to be
sure. We must also bear in mind that a program could be formulated which
was subsequently seen to be inaccurate, and a final desperate attempt
made to change it at the last stride. Something of this kind might be
evidenced by comparing the success of the different jumps but these
were not measured and this kind of analysis cannot be made.
Something must now be said about the discrepancies between the
jumps and run-throughs. The aim of a run-through is, of course,
literally to run through the program for the approach to the board,
both to practise executing the program and to enable adjustments to be
made to the starting position to suit the conditions. We have already
seen that neither Valerie nor Myra*s run-throughs completely fulfilled
this aim; the gather and adjustment patterns were substantially
different from the jumps (see Fig. 5.1). An important question was why
this should be. One possibility which fits quite well with the current
arguments, is that the jump forms as integral part of the final phase
of the run-up. Indeed, from the theoretical arguments put forward
here it would have to be. But in a run-through this final part of the
program is missing. It should surely not be surprising, then, to find
that the final part of a run-through is different from the form of a
full jump when a substantial portion of the normal program is missing.
To re-create a part-program must be very difficult indeed.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 5 seem to offer some fairly convincing
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evidence in favour of the experiments reported earlier. The limited
range over which it seems to be possible to make visual adjustments
fits well with the findings reported earlier, showing that adjustments
are apparently made over distances of some 6 metres (the final 3 paces).
Since these paces (or pace 3 at least), would have to have been planned
somewhat earlier, it seems quite reasonable that visual adjustments were
first initiated at 8 or even ten metres. Obviously, this fits quite
well with earlier results.
Whether the visually adjusted strides were planned as a whole and
then executed as such is much more difficult to say. The only way
this could really be tested would be to ask the athletes to close their
eyes for the last three strides and note the resulting performance.
The present study having been purely observational, this question
cannot really be answered. It seemed that Valerie in her six jumps
had programmed the last two strides at least, as a whole, but we
cannot draw any firm conclusions about the other subjects. However,
since the final pace alone would have to be planned one pace in advance
(i.e. at pace 2), then programming over a distance of 4 metres at the
end of the run-up would have been necessary, at least. Some form
of programming on the basis of visual information must therefore have
taken place.
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SSMMABY AND GENERAL CCMCLPSICNS ON PART II
In Part I of this thesis a theoretical position was taken in
which it was argued that organisms do not guide their behaviour
relative to the environment on the basis of current information
available at the receptor, but on the basis of previously-acquired
information. According to this argument, information available at
the eye is sampled only intermittently and this intermittently-
acquired information is used to formulate programs for action. It
was argued that such programs are normally sufficiently accurate to
rule out the need for further ^sual guidance during the execution
of the program, though vision may undoubtedly be required for other
forms of control during this period (e.g. for balance control). At
any rate, the existence of programs of this sort substantially
reduces the work-load of the visual system for considerable periods.
Since it is argued that this mode of operation is natural and in
continuous use, we have argued that programming is the main activity
for which the visual system is used. Otherwise, so far as guidance
is concerned, the task of vision is to be responsive to unforeseen
circumstances, or to engage in activities other than the guidance
of activity.
If the arguments on the programming strategy, and on the accuracy
of the programs, is correct, it should be relatively easy to obtain
evidence in support of them. The purpose of the five experiments
reported in Part II was to do exactly this; to provide a body of
evidence demonstrating that behaviour can indeed be controlled
accurately on the basis of previously-acquired information.
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In Experiment 1 an attempt was made to show the accuracy with
which behaviour could be controlled on the basis of previously-
acquired information in the simplest possible situation, where the
subject has to locate a single target placed at a distance. In
Experiment 2, that ability, which seemed well-supported by the
results of the first experiment, was found to be limited to dis¬
tances of 10m. and under, with a dramatic threshold in ability
occurring somewhere between 10m. and 12m. and with error over all
subsequent distances tested (i.e. up to 21m.) remaining consistently
high. In Experiments 3 and 4, programming ability was examined in
more complicated situations where a group of "targets" had to be
negotiated, and in the case of Experiment 3, where a number of
re-orientations of the body were also required. The results of
Experiment 4 indicated that subjects were indeed as capable of
negotiating a group of (in this case, 4) targets as of negotiating
one. In Experiment 3 it was found that subjects were not capable of
successfully programming a series of directional manoeuvres, though
the distance estimations made in this experiment were in complete
agreement with the results of Experiment 4. In Experiment 5, an
attempt was made, in a purely observational study, to show programming
in operation in natural behaviour, or in behaviour which was as near to
natural as we felt it possible to get. The evidence of this study also
proved consistent with the results of the more experimental studies,
vie. re-
though the data was less clear on some counts, as could only be expected
with a study of this kind. In general, however, these studies all
seemed highly supportive of the theoretical position adopted in Part I.
There is a number of matters arising from these experiments which
now require discussing. A first priority in this respect must go to
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the threshold obtained in Experiment 2. Obviously, we would like to
know what is responsible for the limitation, and indeed, we might
expect to gain some further insight into the system through such an
investigation. However, since this matter is taken up at length in
Part III, it need not be considered at greater length at this stage.
Experiments 3 and 4 raise a number of questions which were not
dealt with in more experiments themselves. In both these studies,
for example, we found that subjects were capable of negotiating
four obstacles so far as the distance dimension was concerned. One
question arising from this, however, is how many such obstacles could
be negotiated. Clearly, the number cannot be infinite. What kind of
restrictions are there on the numbers which can be effectively
negotiated, and what sort of errors arise when this number is exceeded?
These questions might well prove to have interesting outcomes. Simi¬
larly, we might ask what would happen if were to use groups of
obstacles which varied substantially in size. The distances between
the obstacles could be varied in many ways, for example, by grouping
them close together at a distance from the subject, or by distributing
them in small groups with larger spaces between. Again, we might ask
what kind of results could be expected under these conditions.
Another possibility would be to vary the behaviour required in relation
to the obstacles, for instance, by asking the subjects to jump over
the obstacles instead of circumventing them. This last possibility is
in fact attacked in one way in experiments reported below where
subjects are asked to run to targets instead of walking, but the
behavioural variations that are possible are much more extensive than
this. All these variations to the situations employed in Experiments
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3 and 4 could be carried out, then, and it is possible that some of
them might turn up interesting results. However, it was felt that
the purpose of this series of experiments, and of this thesis as a
whole, should not be to follow up every possible avenue of research,
but rather to concentrate on establishing broad principles which
could then be examined in finer detail at a later stage. It was felt
that the experiments reported were successful in establishing the
basic principle towards which they addressed themselves; namely that the
subjects* abilities were not limited to single targets, but that groups
of reasonable size could be negotiated as well. It was therefore felt
unnecessary to include further experiments of the type noted above in
the present program of research. However, in those areas where a
variation was considered to have a direct theoretical relevance to
the theoretical position advocated, that variation was examined. It
will be seen in Part III that some such variations to the conditions
in Part II have been employed.
In Experiment 5, we attempted to show programming in operation in
a more natural setting than we had employed up till then. That attempt
was fairly successful, showing, as it did, behaviour patterns which
were consistent with the arguments advocated on the nature of control.
It seems likely, however, that a certain degree of manipulation of the
situation might prove useful. For example, we were unable to say with
certainty whether or not the usually-adjusted strides were planned and
executed as a whole. One simple way of determining whether or not they
were, would be simply to ask the athlete to close his eyes at the last
three paces, and examine the resulting stride pattern. Other variations
could also be attempted to elucidate the nature of the control. It
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seems as if a mixture of natural conditions with experimental
manipulations of this sort might prove very valuable.
There are many other sporting events where locomotor programming
strategies should be necessary. One obvious example is the triple
jump, which is very similar to the long jump from our point of view.
However, the task for the triple jumper, once he has hit the take-
Wop
off board, is not to jump but to step. Because of this difference,
we might find interesting differences in the form of the visually-
adjusted strides preceding the step. We should note in this respect
the differences obtained between a full jump and a run-through in the
long jump study.
Other events which could be investigated in this way are the pole-
vault and the high jump. Similar problems are faced by the bowler,
particularly the fast bowler, who takes a long run, in cricket. One
very good event for study is the steeplechase. In this event, fences
are placed at distances of approximately 300m round the track, and one
water-jump is always included. In such a long and tiring event, the
runners* task is to keep his rythm as smooth as possible: the
athletes cannot afford to have to strain to overcome a fence. For
this reason, the approach to the board must be regularised in advance,
and adjustments made at some distance from the fence are often quite
visible. The advantage of this event over the long-jump is that the
athletes do not have a set number of strides to fit into the run-up:
the approach to the fence is more fluid than this. To this extent
also, it is more natural. The examination of such an event should
therefore be interesting. It did not prove possible to examine this
event at the present time, unfortunately, partly because of methodo¬
logical difficulties, and also because no steeplechasers were available
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at the time. But this event may well prove a valuable subject for
future study. One final series of events where programming should be
evident is swimming events. The swimmers must always know at some
point in advance where the edge of the pool lies so that they can make
their turn as swiftly as possible; they cannot afford to look at the end
of each stroke. Here too, then, we might expect to find evidence of
programming.
With a view to examining these possibilities, a number of athletic
training films was obtained of all the events noted above. These films
consisted mainly of Olympic and European Championship events with a
few simpler training films. These were examined carefully for any
evidence of the effects under consideration. In a number of cases,
the results were highly encouraging. This was particularly true of the
steeplechase where, as we noted above, there was a good number of visible
adjustments. This held also for the swimmers, though most clearly for
the crawl and backstroke events, where checks on the distance to the
edge are more evident. There seemed to be a tendency for the swimmers
to check at some strokes out, though this was not always evident. The
quality of the films sometimes precluded accurate estimations. Even
in the long jump and triple jump events, where visual adjusting, as we
have seen, is not easy to demonstrate to the naked eye, was occasionally
visible even in the performance of athletes like Ralph Boston, one of the
greatest long jumpers of all times. It was these findings which
initially encouraged us to do the more thorough investigation reported
in Experiment 5. But it should be clear that the study of other
athletic and sporting events is likely to prove highly valuable in the
future.
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From the results reported in the five experiments of Part II,
then, it seems we can claim to have quite satisfactory evidence of
the adequacy of control when this is achieved on the basis of
previously-acquired information, with no current information being
allowed to influence control. We now require to go beyond this
outline, however, and indicate in greater depth than we have done
up till now, how this guidance is achieved. To do this is the
problem of Part III of this thesis.
PART III
THE MECHANISM UNDERLYING INTERMITTENT CONTROL
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INTRODUCTION
In Part II an attempt was made to demonstrate that subjects have
the ability to control their behaviour on the basis of intermittently-
acquired information. In Part III, our concern is to try to under¬
stand how this kind of control is achieved. It was argued in Part I
that distances are perceived in terms of motor actions, and this would
suggest that control is achieved on the basis of a series of such
formulated motor actions. However, as we shall see, this does not
provide a complete picture of the skill. The process appears to be
more complicated that this.
Perhaps the best place to start such an investigation of the
mechanism underlining the ability reported in Part II would be with
the threshold in ability obtained in Experiment 2. The result of that
experiment is reproduced in Fig. IV. As can be seen, the accuracy of
the orientations breaks down suddenly and dramatically at 12m, the
high degree of error obtained at that distance being carried forward
to all subsequent distances tested. It seems not unreasonable that if
we could understand what is responsible for this breakdown in ability,
we might correspondingly gain some insight into the nature of the
system.
There seem to be three potential explanations of the break-down
which are immediately obvious.
(1) It may be that some critical element of perceptual
information ceases to be available at distances of more than
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(2) It is possible that the trace of the information acquired,
whatever form that information takes, is subject to decay-
over time. This would mean that, by the time the subject
has reached the vicinity of 12m. the trace has faded to
such an extent that it can no longer be used to control
the behaviour. The fact that the threshold in Experiment 2
was so sharp would suggest that decay has relatively little
effect until some vital information is lost, at which point
the possibilities of further guidance are lost.
(3) It is possible that the system is subject to "limited
programming capacity". This would mean that the system
is capable of holding a certain amount of programmed
action, or of information in some other form, but that
beyond this no further information can be stored.
Possibility number 3 may immediately be seen as rather unlikely.
We argued in Part I that distances are apprehended in terms of motor
actions. In the case of locomotion, the units of motor activity
in terms of which distance could be perceived, would most likely be
some form of pace or stride. In this way a target might be perceived
as lying six paces away. (The perception might be in terms of some
other motor unit, but this will not affect the present argument). It
seems highly unlikely, however, that a program for walking one pace
could be considered more complex, from a storage point of view, than
a program for walking n paces. No difficulty can arise so long as n
is known. Of course, it might be that subjects are not capable of
appreciating beyond a certain point, the number of motor units required
to reach that point, but then this has become a case of possibility
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number 1, namely a problem of perceptual rather than storage or program¬
ming error. It certainly seems plausible that an error of this sort
might exist, though it would seem more likely in this case that error
would increase more gradually as the subj ect reaches a field of
uncertainty about the distance, culminating in a high, consistent
level of error.
Possibility number 2, that the error is due to fading of the
trace of the information stored, irrespective of the form that
information takes, is also plausible. Again, the fact that a dramatic
threshold is obtained would suggest that there comes a point when some
vital information is lost, with performance correspondingly falling at
that point. Since possibilities 2 (temporal decay) and 1 (perceptual
error) seemed the more plausible alternatives at this stage, it was
decided to begin the analysis by examining them. It was also decided
that the more appropriate of the two to begin with was the possibility
of temporal decay. This was, firstly, because it seemed the simpler
of the two problems to investigate, and secondly, because, as we shall
see, the results of a temporal experiment are capable of ruling out
perceptual error as an explanation altogether. For these reasons,
the hypothesis of temporal decay was attacked first.
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EXPERIMENT 6
TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS IN THE ABILITY TO CONTROL BEHAVIOUR
IN THE ABSENCE OF VISION I
Introduction
If the threshold of Experiment 2 was caused by some form of
temporal decay of internalised information, there are two simple
methods by which the role of decay could be determined. These are
examined in Experiments 6 and 7 respectively. The first method,
adopted in Experiment 6, is to artificially manipulate the
experimental conditions under which Experiment 2 was conducted in
■j
such a way as to force subj ects to take the same time to reach
targets at distances of, say, 9m. or 6m. as was originally taken to
reach 12m. This would involve manipulating the time elapsing between
the point at which vision is excluded and the point at which the target
is reached in such a way that the total time taken to reach the
shorter distances now equals or exceeds the time taken to reach the
threshold distance in Experiment 2. If the threshold had been due to
temporal factors, then by manipulating time in this way it should be
possible to bring the threshold down from 12m. to 9m. and further.
The extent to which the threshold obtained at these distances reflects
the thresholds obtained at 12m. would then give a measure of the effect
of temporal factors. This question is therefore examined in Experiment 6.
Method
Design
The general design of Experiment 3 closely followed that of
Experiments 1 and 2. Four locomotor distances were chosen at 3, 6, 9
and 12 metres. These distances were chosen as the 3 "high-performance"
distances of Experiment 2, together with the threshold distance. The
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locomotor pathways were laid out in the car park as in Experiment 2.
The target positions were indicated by a wooden marker which was
placed on the left-hand side of the subject's path. As in the previous
experiments, echo location and other forms of auditory cue were
controlled by the use of white noise which was played to subjects
throughout the experimental session. This was effective in eliminating
almost all auditory information.
The experiment was performed under three conditions:
Condition 1 (Control). This condition was a replication of
Condition 1 in Experiment 2, except that the experiment was conducted
over the first four distances only. The purpose of this condition was
to obtain an estimate of the time taken by subjects to reach the dif¬
ferent distances. The condition was conducted with vision excluded
simply because of the possibility that there might be time differences
between conditions where vision is available and where it is not.
Condition 2. This condition employed a time restriction such that
subjects were forced to take the same time to reach the target position
at 9 metres, as they had taken to reach 12 metres in Condition 1. This
was achieved by using a 2 second delay between the point at which S
shut his eyes and the point at which he began walking.
Condition 3. This condition employed a further time restriction
such that the time taken to reach the target at 6 metres was the same
as that taken to reach 9 metres in Condition 2, and 12 metres in
Condition 1. This was achieved by using a 4 second delay between the
points at which vision was excluded and S started walking.
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Procedure
The general procedure of Experiment 3 was similar to that followed
in Experiments 1 and 2. Before the experiment proper began, a short
practice session was held to accustom subjects to the task and to ensure
that they understood the instructions. The practice trials were held at
some distance from the experimental layout to avoid leanning effects from
practising on the experimental pathway. The procedure followed was
similar to that followed in previous experiments.
The experimental procedure was as follows;
Condition 1. S stood at the starting-point and the white noise
was turned on. S was allowed to decide himself when to exclude vision.
As soon as he did this, he informed E, who stood behind him, by saying
"now". Immediately, E started a stop-watch and waited until S had reached
the target position, when the watch was stopped and the time taken
recorded. If S over-estimated the distance of the target and walked past
it, the time recorded was the time to reach the target only. This
measure, together with the associated error on that trial, thus gives
a measure of the fading which had taken place by the time the target
had been reached, and of the total time which achieved it. Whenever
S stopped short of the target, the time recorded was the time taken to
reach the point at which he stopped. Again, the time taken to reach
such a point would give a measure of the time necessary to achieve
sufficient fading to reduce accuracy to the level obtained on that
trial.
Condition 2. The procedure in Condition 2 was identical to that
followed in Condition 1, with one exception. S was instructed that
once he had closed his eyes, he was to stand still until told he
could begin walking. As in Condition 1, S indicated that he was
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about t» cl«se his eyes by saying "now". Immediately, E started the
stop-watch and began timing. After two seconds delay, E informed S
that he could commence the trial, simply by tapping his shoulder.
o
S had been instructed that he was to begin walking immediately he received
this signal. Although this method is extremely simple, it nevertheless
proved effective in gaining fairly strict control over the time lapse
between closing the eyes and reaching the target. The method was
therefore successful in forcing subjects to take the same time to
reach 9 metres as they took in Condition 1 to reach 12 metres.
Condition 3. Condition 3 was performed exactly like condition 2,
except that the delay period employed was four seconds. This delay
thus forced subjects to take as long to reach a target at 6 metres as
they had taken to reach 9 metres in Condition 2 and 12 metres in—
Condition 1.
Each subject was presented with three trials at each distance in
each condition, making a total of 36 trials in all. It was considered
that the number of trials could not be increased beyond this, because
of the influence of fatigue which proved very strong. It was also felt
that cognitive efforts on the part of the subjects began to play a role
when the experiment was lengthened beyond that used here, and this
was testified tp by subjects in pilot studies. Each trial was marked,
as in Experiment 2, by a coloured pin pushed into the ground, except
at 3 metres where these were visible and a direct measurement was taken.
After each trial S remained with eyes closed until E turned him around
and walked him back to the starting-point. In this way, subjects
received no information about the success of previous trials. The
trials were conducted equally on the two pathways to avoid the pick-up
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of tactual cues from the ground surface which might be used to help
gauge the distances.
The conditions were presented successively, with the control
condition being presented first, followed by Condition 2 and then
Condition 3. The presentation of trials was randomised within each
condition.
Subj ects
Ten subjects took part in Experiment 6, seven male and three
female. All subjects were students at Edinburgh University, and were
aged between 19 and 28. No subject was aware of the purpose of the
experiment, or of the predicted results.
Results
Table 6.1 shows the mean times taken at each distance in each
condition. It can be seen that the mean time taken to reach 12 metres
in Condition 1 was 9.06 seconds. It can also be seen that the time
delays employed in conditions 2 and 3 were effective in producing
comparable mean times at 6 and 9 metres (10.16 seconds; 9.84 seconds).
The experimental manipulations therefore seem to have been successful
in creating the conditions for an examination of the influence of
temporal parameters on performance.
The basic findings of Experiment 6 are presented in Fig. 6.1
which shows the distribution of variance obtained at each of the
distances used. Fig. 6.1a shows the results obtained in condition 1
(no time delay). Fig. 6.1b the results of Condition 2 (2 seconds delay)
and Fig. 6.1c the results of Condition 3 (4 seconds delay).
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It can be seen from Fig. 6.1a that the results of Condition 1
are in very good accordance with the results of Experiment 2, and
constitute a replication over the first four distances of that
experiment. No differences can be seen in the variance of the error
at the first three distances, but at 12 metres, the sharp threshold
first seen in Experiment 2 is obtained. A statistical analysis
confirmed this trend. No differences were found in the variances at
3 and 6 metres (F = 1.78 n.s.) or at 6 and 9 metres (F = 1.54 n.s.).
At 9 and 12 metres the difference was highly significant (F = 17.98,
p K. .001). These results then offer a clear confirmation of the
results of Experiment 2.
It is clear from Fig. 6.1b that the predicted results of
Condition 2 are also confirmed. This figure shows that the threshold
found at 12 metres in Condition 1 has now been shifted down to 9 metres
in Condition 2. The variances on either side of the threshold appear
to be roughly equal. Again, a statistical analysis confirms these
trends. The difference between the variances at 3 and 6 metres was
not significant (F = 1.01 n.s.). At 6 and 9 metres the difference was
highly significant (F = 16.38, p <^.001). The difference between the
variances at 9 and 12 metres was not significant (F = 1.64 n.s.).
These results clearly confirm the hypothesis formulated with respect
to Condition 2.
Fig. 6.1c shows the variance of error obtained when a 4 second
delay is added to subjects* locomotion times. These results are also
in line with the experimental predictions. It can be seen that the
threshold which in condition 2 lay at 9 metres has now been relocated
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at 6 metres. The difference between the variances at 3 and 6 metres
proved statistically significant (F = 14.45, p ^ .001). No dif¬
ferences were obtained between the variances at 6 and 9 metres (F =
1.78 n.s.), or at 9 and 12 metres (F = 1.57 n.s.). These results
therefore also confirm the experimental hypotheses.
TABLE 6.1
Means and Standard Deviations of Times Taken to Reach each Distance
Condition






























The variances obtained between corresponding distances in the
different conditions also accord with the predictions. No differences
were found between the variances at 3 metres in the different
conditions (cons 1 x 2, F = .95, n.s.; cons 2 x 3, F = 1.09, n.s.;
cons. 1 x 3, F = 1.77 n.s.). At 6 metres the difference between
conditions 1 and 2 was insignificant (F = 1.79 n.s.), but the dif¬
ference between conditions 2 and 3 was highly significant (F = 13.43,
p <.001), as was the difference between conditions 1 and 3 (F = 23.98,
p .001). At 9 metres the difference between conditions 1 and 2 was
significant (F = 1.46 n.s.). At 12 metres no significant differences
were found between the variances in the different conditions
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(cons. 1 x 2, F= 1.74 n.s.; cons 2 x 3 F = 1.39 n.s.; cons 1x3,
F = 2.41 n.s.). These results then agree completely with the
experimental predictions. Apparently, whenever the time taken to
reach a target exceeds the time taken in condition 1 to reach 12
metres (approximately 9 seconds) then, irrespective of the distance
of the target, performance suffers acutely. The results of the
statistical analyses are summarised in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
Although it is clear from the results so far that whenever time
to locate the target exceeds 9 seconds, performance can be expected to
deteriorate, it is in fact possible to make a closer examination of
the role of time in determining error, and also to identify more
precisely the critical time point at which performance breaks down.
Fig. 6.2 and Table 6.4 show the error obtained with increasing time,
and were calculated irrespective of the distance covered in that time.
For the sake of clarity scores are grouped at 1 second intervals as
shown in Table 6.4.
An examination of Fig. 6.2 and Table 6.4 suggests that the critical
time-point at which performance breaks down occurs at approximately
8 seconds. Up until that point performance appears to hold relatively
stable, though one or two larger errors were obtained between 7 and
7.9 seconds. At 8 - 8.9 seconds performance can be seen to decrease
in consistency, and that inconsistency appears to remain roughly steady
over further time intervals. Statistical analysis confirms this trend.
It can be seen from Table 6.5 that no differences are obtained between
consecutive time intervals between 2 and 7 seconds, but at 7 and 8
seconds the difference in the variances is highly significant
(F = 23.17, p <^.001). At intervals of 8 - 13 seconds, the differences
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TABLE 6.2
F Ratios Obtained between Distances in Each Condition
Source
Condition 1
Distance F Source Distance F
4
3x6 1.78 Condition 3 3x6 14.45
6x9 1.54 6x9 1.78
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All other cells insignificant at = .01, one-tailed test.














Variance as a Function of Time (Condition 1)
Time
2-2.9 3-3.9 4-4.9 5-5.9 6-6.9 7-7.9




3708.10 1552.46 3009.72 2975.42 4997.93 5298.43
TABLE 6.5











































12 " 13 1.68
12 13
13 " 13+ 1.06
*
p < .001
All other cells insignificant at = .01
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between the variances are insignificant. These results then seem
to confirm that the critical break-point in performance occurs when
the time between closing the eyes and reaching the target exceeds about
8 seconds.
The hypothesis that the thresholds in Experiments 2 and 6 are
due to temporal trace delay is further supported by the results
presented in Fig. 6.3. This figure shows the relationship between
time and performance at times below the 8 second threshold, and at
times above it. It can be seen from Fig. 6.3a that at sub-threshold
times the relationship between time and performance is well described
by a linear rule, yielding a Pearson r of .92. This indicates that
below the break-point, 85% of the variance is accounted for by
temporal factors. Above the break-point, however, the relationship
between time and error is considerably less clear. Fig. 6.3b shows
the regression line obtained from a Pearson 5 of .69. The best-
fitting line in this case accounts for only 48% of the variance and
did not satisfy a statistical criterion as differing significantly
from zero (t = 1.92; not significant atO(= .05, one-tailed test).
The results may be interpreted as suggesting that at times of less
than the break-point, the relationship between time and performance
is close with increases in time producing linear increases in the
variance among- scores. At 8 seconds, however, a break-point occurs
and above this point the relationship is far from clear. It seems
that further increases in time are capable of producing some influence
on performance but to a far lesser degree, with time now accounting for
only the half the variance it accounted for at less than 8 seconds.
This result would suggest that some fundamental information ceases to


























FIG, 6,3 Regression analyses on
data of Fig 6,2 (a) over 6 sec.
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Because this vital information is no longer available, further increases
in time have a markedly reduced effect on performance. From Fig. 6.3b
it seems that some usable information continues to be available after
eight seconds, as evidenced by the fact that 48% of the variance is
still accounted for by temporal factors but it is clear that this
information is of markedly reduced value for guiding behaviour. The
fact that the relationship between time and variance can no longer be
adequately accounted for by a linear rule suggests that performance
now depends considerably less on the passage of time.
Discussion
The first result of Experiment 6 which should be noted is the
confirmation, clearly seen in Fig. 6.1a, of the results of Experiment
2. No subject taking part in Experiment 6 had taken part in Experiment
2, and the results obtained in the control condition of the second
experiment thus provide an independent confirmation of the results
of the first experiment. This was confirmed by a statistical analysis
of the variances at corresponding distances in the two experiments,
which showed no differences between the two. We are therefore
justified in drawing weight from the first part of Experiment 6 for
the conclusions drawn from the results of Experiment 2.
The general prediction which the present experiment was designed
to test stated that the dramatic increase in the variance obtained at
12 metres in Experiment 2 was caused by temporal decay of the trace of
a program formulated to enable S to reach the target. It was hypo¬
thesised that by the time the S had reached the vicinity of 12 metres
in Experiment 2, this trace had decayed to such an extent that it could
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no longer be used to locate the goal. To test the hypothesis that the
error at 12 metres and above was due to time factors of this sort it
was arranged that subjects should take a similar time to reach targets
at the shorter distances of 9 and 6 metres. The prediction was that
whenever the time to reach the target exceeded some critical point
corresponding to the time taken to reach 12 metres, then performance
would show a corresponding deterioration irrespective of the distance.
We can see from Table 6.1 that the essential conditions for a test
of this hypothesis have been achieved. The mean time taken to reach
12 metres in Condition 1 was 9.060 sees. According to the predictions,
therefore, whenever a response takes a time equal to or greater than
this, we may expect the performance to suffer accordingly. It can be
seen that this time is exceeded in 3 cases; the mean times to reach 9
metres in Conditions 2 and 3 are 9.84 and 12.71 seconds respectively.
The mean time taken to reach 6 metres in Condition 3 is 10.16 seconds.
According to the hypothesis therefore, the variance at these distances
should match those obtained at 12 metres. An examination of Fig. 6.1
shows that this is true. In Condition 1 only responses at 12 metres
took more than the critical time, and the error at this distance is
high. In Condition 2, however, the responses at 9 metres exceeded
9 seconds, and a greatly increased error is seen among the scores at
this distance. In Condition 3 the critical time is exceeded at 6 metres
as well. Again, the performance is found to deteriorate dramatically
when this time limit is exceeded. The differences between the variances
taking less than the critical time are all insignificant, as are the
differences between the variances obtained for times greater than the
critical one. These results, then, strongly confirm the experimental
5
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predictions. It would appear that the dramatic threshold obtained in
Experiment 2 and Condition 1 of Experiment 6 is determined to a very-
substantial degree by the times taken by subjects to reach the target.
These results so far allow us to say that temporal factors are
responsible to a large degree for the results obtained in Experiment 2.
It is possible to go beyond this, however, and pin-point more accurately
the critical time-lapse which causes performance to deteriorate. This
was attempted in Fig. 6.2 and Table 6.4 which show the error obtained
at increasing units of time. It is immediately clear that the critical
time-point we are looking for occurs at approximately eight seconds.
One or two large errors are obtained below this point, in the 7-7.9
second range, but it is clear that some much larger increase in error
is to be expected at 8-8.9 seconds than at any lower interval. This
was attested to by the results of a statistical analysis which revealed
that the change in variance at eight seconds was very highly significant
(F = 23.17; required F for significance at OC, = .01 with 10 and 63
degrees of freedom = 2.72). Differences between the variances at other
consecutive distances all proved insignificant. This seems to high¬
light the region of eight seconds as critical to performance.
The results of the regression analyses shown in Fig. 6.3 are
extremely interesting with regard to the basic hypothesis that the
thresholds are due to time factors. We saw in Fig. 6.3a that times
between 2 and 8 seconds exert a gradually increasing effect on
performance as time increases. Time at this stage accounts for 85%
of the variance between scores. Beyond the threshold of 8 seconds,
however, the role of time seems far less clear. The best-fitting
line describes the date rather poorly, accounting for only 48% of
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the variance. Furthermore, a statistical analysis did not allow us to
conclude that the correlation between time and variance (.69) differed
significantly from zero. It seems that time is having a far less
direct influence on performance above the threshold.
These results may be interpreted as being highly supportive of
the temporal decay theory. As time increases from 0 to 8 seconds, its
effect on performance seems to be direct and linear. At 8 seconds a
sudden dramatic increase in error occurs. This is followed by error
which may continue to increase with time, though this is not entirely
clear, and in any case, now accounts for only half the variance it
formerly accounted for. This would seem to suggest that as the trace
decays, some information begins to be lost which reduces the accuracy
of performance proportionately. At about 8 seconds, however, some
vital information is lost, and the performance shows a dramatic drop,
in accuracy. Beyond this point it is not clear what is happening.
Since some 48% of the variance at this point is still accounted for by
time, it may be that there remains some vestige of usable information
which continues to fade over a longer period with consequent continuing
decrease in performance. It seems, however, that performance now
depends considerably less on the passage of time. The trace being
now almost completely destroyed, time comes to play a minimal role.
These findings, then, fit very well with the hypothesis of temporal
decay.
A final point which must be made about the results of Experiment 6
concerns the estimation that the breakpoint occurs at 8 seconds. This
was based on the fact that whenever the total time between excluding
vision and reaching the target (or stopping, if the distance was under-
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estimated) exceeded approximately 8 seconds. However, this must mean
that the initial time till the trace fades is somewhat less than 8
seconds, because obviously the trace must decay at some point before
the target is reached. We have, however, no way of knowing at this
stage where the critical point really occurs. It may be possible to
estimate this more accurately in future experiments, but for the
moment we can only note the existence of the problem. Since we cannot
go beyond this, we will continue to base time estimates on the time
elapsing between exclusion of vision and reaching the target. Obviously,
however, it would be desirable to go beyond this.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 6 seem to fit very well with the
hypothesis formulated at the beginning of the experiment. It appears
as if some sort of temporal decay is indeed responsible for the thresh-
holds in accuracy found in Experiments 2 and 6. It appears further that
these thresholds are to be expected whenever the total time from closing
the eyes to reaching the target exceeds 8 seconds, and that the initial
time needed for decay must occur at a point of somewhat less than this.
With regard to the alternative explanation of perceptual
limitation put forward in the introduction to Part III, it can be said
that the results of Experiment 6 throw some doubt on it. The fact that
temporal factors were found to account for the greatest part of the
variance seen at 12m. would strongly suggest that perceptual limitations
were not involved in that particular threshold. However, we may leave
a decision on the role of perceptual factors until the second study of
temporal factors, Experiment 7, has been reported.
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EXPERIMENT 7
TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS IN THE ABILITY TO CONTROL BEHAVIOUR
IN THE ABSENCE OF VISION II
Introduction
We saw in Experiment 6 that it was possible to generate the same
thresholds in performance as we first saw in Experiment 2 by controlling
the time which elapses between closing the eyes and reaching the target.
It was found that when subjects were forced to take the same time to
reach targets at 6 and 9 metres as they took to reach the threshold
distance of 12m. then the pattern of error at the nearer distances
mirrored that obtained at 12m. This result was taken to imply that
the trace of whatever information is internalised for guiding behaviour
fades over time, and that whenever the time taken to complete an act
exceeds that time, then the accuracy of the act will suffer. This
finding was taken to explain the original threshold found in Experiment
2.
It is possible to test in another way the hypothesis that the
major limiting factor under the conditions employed is the time which
elapses between closing the eyes and reaching the object. In
Experiment 6, this was achieved by artificially increasing the time
taken to reach targets at distances nearer than the original threshold
distance. It is obviously possible to test the hypothesis in the
converse way, however, by shortening the length of time taken to reach
longer distances. For example, if subjects can be made to take less
than the critical time of 8 seconds to reach a target at 12m, then the
threshold found there in Experiment 2 would be expected to move up to
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15m, with performance at 12m. mirroring that obtained at 9m. If this
were possible, then the evidence and conclusions of Experiment 6 would




The design of Experiment 7 closely followed that of Experiment 2.
Five locomotor distances were chosen at 9, 12, 15, 18 and 21 metres.
These distances were selected as being the threshold distances of 9 and
12 metres in Experiment 2, together with the three high error, post-
threshold distances. The experiment took place on the same location
as Experiments 2 and 3 and used the same pathways. The target
positions were indicated in the same way by means of a wooden marker
placed on the left-hand side of the subject*s path. Echo location and
other forms of auditory information were controlled by means of a white
noise apparatus, which was effective in eliminating such information
from subjects during the course of the experiment.
Since Condition 2 of Experiment 2 acts as a control of how
subjects perform when visual information is available during the
execution of an act of this sort, it was considered unnecessary to repeat
that condition here. Responses at the 9 metre distance also represent
a control against which responses at further distances can be evaluated.
Since it has already been seen that non-visual responses to targets set
at 9 metres do not differ significantly from responses made when vision
is available, this is quite acceptable. For these reasons, only one
condition was employed in Experiment 7.
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This condition was designed to get subjects to take less than
the critical time, estimated in Experiment 6 to be 8 seconds, to
reach the target irrespective of distance to the target. Some subjects
wished to be allowed to walk quickly rather than to run, and so long
as this seemed to be done in a natural manner it was allowed. In
general, however, it proved necessary to run in order to reach the
furthest distances in the time allowed, and subjects were encouraged
to use this mode of locomotion.
Procedure
As in the earlier studies, a short practice and instruction period
was given to subjects before the experiment proper began. As would be
expected, it proved difficult at first to get some subjects at first
to cover the distances at a sufficiently fast rate to reach the target
within the time allowed. In general, however, it was remarkably easy
to perform the experiment when it is considered that they were asked to
run distances of up to 21 metres over rough ground in less than 8
seconds with the eyes shut. It will be seen in the results section
that subjects were not always successful in covering the distances in
the time allowed. In such cases, subjects were encouraged to move faster,
and extra trials were given. Where it did not prove possible to get
subjects to perform within the limits on all trials, even after a
number of extra trials had been given, the responses on those trials
were recorded as they were obtained. It was not possible to give sub¬
jects too many extra trials because the experiment was already rather
long and tiring.
At the beginning of each trial the subj ect was lined up at the
starting-point while the target was placed in position. The white noise
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was turned on and S was allowed to choose when to begin the trial. S
simply closed his eyes and commenced his approach to the target. When
the trial ended, he remained with eyes closed until the response had been
marked by means of a coloured pin and until E had led him back a
substantial way towards the starting-point. Trials were given alter¬
natively on the two pathways, and the presentation of the distances
was randomised.. Five trials were given at each distance.
As in Experiment 2, no blindfold was used to exclude vision,
subjects being asked simply to close their eyes. It was felt impossible
to ask subjects to perform Experiment 7 with a blindfold on, because the
dangers of Experiment 2 were greatly increased in the present one.
Obviously, when running over uneven ground with the eyes shut, there is
a considerable danger of stumbling and falling: and indeed, stumbles
did occur on occasion. Because of this danger, E always stood part way
along the track - though always somewhat back from the subject*s path -
in order to be in a better position to reach S if he should fall. On
the few occasions when this did happen, the trial was obviously scrapped,
and a new one initiated.
The danger of malingering by subjects is obviously more important
in Experiment 7, since the hypothesis on performance is that it will be
. high throughout. This means that there is no"variable performance"
hypothesis on which to catch malingerers out. For this reason, care
was taken in the selection of subjects for the present experiment,
all of whom were personally known to the writer and who were considered
sufficiently mature to perform the experiment as asked. As an extra
control, however, E kept a particularly close watch on subjects to
ensure that performance was taking place as demanded. No reason for
suspicion arose with any of the subjects.
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Subj ects
Nine subjects took part in Experiment 7, 6 male and 3 female.
All were students at Edinburgh University and were aged between 22
and 30 years. None of the subjects was familiar with the purpose
or predicted results of the experiment.
Results
Table 7.1 shows the mean times taken by the subjects as a group
to reach each of the five distances. It can be seen that the proc¬
edure employed was moderately successful in producing the desired
times, though this was not satisfactorily achieved at the 18 and 21
metre distances.
TABLE 7.1






Mean 3.99 4.95 5.88 6.93 8.01
S.D. .90 1.35 1.69 TPooH 1.90
The imprecision in controlling the temporal paramaters at the
longer distances is evident in Fig. 7.1, which shows the error
obtained at each of the five distances. It can be seen that a high
percentage of responses at 18 and 21 metres took longer than 8 seconds
(responses circled) and this has greatly increased the overall variance
at these distances. Nevertheless, it is clear from Fig. 7.1 that the
error obtained whenever the critical time falls short of 8 seconds,















the variance among such responses remains very stable over .all distances.
A statistical analysis confirms this. The variances at 12, 15, 18
and 21 metres did not in case differ significantly from the variance
obtained at 9 metres (9x12, F = 1.13; 9x15, F = 2.25; 9x18, F = 2.38;
9x21, F = 2.18, all insignificant at & = .01, one-tailed test). The
results therefore support the basic hypothesis of Experiment 7. It
can also be shown that the variance obtained at 9 metres in the present
experiment does not differ significantly from the corresponding variance
in Experiment 2 (9x9, F = 1.03, n.s. at o( = .01). Since the variance
at 9 metres in Experiment 2 was larger than that obtained in Experiment
7, this means that the performances at the 12 to 21 metre distances in
Experiment 7 did not differ from that obtained at 9 metres in Experiment
2 either. These results, then, fit extremely well with the experimental
hypotheses.
The influence on performance of the time elapsing between closing
the eyes and reaching the target can be gauged more directly from
Fig. 7.2 which shows the error made at increasing time-lapse intervals.
It can be seen that the variance remains relatively stable over time
lapses of 2 to 7 seconds. After the 7-7.9 sec. lapse, performance
continues to remain relatively stable with one or two large errors,
but at eight seconds and over it is clear that the error has greatly
increased. This is clearly seen not only in the increased variance
among scores, but in the average deviation from the target line as
well, as can be seen from Table 7.2.
These trends were examined statistically and were confirmed.
Table 7.3 shows the results of a comparison of the variances at each
time lapse. It can be seen that no differences emerge until the
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significance. The differences at subsequent time lapses were all
insignificant. Table 7.3 also shows mean error obtained at each
time lapse. At lapses from 2-6.9 sees., the average error did not
differ significantly from zero, but in all subsequent cases, the
deviations were highly significant. These results, then, suggest
that for time lapses of approximately 7-8 seconds and above, per¬
formance can be expected to suffer very substantial impairment as
compared to shorter time lapses.
The results which have been outlined above are confirmed when
we examine the results of individual subjects as well. The profiles
for each individual subject are shown in Figure 7.3. Responses
taking less than 8 seconds are indicated by dots and those taking
more than 8 seconds are ringed. It can immediately be seen that
responses taking less than the threshold consistently group them¬
selves around the target line, whereas those taking more than the
threshold time-lapse fall consistently and substantially short of
the line.
Finally, we can gauge the overall accuracy of subjects in
Experiment 7 from Table 7.4, which shows the percentages of responses
falling within 30 cms. of the target. The percentage declines some¬
what as distance increases, but the mean accuracy over all five
distances is 71%. This result therefore adds a final piece of support
to the experimental hypothesis.
TABLE 7.4





No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %






















£150- D 175- 200J
-i=5responses
©=over8sec. S1
100- 75-| 50- 25-
0-








0 251 50 75 100- 125- 150- 175-
S3
200-1200J






















100- 75" 50- 25"
0-
25- 50- 75* 100- 125H 150" 175' 200-




100" 75' ' 50- 25'
o-












Z75* D E ~50- wJU
<l> <1)
>25Ho 25* _50" w E £75"






100- 75- 50- 25-
o-











The hypothesis which Experiment 7 was designed to test stated that
so long as the time-lapse between closing the eyes and reaching a
target does not exceed approximately eight seconds, then a subject's
ability to locate that target will not differ significantly from his
ability to do so when the eyes are open. This hypothesis seems to be
confirmed in the present experiment. We saw in Figure 7.1 that whenever
subjects took less than eight seconds to reach the target, irrespective
of distance, then the performance did not differ either from that
obtained at 9 metres, where performance should be high according to
the results of earlier experiments, or from the corresponding per¬
formances when vision is avilable. The result is evident in Fig. 7.1
which shows the performance of the subjects as a group, and also in
Fig. 7.3 which shows the response profiles of the individual subjects.
The effect does not appear to be merely a conglomerate group effect,
but seems to underlie the behaviour of each subject as an individual
as well. These findings therefore greatly strengthen the hypothesis
of temporal delay.
The high accuracy of the responses can also be seen from Table 7.4
which shows the percentage of responses falling within 30 cms. of the
target. The accuracy, by this definition of accuracy, was somewhat
higher at the nearer than at the further distances, but the mean
percentage falling within 30 cms. irrespective of distance was 71%,
indicating a high degree of accuracy. This is, however, lower than
in Experiment 2 where 84% of all responses at distances below the
threshold fell within 24 cms. of the target. It seems highly likely,
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however, that this difference is due to the different modes of loco¬
motion used in the two experiments. Experiment 2 used a walk-mode,
and it certainly seems likely that this would occasion greater accuracy
than running. This is further supported by the fact that in Experiment
7, only 72% of the responses at 9m. fell within 24cms. of the target,
compared to 84% in Experiment 2 and 82% in Condition 1 of Experiment 6.
y
The effect is not therefore restricted to the distances beyond 12m.
where it might be expected that the variance is only partially due to
temporal factors; it occurs at the "high performance" distances of
Experiments 1 and 2 as well. Since the only difference in these
cases is the mode of locomotion used, it seems that the larger
variances found in Experiment 7 are due to this factor. Nevertheless,
it must be emphasised that no significant differences were found
between variances at less than eight seconds time-lapse, irrespective
of the distances involved. The consistency and general accuracy of
subject's responses seem to be roughly the same in all the current
experiments.
We found in Experiment 6 that the critical time lapse at which
performance broke down occurred at approximately eight seconds. Since
Experiment 7 was not successful in keeping all responses below eight
seconds as intended, it was possible to re-examine the role of time
lapse on performance. The results of the analysis of performance in
relation to time were shown in Fig. 7.2. As in Experiment 6 it was
found that performance at eight seconds was considerably poorer than
at the shorter time-lapses. However, the statistical analysis identified
7-7.9 seconds as the threshold time, and this constitutes a deviation
from the results of Experiment 6. In fact, an examination of Figs. 6.2
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and 7.2 indicates a considerable similarity in the two cases. In both
experiments, the majority of responses at 7-7.9 seconds fall within the
same range as at lower time-lapses, with only one or two responses
deviating from the pattern in Experiment 7. When these responses are
removed, the results at 7 seconds fail to differ significantly from
those at shorter time-intervals (6x7, F = 1.81, n.s. at c>(= .01,
one—tailed test). The result indicates, nevertheless, that time
lapses of less than eight seconds can be effective in reducing
performance. However, when it is seen that the time-lapses producing
the deviant responses at 7 seconds fell at 7.9, 7.9 and 7.8 seconds,
it is clear that the essential result of Experiment 6 is upheld.
Differences of this order should not force us to change our original
proposal that a time-lapse of approximately eight seconds represents the
limiting factor to performance accuracy.
In the Introduction to Part III, we indicated three possible
causes of the limitation found in Experiment 2. These possibilities
were: perceptual limitations, limited information storage capacity,
and temporal decay of the trace of the information. It appears that
we can now make a decision as to the most likely of the three pos¬
sibilities. The results of Experiments 6 and 7 almost certainly exclude
perceptual limitation as a factor determining performance for distances
of up to 21m. at least. In Experiment 6, we saw that the performance
deteriorated according to time, not according to distance, but the
lack of perceptual determination of performance was most clearly seen
in Experiment 7, where it was shown that distances of up to 21m. at
least could be reached so long as the eight second rule was not broken.
These results therefore enable us to reject perceptual limitation as an
appealing explanation of the results. It seems reasonable to reject
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the hypothesis of limited information storage from these results also.
This is because a program formulated to enable S to reach a point one
pace away cannot be said to be more complex than a program to reach a
point n paces away. The details of the instructions would vary from
situation to situation, but the complexity of the overall program
remains the same. Of course, a problem might arise when S is asked
to formulate this program from the information available, but this
becomes a problem of perceptual limitation, and we have already seen
that this kind of limitation does not seem to operate within the
distance bracket investigated so far. From the point of view of
program complexity, a change in the quantitative values of the program
units cannot be considered to change the basic complexity of the
program. These results therefore strongly implicate temporal decay
as the main agent responsible for the results of Experiments 6 and 7.
Exactly what form of information it is that decays with time is the
subject of the next section of this thesis.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 7 strongly confirm the prediction that
+
temporal decay is responsible for the thresholds in performance,
wherever these occur. The exact interpretation of this result requires
a section to itself, and this is the task of the discussion which
follows. But the general hypothesis of temporal decay, and the




GENERAL DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTS 6 and 7
The results of Experiments 6 and 7 strongly suggested that the
threshold in performance originally obtained at 12m. was due to fading
of the information about distance which had been internalised. This
conclusion was supported by the finding that through temporal manipulation,
the threshold could be brought down from 12m. to 9m. and 6m. Conversely,
by shortening the length of time taken to reach the targets, it was
shown that the threshold could be moved up at least as far as 21m.
These results strongly i mplicated temporal decay as the cause of the
effect.
A question which we can now ask, is the extent to which this
finding can be said to throw light on the nature of the mechanism
underlying the general ability we are investigating. In Part I, and
generally up until this point, we have argued that behaviour is con¬
trolled by means of programs for action, these programs containing a
specification of the motor actions necessary to accomplish whatever
act is under consideration. The motor action contained within these
programs would be composed of a group of action units which, in the
case of locomotion, would be paces, strides, crawls, hops, or other
units typically seen in locomotor behaviour. Thus, a program for action
would simply indicate the number of such units required to reach the
target under consideration. In this way, we could talk of formulating
programs for action and perceiving distance, as being equivalent ways
of saying the same thing.
However, while we have argued that such a mechanism is responsible
for the abilities seen in Part II, and while we shall continue to argue
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that a mechanism such as this does indeed play a role in motor control
as will be seen more clearly below, it does not seem that this type
of mechanism is compatible with the results obtained in Experiments 6
and 7. This is because it does not seem likely that programs of the
sort indicated above would be subject to the kind of decay observed
in those experiments. With the program defined simply in terms of a
given number of action units, it does not seem likely that this form
of information would decay until run off or written over in the storage
unit. This is because the program would take the form of a set of
instructions in which the number of action units necessary for success¬
ful performance of the task would be defined. It seems hardly likely
that information of this sort would be subject to the kind of strict
temporal control seen in Experiments 6 and 7.
If the information used to control activity in these experiments
did not take the form of programs, we may ask what alternative form
the information might have taken. The alternative which seems most
likely is. that the subjects retain an image or map of the environment,
and use this to guide behaviour in much the same way as they might use
visual information directly available at the eye. It is much easier
to understand such a map fading in time than to imagine a program
fading.
The notion of map being employed here differs considerably from
the notion which is normally found in the psychological literature.
The notion of map usually employed is that of "cognitive map" (Tolman,
1949), and refers to some form of internalised representation of the
layout of an environment. This representation, however, is built up
through prolonged contact with the environment concerned, and becomes
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a more or less long-term fixture within the subject. In this respect,
a cognitive map compares to "pre-programs" (see, e.g. Bartlett, 19-32 );
behaviours which have been established after long periods of practice
and which can be subsequently run off as ballistic wholes (e.g. tennis
serves, golf swings). The evidence that a cognitive map is indeed a
map and not a complex program is drawn from studies where the layout
of the environment is changed to allow the map to show itself. For
example, Spence and Shipley (1934) showed that if blind alleys in a
maze were opened, rats would take these new routes to the food-box
almost immediately if these were quicker. There was no new learning
process. Lashley (1929) found that when the wire mesh over the trap
of the maze was accidentally left off, the rats would climb over the
walls to shorten the journey. Studies of this kind clearly implicate
some kind of internalised map of the environment concerned.
However, these notions of map differ from the notion being proposed
here to explain the results of Experiments 6 and 7. In the present case,
the map is not built into the system through prolonged exposure to the
particular environment concerned, but rather is immediately available to
the subject without any preliminary contact being necessary, though for
a limited period not exceeding 8 seconds. This map, then, would seem
to exist in a kind of short-term memory, disappearing after a certain
period whether used or not.
We may well ask why it is that maps of this kind should be necessary
why could behaviour not be controlled simply on the basis of programs as
originally suggested? There seem to be two basic reasons for this:
first of all, a program for action is to some extent idealised, and it
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is unlikely that it will normally bear a one to one correspondence
with the behaviour executed. For this reason, a program will always
have a degree of error associated with it. It should be clear that
this error is likely to grow larger and more significant as the
program increases in size. We would therefore expect that at longer
distances, the error in an executed program would become too great for
the program to have been of much value, and we might well predict that
the system must be restricted to formulating shorter programs where
the accuracy would be sufficient to be valuable. There is evidence to
support this notion that programs are of limited accuracy in the results
of Experiment 5. Even in the programmed run-up of Olympic long-jumpers
the program could not be perfectly realised due to the accumulative
error in execution which built up as the athlete proceeded down the
tract. If athletes of this calibre, after years of training, cannot
achieve greater control of a single locomotor program, this is surely
indicative of the basic problem proposed. However, since it is of
benefit to the organism for its visual system to be freed from the
task of guidance for as long as possible, we might expect that some
alternative representation of the environment be retained for longer
distances. This representation or map would then allow the subject to
turn his visual system to other tasks and use the map to formulate further
programs for controlling behaviour as these were necessary. Such a
method would clearly extend the periods over which independence of the
visual system could be achieved.
A related reason why it is of value to have maps, is that maps
give a greater fluidity than programs. If a mismatch occurs between
programmed and executed action, it would be difficult to correct this
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mismatch from a program except by a complicated process of checking
size of steps taken against the idealised ones and adding the mis¬
match on later. But this kind of problem can be solved much more
easily if there is an image available which can be updated more
directly. For these reasons, then, it would appear that a system
capable of retaining short-term maps is likely to have an advantage
over systems which are capable only of programming.
This discussion should not allow us to think that programming
has no function in the system, however, for it must indeed have a
function- for reasons outlined in detail in Part I. It was argued
that animals must always know at some point in advance what his action-
relation to an obstacle is. If he does not have information of that
kind, he cannot know how his behaviour relative to the obstacle is to
be regulated. This would therefore always involve apprehending in
motor terms what that relation is, and formulating decisions in advance
of any actions necessary to enable the control desired to take place.
For these reasons, it would always be necessary to program in advance.
If it is accepted that the results of Experiments 6 and 7 are more
consistent with the concept of map than with the concept of program,
there are two questions which may be asked: firstly, we may ask what
evidence there actually is for the programs which it has been claimed
operate at shorter distances. Secondly, it would be desirable to have
evidence supporting in a more direct way the concept of map. It is the
purpose of the remainder of Part III to provide such evidence and to
try to show how the two mechanisms are linked.
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EXPERIMENT 8
THE CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION BY MEANS OF MOTOR PROGRAMS
Introduction
The evidence obtained in Experiments 6 and 7 suggested that subj ects
were capable of internalising information about the external environment
in the form of a map, and of using this map to control behaviour in place
of vision. It was argued that this map is used to formulate programs for
action in the same way as they can be formulated directly through vision.
However, if a map interpretation of the results is accepted, at least
provisionally, it must be said that little evidence in support of the
(
concept of map has been obtained at all. Some evidence was obtained
in Experiment 5 (long jump) where we saw, particularly in the case of
Valerie's six runs, that some form of programming seemed to be taking
place, but in general there is relatively little evidence of it. Further¬
more, although we have asserted that programs can be formulated over
limited distances only, we have no real idea of how extensive such
programs can be. The purpose of Experiment 8 was to try to solve both
of these problems; to provide evidence, firstly in support of the
concept of program in general, and secondly to try to show the kind of
distances over which such programs can operate.
In our general discussion of the results of Experiments 6 and 7,
we argued against interpreting the results in favour of the concept of
program, on the grounds that a program as we had defined it would be
unlikely to suffer decay in the way found. Such a form of decay was
more compatible with the concept of map. We concluded that programs
are used for guidance over short distances, control over longer
stretches being accomplished by means of maps.
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If this argument is correct, however, we should be able to demonstrate
the existence of programs by following the basic method which inspired
Experiments 6 and 7. If programs are formulated over short distances
only and if they are not subject to decay over time in the way that
maps are, then by following the method of Experiment 6 over short
distances, we should find the converse result: namely that temporal
delay does not affect performance. This can be tested quite easily by
extending the range of distances tested in Experiment 6 downwards. It
will be remembered that in that experiment, attempts to bring the
threshold downwards were not extended beyond six metres. At the time
it was felt unnecessary to go beyond this to demonstrate the effect
of temporal decay. However, we can now predict that at some distances
of less than 6 metres the effect will not hold, due to the existence




The design of Experiment 8 was, in fact, basically a replica of
that of Experiment 6, except that the distances employed were different.
Six locomotor distances were chosen, at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 metres.
Distances at less than 6 metres were chosen to see at what point
evidence of a program could be found. Six metres itself was chosen as
the lowest point at which temporal factors were found to operate in
Experiment 6. Unlike Experiment 6, Experiment 8 was performed indoors,
on the same location as Experiments 1, 3 and 4. The target was represented
by a line drawn on the floor with a wooden marker placed opposite. This
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marker was moved around by the experimenter, and was used to indicate
the target currently being used. As in previous experiments, auditory
information was controlled by means of a white noise apparatus.
The experiment was conducted under two conditions;
(1) Experimental Condition. In this condition the time
taken by subjects to reach the targets was manipulated
in such a way that the critical time point of 8 seconds
found in Experiments 6 and 7 was increased by at least
50%. Thus the time elapsing between the point at which
vision was excluded and the point at which the target
was reached was manipulated so that it equalled not
less than 12 seconds in each case. In order to
accomplish this, a number of pilot trials were run over
the six distances used under the basic, non-visual
condition as employed in Experiment 1, and the times to
reach the distances measured. These times then made
it possible to calculate the delays which would be
necessary at each distance, to generate a total time
of 12 seconds. The pilot studies were conducted with
subjects other than those taking part in the experiment
proper.
(2) Control Condition. This condition was simply a replication
of the non-visual condition of Experiment 1, using a




As with the design, the procedure was similar to that used in
Experiment 6. In Condition 1, the procedure was as follows; S stood
lined up at the starting point and the white noise was turned on. He
was instructed to close his eyes while the marker was placed at the
appropriate target point. This was simply to avoid the possibilities
of distance cues being picked up from the experimenter's movements
between the target points. The subject was then allowed to survey the
target and decide for himself when to begin. At the point at which he
closed his eyes, he informed the experimenter by saying "Now". A
stop-watch was started and timing began. When the appropriate time-
lapse for the distance under consideration had passed, E simply
tapped S on the shoulder and S immediately began his orientation.
Although there has to be a finite time between the point at which S
is told to start walking and the point at which he actually begins to
do so, this can be controlled after only a very short practice period
with the method, which, although extremely simple, proved equally
effective in achieving the control over time desired.
Each subject was presented with three trials at each distance
in each condition. It was considered that the number of trials could
not be extended beyond this because of the role of fatigue, which
proved very strong. Indeed, subjects had to be given a short break
part of the way through Condition 1, as well as between Conditiors 1
and 2, to counteract its effects. The result of each trial was
measured immediately by the experimenter because any marks made on
the surface would have been visible to the subjects and would have
provided an unwanted source of feedback about previous performances.
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Alter each trial had ended, S remained with his eyes closed until E had
measured the response, after which he was turned round and walked back
to the starting point. In this way, all feedback about performance
was excluded. Only after the marker had been placed in position for
the next trial was S allowed to open his eyes.
The presentation of trials was randomised within each condition,
but the conditions were presented consecutively, with the experimental
condition being run first.
Sub.j ects
Nine subjects took part in Experiment 8, 8 male and 1 female. All
were students at Edinburgh University, and were aged between 20 and 30
years.
Results
Table 8.1 shows the mean times taken to reach the different
distances in the two conditions. It can be seen that the manipulation
employed in Condition 1 was effective in increasing the total times to
a level some 50% higher than the initial time of 8 seconds. The mean
times were, in fact, slightly longer by about half a second than was
intended, but this makes no difference to the task. The experimental




Means and Standard Deviations of Times Taken at Each Distance
Distance (Metres)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Time delay 12.68^.74 12.67-.44 12.57^.39 12.66-.56 12.49±.74 12.76±.80
No Time
^
delay 1.34^.48 2.24^.51 3.17^.73 3.67i.62 4.28^.66 5.28-.92
The basic result of Experiment 8 is shown in Fig1. 8.1 which shows
the distribution of judgments around the target lines in each condition.
The effect of the conditions is immediately clear.' In Condition 1, a
time delay greatly exceeding that which caused disruptions in Experiment
6 apparently has no effect on distances of less than 6m. At 6m, however,
the characteristic break-down in performance seen in the earlier experi¬
ments is found. The differences between the variances in the different
conditions were examined statistically by means of the F test for
homogeneity of variances atCX = .01, one-tailed test. The differences
in variance at corresponding distances all proved insignificant except
at the 6m. distance where the difference between the conditions was
highly significant (lxl, F=1.28, n.s.; 2x2,F=1.10, n.s.; 3x3, F=1.68,
n.s.; 4x4, F=1.18, n.s.; 5x5, F=1.20, n.s.; 6x6, F=10.16, p < .001).
These results strongly support the experimental predictions.
Means, standard deviations and variances of error at each distance in
each condition are shown in Table 8.2. It can be seen that the mean errors
are practically zero in all cases. The significance of the differences
were examined by means of the t-test. In no case was the mean error
found to deviate significantly from zero. The results of the analysis





























I \ 5 responses
overe st imati ons
unde restimations
FIG. 8 ,1 Distribution of judgments at each distance in each condition.
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These results, then, are consistent with the findings of previous
experiments and conform to the pattern of results obtained in those
experiments, which suggest that perceptual error is not attributable
as a cause of the variances obtained.
One finding of some interest is the differences in variance found
at the different distances in Condition 1. It can be seen that at 3,
4 and 5 metres, the variance is more or less constant, but at 1 and 2
metres it is smaller, increasing over these two distances to reach the
plateau at 3 metres (see Fig. 8.1 and Table 8.2). This apparent increase
cannot be attributable to increasing time as it could in Experiment 2,
for example, because in Condition 1 time was held constant over the six
distances. The effect was examined statistically by means of the F
test for homogeneity of variances. The differences at 1 and 2 metres,
and at 2 and 3 metres were insignificant (1x2, F=2.13; 2x3, F=1.68,
both insignificant atC!( = .01, one-tailed test); but the difference
between the variances at 1 and 3 metres did reach significance (1x3,
F=3.58, p < .01, one-tailed test). This would suggest a small threshold
at 3 metres due to some factor other than time.
Discussion
In the introduction to Experiment 8 we stated our general purpose
to be:
(1) To obtain evidence which would support the notion of
program as a general concept.
(2) To try to find out over what distances programs can
operate. It was argued that if the temporal limitations
obtained in Experiment 6 could be found to be absent at
shorter distances, then this would strongly support the
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concepts of program and map discussed above. It
was also hoped that the range of distances over which
programs can operate would be discovered.
The results of Experiment 8 seem to allow us to answer both
these questions. Even a delay more than 50% greater than the critical
time delay in Experiment 6 was ineffective in disrupting performance.
This finding therefore, fits exactly the theoretical predictions.
Furthermore, it seems that we can identify the distances over which
programming can operate as up to 6m. At that point, the temporal
decline found in earlier studies is obtained. These findings therefore
enable us to answer both of the fundamental questions posed positively.
The results of Experiments 6 and 8 seem to suggest quite strongly that
maps and programs exist in a form approximating to that described.
It also appears that the distances over which programs can be formulated
does not exceed 6m.
One interesting finding of this study is the differences in variance
between different distances in Condition 1 (see Table 8.2). It can be
seen that there is an increase in variance over the first three distances
which seems to become more stable at 3m. and above. These differences
cannot be due to the increasing passage of time (as the differences in
Condition 2 can) because in Condition 1 the time factor was held constant
(see Table 8.1). Consequently, the differences must be due to some other
factor. One possibility might be that the effect is due to perceptual
error. However, we have consistently argued against the interpretation
that perceptual error would be revealed through increased variance.
This form of error would be more likely to be revealed in consistent
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over- or under-estimation, as revealed by the mean errors. In
Experiment 8 we found that the mean error does not at any distance
deviate significantly from zero. This finding would militate against
an explanation in terms of perceptual -error"!
The interpretation which seems best to fit the results is that
proposed in the general discussion of Experiments 6 and 7. There,
it was argued that a certain degree of error will always accrue to the
execution of a program, a claim which was supported by the results of
the long-jump study reported in Experiment 5, where the variance was
clearly seen to build up from pace to pace. It would appear that this
variance is somewhat lower at lm and 2m than at larger distances,
though the effect seems to have slowed down somewhat at longer distances.
This result seems to fit quite well with the interpretation of
execution error.
One question which might be asked about the limitation in program¬
ming ability is why that limitation should exist at 5m and not at
some other distance. The reason that programming does not extend to
distances of more than 5m may be due to the accumulative execution
error discussed above. The reason that the limitation does not occur
at distances of less than 5m may be due to the reaction time arguments
proposed in Part I. If we take, as an example of the practical upper
limit to human speed of movement, the times of Olympic 100m sprinters
we can estimate the minimum distance over which programming should
operate to accommodate the possible variations in speed. Such sprinters
can run 100m in about 10 seconds. This represents an average speed of
approximately 22 mph. At this speed, the sprinters traverse 5m. in .5
seconds. We have already seen in Part I, however, that .5 seconds
represents probably the shortest time at which a correction on the
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basis of visual information can be made. If this argument is correct,
5m would indeed represent something like the shortest distance over
which programming should be possible, if it is to accommodate something
approximating the full range of speeds of which man is capable. It
should be noted that this argument predicts that the programming
capacities of different animals must vary. For example, an animal with
a top speed of 35 m.p.h. would have to be capable of programming over
a distance of at least 8m if it were to meet the .5 sec. limitation to
the possibilities of correction. This prediction may be testable, but
there does not appear to be any evidence with a direct bearing at present.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 8, then, seem to support the theoretical
position advocated very well. The fact that even a (relatively) massive
time delay had no effect on performance at distances up to 5m lends the
interpretation proposed considerable plausibility. The results suggest
that subjects may very well have the ability to formulate programs for
distances up to 5m, with movement over longer distances being accom-
lished through the retention of maps which can then be used to formulate
further programs just as at distances up to 5m these can be formulated
directly from vision.
While the results of Experiment 8 seem to fit the theory rather
well, it would obviously be desirable to obtain further, preferably
more direct, evidence supporting the concepts of map and program. It
would also be highly desirable.to show more clearly the way in which the
two mechanisms co-operate in controlling behaviour, a problem which has
not yet been attacked. The task of Experiment 9 is to do just this:
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to develop the evidence in support of the two concepts further and to
show them operating together to control behaviour.
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EXPERIMENT 9
MAPS AND PROGRAMS IN THE CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION I
Introduction
The experiments so far reported in Part III seem to support the
existence of two distinct mechanisms by which the abilities seen in
Part II are controlled. In Experiments 6 and 7 we saw that accuracy was
strongly affected by temporal factors, and this finding was considered
to be more consistent with an interpretation in terms of map as defined
in the preceding section, than in terms of program. Nevertheless, the
results of Experiment 8 strongly implied that subjects are capable of
formulating programs for action over distances of up to 5m. The results
of these experiments were taken to suggest that behaviour is guided by
some sort of co-operative action between these two mechanisms.
With regard to the outcome of these experiments, the aims of
Experiment 9 may be stated as follows;
(1) To provide further evidence in support of the concept
of map. So far this concept has been demonstrated in
only as indirect way through the time limits of
Experiments 6 and 7, and while the results of Experiment
8 can be said to support the notion of map insofar as it
supports the notion of a limited program, it was considered
desirable to obtain further, more direct evidence for the
concept. This may therefore be said to be the first aim
of Experiment 9.
(2) The second aim of this experiment is to demonstrate the
co-operation of the two mechanisms. In our general
discussion of Experiments 6 and 7, it was suggested that
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maps are retained for use over longer distances than
programs, but that programs can be formulated from
maps in the same way as they can be formulated directly
from vision. The second purpose of Experiment 9 was to
try to show this co-operative behaviour in action in a
relatively unambiguous form.
The methodological strategy by which these aims were achieved was
rather simple. In order to test the first of these, an experimental
situation was created in which the possibilities of programming responses
in advance were eliminated. This was achieved by defining the task in
such a way that the subject could not know in advance what was required
of him, instructions being given only after vision had been excluded.
If the method is accepted as being successful in eliminating the pos¬
sibility of advance programming, and performance continues to be suc-
cesful, then this would lend strong support for the concept of map.
An attempt was made to fulfil the second stated aim of Experiment 9
by asking subj ects to use their map to execute a behaviour which can only
be executed as a programmed whole. The example of such a behaviour chosen
in Experiment 9 was throwing. It should be clear that the subject has
no control over a thrown object once it has been released, and that the
success of the throw will depend on the throwing-decisions made before
the object is cast. Since these throwing^-decisions must be formulated
in advance of the point at which the object is released, and since no
further corrections can be made after that point, it is clear that
throwing does constitute a programmed activity of the kind being dis¬
cussed here. In order to show that such programs can be formulated
from maps a situation was contrived where the subject could never
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know the distance over which he would be asked to throw until after
vision had been excluded. Again, a throw could only be successful
under these conditions if internalised information exists on which
to base it. Experiment 9 was designed to achieve these aims.
Method
Design
Experiment 9 was conducted on the same location as Experiments 1,
3, 4 and 8; that is, in a large theatre from which all seating had been
removed. Various pieces of experimental material and other articles
were distributed around the sides of the room, but a free area was
left for conducting experiments which measured approximately 14m x 9m.
The experiment was conducted under 3 conditions as follows;
Condition 2. Since in the present experiment Conditions 1 and 3 are
control conditions against which the results of the experimental
condition should be evaluated, and since these are concerned with
control of only one part of the experimental condition each, it will
be best to describe this latter condition first. The experimental
condition was conducted over a single distance of 10m. This distance
was chosen as being the most suitable for the manipulations exerted
in the experiment. It also accords well with the results of Experiment
8, representing a 100% increase on the critical programming distance
found in that experiment. This would help to sustain the argument that
we are dealing with "map-space" only in Experiment 9. The subject's
task was defined as being to walk towards the target as in previous
experiments, with a view to lining himself up on the target-line if
required. However, at a series of pre-determined points along the
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track subjects were asked to stop walking and to throw a small object
carried in the hand the rest of the way to the target. The points at
which the subjects had to stop and throw were at distances of 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5m. from the target. These distances over which the object had to
be thrown were always unknown to the subjects, instructions being given
only some time after vision had been excluded. The object to be thrown
was a small wooden block of appropriate size and weight which had
previously been determined as being a good throwing object. The target,
as in previous experiments, was a line on the floor. In the present study
this was a 2" wide length of white tape, which was used rather than a
painted line, in view of the longer distance involved in Experiment 9.
A line, rather than some other form of target, such as a circle, was
used for the increased accuracy of measurement it allows, and because
only distance errors were of interest; errors in the left/right
dimension were ignored. As in previous experiments, echo location was
controlled by means of a white-noise apparatus which subj ects carried
throughout the experiment. However, the level of noise employed in
Experiment 9 was rather lower than in previous experiments. This was
because the only practicable way of making subj ects stop at an unknown
point was to give them a verbal instruction. The level of noise was
accordingly carefully adjusted so that maximum isolation was obtained,
while still permitting instructions to be heard. Given that the echo
location abilities of man are rather crude in any case (see Bower, 1976),
it is unlikely that this slightly reduced level of noise made any dif¬
ference to the subject's ability to use auditory information to control
his behaviour. The level chosen allowed only loud noises to be heard,
and the subject was as isolated as before from the largest part of the
sound-field.
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Condition 1. Since in the experimental condition of Experiment 9,
subjects were asked to throw an object over a series of distances of
up to 5m. it is obviously necessary to have some measure of subjects®
general throwing ability, so that the results can be properly evaluated.
In order to obtain such information, a condition was run in which
subjects were simply asked to throw objects to the 5 distances involved
in Experiment 9, under normal visual conditions. The results of this
condition can then serve as a control against which to evaluate the
results of the experimental condition. To avoid learning effects this
condition was carried out on a different location from Condition 2.
Condition 3. The purpose of the present experiment was stated as being
to devise a method whereby advance programming of responses is prohibited.
The principal means by which this was achieved was to use a two-part task
where the distance over which the second part was to be executed, varied
in a way unknown to subjects. There is one way in which performance
might be achieved without the use of a map, however. It is possible
that the subject sets up a program for walking the 10m to the target.
Although the subject never knows in advance the point at which he will
be asked to stop and throw, if a program for walking had been set up
he nevertheless would know how much of that program had been executed,
and how much remained. It is therefore possible that he might be able
to convert the remaining part of a program for walking into a program
for throwing. Condition 3 was designed to control for this possibility.
The means by which this was done was very simple. Since the remaining
part of the program for walking tells the subject in some form the
remaining number of action units to be executed, subjects were merely
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asked to convert these action units into a program for throwing. In
order to simplify the situation, however, subjects were asked not to
convert a given number of paces into a program for throwing, but simply
to throw the obj ect a given number of metres, these corresponding to
the distances over which the obj ect had to be thrown in the experimental
condition. Although it is not as satisfactory to use this method as it
would be to use the former, it was felt that if program conversion is
possible, a reasonable approximation to the target distances should be
seen in the distribution of subjects* responses.
Procedure
Before the experiment proper began, subjects were given a practice
session in throwing to develop their ability to a reasonable level for
measurement. This practice period was conducted in a quite informal
way, with subjects being asked simply to throw the object to the
experimenter and to various points on the ground. No measures were
taken at this time, the purpose being merely to get the subjects used
to throwing the object. The practice session was continued until it
became apparent that a reasonable facility had been achieved.
Condition 1. The subject was placed at the starting point with target
lines drawn at distances of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5m. in front of him. He
held the throwing object in his hand and was instructed to try to throw
the object on to the lines as these were indicated to him. The
condition was conducted under normal visual conditions. The target line
to which the obj ect should be thrown on any particular occasion was
indicated with a pointer by the experimenter, who stood to the side of
the lay-out. 4 trials were given at each distance, and these were
randomised with respect to distance.
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Condition 2. The subject stood at the starting: point with the target
visible at 10m. As in previous experiments, the subject was allowed to
survey the lay-out and decide for himself when to begin the trial. As
soon as he excluded vision the experimenter started a stop-watch and began
timing. The purpose of this was to ascertain that not more than 8 seconds
did elapse between excluding vision and releasing the object. Just before
the subject reached the appropriate throwing-point, the experimenter
instructed him to stop. In order to avoid any distance information being
imparted by the experimenter speaking from the position the subject last
saw him occupying, the subj ects were informed that E would always give
his instructions from a position directly opposite the subject, irres¬
pective of how far he had walked. The level of white noise used was
sufficiently high to mask any sounds made by E in positioning himself
at the appropriate point. In order to have control over the point at
which subjects stopped, the instruction had to be given a little in
advance. It should also be noted that because of variations in the
size of subjects* paces it could not be guaranteed that they would
stop at exactly the point desired on every occasion. Since absolute
control over the stopping point was not required, this obviously does
not affect the situation, and it was felt unnecessary to make a precise
determination of the points stopped at on each occasion. Subjects were
instructed that they were to throw the object as soon as possible after
being told to stop, but that they should nevertheless satisfy themselves
that they were ready to do so. After the object had been thrown,
subjects were told to wait until the point of contact had been marked,
then were turned around by E and led back to the starting point where
they were allowed to prepare for the next trial. The distance the object
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was thrown was marked by coloured chalk, a different colour being used
for each trial. These marks were always made too small to be seen by
the subject from the starting-point. In this way, all feedback about
performance was excluded. 4 trials were given at each of the 5 distances
for each subject. Trials were randomised with respect to throwing
distance.
Condition 3. Subjects were led, blindfold, to the location used for
Condition 1, and were placed lined up at the starting point. They were
then instructed to thrown the object to one of the 5 distances between
1 and 5 metres. This condition was therefore performed in vacuo. After
each trial the object was brought back to the subject, who remained
blindfold throughout the entire condition. As in the previous conditions,
4 trials were given at each of the 5 distances and these were randomised
with respect to distance.
The conditions were always run in the same order, beginning with
Condition 1, and advancing to Condition 3. Because of the possibility
that learning effects from Condition 1 would influence scores in
Condition 2, Condition 1 was always described as being merely a more
refined extension of the practice period. A short break was given
after this condition had been completed. Condition 3 was. always run
last, because any learning effects from Conditions 1 and 2 could only
improve performance and militate against the hypothesis.
Because of the length of time necessary to perform this experiment,
it was divided into two sections and run on two separate occasions.
Each section contained half of the total number of trials performed in
the three conditions, making each section a mini-experiment. The
sections were run approximately one week apart.
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Subj ects
Eight subjects took part in Experiment 9, 4 male and 4 female.
All were students at Edinburgh University and were aged between 20 and
25 years. None was familiar with the purposes or predicted results of
the experiment.
Results
The essential results of Experiment 9 are shown in Fig. 9.1.
Fig. 9.1a shows the distribution of responses around the target line at
each distance in Condition 1 (control throwing); Fig. 9.1b shows the
results for Condition 2 (experimental condition); and Fig. 9.1c shows
the results of Condition 3 (blind throwing).
An inspection of this Figure reveals that the greatest accuracy is
found in the control-throwing situation, followed by the experimental
condition, with performance in Condition 3 being extremely inaccurate by
comparison. The effect can also be seen in Table 9.1, which shows the
variances obtained in each condition, together with the means and standard
deviations. The trend reflects that found from a visual inspection of
the graphs.
TABLE 9.1
Means, Standard Deviations and Variances of Errors in each Condition
Throwing Distance (Metres)
1 2 3 4 5
1 (throw) 5.62 7.80 2.71 13.32 -6.60 13.68 -19.10 14.28 -19.85 21.96
S2 25.34 73.82 77.88 85.08 200.93
2 (walk +
throw) 13.32 21.31 6.00 27.24 -3.00 26.16 -1.13 25.46 -15.98 27.94
S2 189.24 309.22 285.22 270.19 325.10
3 (throw
blind) 43.06 55.66 22.51 55.49 -14.78 65.64 -16.06 103.56 -36.53 87.84
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The differences between Conditions 1 and 3, and 2 and 3 were
evaluated statistically by means of the F test for homogeneity of
variances which was applied to corresponding distances in the different
conditions. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 9.2. It can
be seen that the differences were significant in every case. This finding
would suggest that the success of performance in Condition 2 was not due
to an ability to transform a program for walking into a program for
throwing. The success would seem to be due to some other source of
information.
TABLE 9.2
F Ratios from Analysis of Data in Table 9.1
Throwing Distance (Metres)
1 2 3 4 5
Conditions 1x3 50.93 17.37 23.05 52.53 16
*
Conditions 1x2 7.47 4.19 3.66 3.18 1.62
Conditions 2x3 6.82 4.15 6.29 16.54 9.89
*n.s. at o( = .01, one-tailed test
all other cells significant (required F with 31 and 31 degrees of
freedom = 2.39)
An inspection of Figs. 9.1a and 9.ab, and of the corresponding cells
in Table 9.1, reveals that performance is consistently poorer in the
experimental condition than in the control throwing condition. This
result is to be expected, however, as the error in Condition 2 is made
up of two components. The first of these is error resulting from the
walking section of the act. We saw in Experiments 1 and 2 and also
elsewhere that blindfold walking produces a variance which, in the
case of Experiment 2, amounted to 20cms. at 6m. and 22cms. at 9m.
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Since the distances walked in Experiment 9 varied from 5 to 9m. , we
would expect a similar variance to be associated with the walking
element of this experiment. However, in addition to this variance,
there is a further variance in Experiment 9 created by the throwing
section of the act. The variance in this case is given in Table 9.1.
Since both these components, together with their associated variances,
are involved in Experiment 9, then the true control variance against
which to compare that obtained in Condition 2 must be the sum of the
variances from the two components. A linear regression was conducted
on the variances obtained at 3, 6 and 9 metres in Experiment 2, and
estimates made of the variances at 5, 7 and 8 metres. These variances
were then added to those obtained from Condition 1 in Experiment 9. The
result of this manipulation, together with the variances found in
Condition 2, are presented in Table 9.3.
TABLE 9.3
Corrected Control Variances for Evaluating Results of Condition 2
Distance (Metres)
1 2 3 4 5
Throw (Expt. 9) 10..56 30..76 32..45 35,,45 83,,72
Corresponding walk (Expt. 2) 88 88 78 76 58
Total 98..56 118,.76 110,.45 111.,45 141,.72
Walk + throw (Expt. 9) 78.,85 128..84 118..84 112.,58 135,,46
It can be seen that this manipulation of the results of Condition 1
produces a set of variances which differ only marginally from those
obtained in Condition 2. The differences between the variances at
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corresponding distances in the two Conditions were evaluated by means
of the F test at ^ = .01, one-tailed test. The differences failed to
reach significance in any case (lxl, F=1.25, n.s.; 2x2, F=1.08, n.s.;
3x3, F=1.08, n.s.; 4x4, F=1.01, n.s.; 5x5, F=1.05, n.s.). This result,
then, confirms the experimental hypotheses very well.
The response profiles seen in the case of the group of subjects as
a whole can also be seen in the response profiles of individual subjects.
Fig. 9.2 shows the judgments made by different subjects in the different
conditions. It can be seen that the results confirm those obtained for
the group. Performance is best in Condition 1, slightly poorer in
Condition 2, and poorest in Condition 3. Unfortunately, no correction
can be made to the responses of individual subj ects to take account
of the error contingent on the walking phase of Experiment 9, but since
the other features conform to the group picture, we might reasonably
suppose that this would conform as well. The results, then, seem to
support the experimental predictions very well.
Discussion
In the Introduction to Experiment 9, we argued that the study had
two basic aims: firstly, to provide further evidence in support of the
concept of map, and secondly, to show that it is possible to formulate
programs from such maps. We may begin our discussion by considering the
extent to which Experiment 9 was successful in creating the conditions
for a test of these aims.
The main argument underlying the present experiment was that it is
possible to eliminate the possibilities of subjects preparing programs





















































































































































































































dimensions of the task until after vision is excluded. In the present
case, the relevant dimension is distance from the target. Since the
subject never knows in advance how far he will be from the target when
he is asked to throw the object he carries, this latter part of the act
cannot be programmed in advance. There seem to be only two ways in which
a successful performance could be obtained under these conditions. The
first possibility is that the subject retains some sort of representation
or map of the layout of the environment, and is able to update this
position in that map as he moves through the environment. When the subject
is called on to organise a different behaviour relative to the target, this
would then provide no problem, as the subject can use the information in
his map to do so. This is the hypothesis favoured here. There is,
however, one competing possibility which must be considered. This is
that subjects could, in principle, formulate a program for walking the
10m. to the target. Although the subject is stopped at an unknown
point and asked to locate the target by some other means, the subj ect
would then know how much of his program had been executed and how much
remained. It is therefore possible that the remainder of his program
for walking could be transformed into a program for throwing with
sufficient accuracy to enable him to locate the target. In order to
provide a convincing test of the map hypothesis, it would therefore be
necessary to control for this competing hypothesis.
The results of Experiment 9 seem to fit very well with the prediction
that performance would be high in the experimental condition. The
accuracy of subjects' performance under this condition is best seen in
Table 9.3 which shows the variances obtained at the different distances
in that condition, together with the control variance, corrected to
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take account of the error contingent on walking, together with that
contingent on throwing. No differences were found between the corres¬
ponding variances in the two cases. The fact that such a high degree of
accuracy was attained in the experimental condition implies that subjects
were indeed able to formulate their program for throwing on the basis of
some form of internalised information".
An attempt was made to examine the possibility that the successful
performance was due to the transformation of a program for walking into
a program for throwing rather than through the retention of a map, in
Condition 3. Program transformation in the present experiment would have
entailed the transformation of programs for walking distances of between
1 and 5m. into programs for throwing over these same distances. An
assessment of the subjects* ability to do this was therefore arranged.
Although, strictly speaking, the subjects should have been asked to
throw the object over the appropriate number of paces,this was not done
in the present experiment. It was felt that metres fell sufficiently
close to paceelengths to make the results of this condition valid. All
subjects claimed to be familiar with metres as measures of distance.
The results of the condition, presented in Fig. 9.1c and Table 9.3,
show unequivocally that subjects are quite unable to perform this task
with accuracy. In all cases, the variances were vastly in excess of
the variances obtained in the other two conditions. This finding, then,
would seem to fit the experimental predictions very well.
It must be noted, however, that the method employed in Condition 3
bore only an approximation to the proper control for the prcgram-
transformation hypothesis. An estimation should have been taken of the
number of paces each individual subject would need to reach the targets
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from the various throwing distances, and subjects should then have been
asked to throw the object the appropriate number of paces. The method
employed was considerable more artificial and this must be seen as an
inadequacy of the design. An attempt to create a more appropriate
control is made in Experiment 10.
However, although metres are a rather unecological measure compared
to paces, it nevertheless seems clear that such measures, approximating
as they do to paces in size, would generate a level of accuracy far higher
than that obtained if a program for walking can indeed be transformed into
a program for throwing. The fact that accuracy was so poor would suggest
that subjects are either not capable of such transformations, or else
that no program for transformation existed, which is what we would predict
from the results of Experiment 8. The present finding therefore supports
the argument that the success of subjects* performance in Condition 2 was
due to the retaining of a map which could then be used to control behaviour
and formulate programs.
The first aim of Experiment 9 was stated as being to obtain further
evidence in support of the concept of map. The second was to show that
such maps can be used to formulate programs in the same way as those
can be formulated directly from vision. The results of Experiment 9
certainly seem to support this latter hypothesis. We have already
indicated that there is no possibility of subjects formulating their
throw on the basis of visual information before the trial begins, since
they never know in advance what the distance over which the object is to
be thrown will be. This would mean that the throw would have to be
determined on the basis of internalised information available at the
point at which the subject is called in to throw the object. The fact
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that the accuracy with which subjects were able to reach the target was
so high, failing to differ significantly from the control error, indicates
that subjects are indeed able to formulate programs from internalised
information. The results of Experiment 9, then, seem to support this
prediction also.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 9, then, seem to fit well with the
experimental predictions. It certainly seems as if subjects are capable
of formulating programs on the basis of internalised information, and
furthermore seem to be capable of doing so as accurately as when the
programs are based directly in vision. The results also suggest that
the programs are based on information internalised in the form of a
map, though there remained a certain amount of doubt about this inter¬
pretation. One of the purposes of Experiment 10 is to improve this
control. In general, however, the results of Experiment 9 are in
excellent agreement with the predictions.
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EXPERIMENT 10
MAPS AND PROGRAMS IN THE CONTROL OF LOCOMOTION II
Introduction
As we saw in the introduction to Experiment 9, that experiment had
two basic aims. Firstly, it was designed to show that programs can be
formulated on the basis of internalised information of some sort, and
secondly, to show that this information takes the form of a map. The
first of these aims was well supported by the results of the experiment.
However, it could not be said with absolute certainty that the accuracy
obtained was due to the internalisation of a map rather than to some
other form of internalised information, because of the weakness of one
of the controls.
Experiment 10 represents in some ways an extension of Experiment 9
since it is similarly concerned to obtain information in support of the
concept of map, and in doing so attempts to correct the defects of
Experiment 9. The main problem of Experiment 9, of course, was that it
was not made sufficiently clear whether the subject*s successful per¬
formance in the experimental condition was due to the retaining of a
map or to the transformation of a program for walking into a program
for throwing. In that experiment, the problem was attacked by trying
to eliminate the possibilities of formulating programs so that a
successful performance could then only be attributed to the existence of
a map. In the present experiment, subjects were specifically enabled
to formulate programs for walking, so that it could be demonstrated
directly that these could not be used to formulate programs for throwing.
The method by which this was achieved was basically as follows.
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The experiment was conducted over a single distance of 5m. This distance
was chosen because it had been found in Experiment 8 that programs could
be formulated over distances up to 5m. The subject's task varied
between the conditions. In Condition 1 the subject was asked simply to
walk up to the target and line himself up on it in exactly the same way
as in Experiment 8.. The subject's task in. Conditions 2 and 3 was to
walk towards the line with a view to lining himself up on it if required
However, at a series of predetermined points, the subjects were asked to
stop walking and to throw an obj ect which they carried the rest of the
way to the target. The points at which the subjects were asked to stop
and throw were at distances of 2 and 3m. from the target. These points
at which they were stopped were always unknown to subjects in advance.
The object which the subjects were asked to throw was a small wooden
block which had previously been found to be a good throwing object.
The target, as in Experiment 9, was a length of 2 inch white tape
placed on the floor. Distance errors only were measured, errors in
}
the left-right dimension being ignored.
As in previous experiments, echo location was controlled by means of
a white noise apparatus, which was carried throughout the experiment.
The level of noise employed was as in Experiment 9, and was somewhat
lower than in the earlier experiments. This was because subjects were
given verbal instructions about when to stop in Conditions 2 and 3,
and those instructions had to be heard. The level of noise used was
still sufficient to eliminate all but loud noises, and the subjects
were still effectively isolated from the largest part of the surrounding
sound field.
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It will be remembered that in Experiment 8, we obtained evidence
which showed that at distances of less than 6m. a time delay of more
than 8 seconds had no influence on performance, whereas at distances
of more than 6m. the effect of the time delay was to greatly disrupt
performance. This was interpreted as meaning that at distances of
less than 6m. programs can be formulated, but that at longer distances,
only maps exist and these are subject to decay with time. From the
results of this experiment and of Experiment 9, we can formulate the
following hypotheses:
(1) When subjects are placed in the same experimental
situation as in Experiment 9, but with the distance
to the target being only 5m., the accuracy of throwing
should be high, so long as subjects take less than 8
seconds because they have a map available for formulating
the throwing program.
(2) When subjects are asked merely to walk to the target, but
are forced to take more than 8 seconds to do so, performance
should still be high, because the subjects have a program
for walking. (We have already seen in Experiment 8 that
performance under this condition is indeed high).
(3) When subjects are placed in the same experimental situation
as in Condition 1, except that the total time from closing
the eyes till throwing the object is more than 8 seconds,
performance should now be poor, because although the subject
has a program for walking (see Condition 2), he no longer
has a map. Our main hypothesis is that this program for
walking cannot be accurately transformed into a program
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throwing, and that the accuracy obtained in Condition 1
and in Experiment 9 was therefore due to the retaining
of a map.
This methodology has a number of advantages over that employed in
Experiment 9. Firstly, it avoids the problems obtained in Condition 3
of that experiment by specifically enabling the subj ects to formulate
a program for walking. If the. results of Condition 3 of that experiment
are obtained in the present experiment, then we can indeed conclude
that success is due to internalised maps and not due to internalised
programs. The second major advantage is that in Experiment 9 we
assumed that the program for walking would be defined in terms of the
number of paces to reach the target; or that, at any rate, this
information would have to be written into the program at some level.
Although this is not an unreasonable assumption, and indeed seems to
be a necessary assumption to make, Experiment 10 is distinguished by
making no assumptions about the nature or form of the program at all.
It merely allows the subject to construct a motor program in whatever
form this is done, and tests the efficacy with which it can be trans¬
formed into a program for the accomplishment of a different activity.
The fact that no assumptions are made about the nature of the program
in Experiment 10 must; surely be seen as an advantage over the method
of Experiment 9. This method therefore seems to make an extremely
direct test of the hypothesis of map control.
Method
Design
The design of Experiment 10 was very similar to that of Experiment 9,
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The conditions of Experiment 10 were conducted under varying
temporal restraints. In Condition 1, the total time between the point
at which vision was excluded and the target reached was artificially
manipulated to take 12 seconds. In this way, Condition 1 represents a
replication of the experimental condition of Experiment 8. In
Condition 2, subjects* performance was regulated so that the total time
did not exceed 8 seconds. In Condition 3, which was otherwise a
replication of Condition 2, times were again artificially manipulated
to take 12 seconds. Trials were presented randomly with respect to the
conditions and the distances.
*
Procedure
Before the experiment proper began, subjects were given a practice
session in throwing as in Experiment 9. This session was conducted in
a quite informal way, with the subject being asked merely to throw
the object to various points on the floor or to the experimenter. This
practice period was continued until it became obvious that the subject
had achieved a reasonably accurate and consistent performance.
Condition 1. At the beginning of each trial, the subject was lined
up at the starting point. He was allowed to survey the layout and to
choose for himself when to exclude vision and commence the trial. As
soon as vision was excluded, the experimenter started a stop-watch and
began timing. When the appropriate time interval had elapsed the
subj ect was tapped on the shoulder to indicate that he should now begin
the trial. When the trial had been completed the subject remained with
vision excluded until E measured the error and recorded this on a data
sheet. The subject was then turned around by E and led back to the
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starting point ready for the next trial. Five trials were given in
Condition 1. The low number of trials in this condition was simply
due to the fact that the condition had already been run as a formal
experiment (Experiment 8), and therefore merely represents a control
for the results of that experiment.
Condition 2. No time delay was involved in this condition. S was
allowed to survey the layout and begin the trial immediately vision was
excluded. However, at a point unknown to him which was either 2 or 3m.
from the target, he was told to stop and throw the object he carried
the rest of the way to the target. As in Experiment 9, it proved
quite easy to get control over the stopping point by informing S to
stop just before he reached the point concerned. When the object had
been thrown S remained with vision excluded until E measured the
error in the point at which the object struck the ground and recorded
this. S was then led back to the starting point and allowed to begin
the next trial. Five trials were given at each of the two throwing
distances.
Condition 3. This condition was simply a replica of Condition 2,
except that a time-delay as in Condition 1 was employed. S was
informed that he should commence the trial in the same way as
Condition 1, by being tapped on the shoulder. In this condition,
however, E walked alongside the subject until the point where he
was to stop was reached and E informed him to do so simply by saying
"stop". This was to preclude the distance information which would--
have been available had E issued the instruction from the subject*s
starting point. Again, 5 trials were given at each of the two
throwing distances in this condition.
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Subj ects
Eight subjects took part in Experiment 10, 4 male and 4 female.
All were students at Edinburgh University and were aged between 18 and
23. None was familiar with the purpose or predicted results of the
experiment.
Results
The mean times taken to reach the target or to throw the object
in each condition are shown in Table 10.1. It can be seen that the
conditions for a test of the experimental hypotheses have been met
in each case. In Condition 1, the mean time was consistently less
than 8 seconds and in Conditions 2 and 3 were consistently greater,
at approximately 12 seconds. This fits well with the intended pattern
of times in the different conditions.
TABLE 10.1
Mean times taken at each Distance in each Condition
1 (Walk)
Condition
2 (throw 8 sees.) 3 (throw 8 sees.)
All Distances 2m 3m 2m 3m
M 12.16 2.36 3.21 12.36 12.41
SD .53 .48 .75 .52 .49
The basic results of Experiment 10 are shown in Fig. 10.1 which
shows the distribution of judgments around the target line in each of
the three conditions. A visual inspection of this figure reveals that



















































































seen that in Conditions 1 and 2 performance is high whereas in Condition
3 performance is markedly lower. The effect can also be seen in Table
10.2 which shows the means, standard deviations and variances in each
condition.
TABLE 10.2
Means, Standard Deviations and Variances of Scores in Each Condition
1 (Walk)
Condition
2 (throw 8 sees.) 3 (throw 8 sees.)
2m 3m 2m 3m
M 2.2 -3.84 -12.43 -24.91 -47.62
SD 18.36 15.79 13.66 31.18 27.58
S2 140.35 103.78 77.71 405.22 339.86
error in cms.
Statistical analyses were conducted on the variances in the different
conditions and the results confirm the trend. The variance obtained in
Condition 1 was not found to differ significantly from the variances at
either distance in Condition 2 (Con. 1 x Con. 2, 2m, F=1.35; Con. 1 x Con. 2,
3m, F=1.81; both insignificant at c< = .01, one-tailed test). The
differences between the corresponding distances in Conditions 2 and 3
were significant (2x2, F=3.90, p < .01; 3x3, F=4.37, p < .01). The
differences between the variances in Condition 1 and those obtained in
Condition 3 were also significant (Con. 1 x Con. 3, 2m, F=2.89, p <, .01;
Con. 1 x Con. 3, 3m, F = 2.42, p .01). These results are therefore
highly supportive of the experimental hypotheses.
The variance obtained in Condition 1 was compared to that obtained
in the experimental condition of Experiment 8 to see if the result
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confirmed that of the earlier experiment. The variances were not found
to differ significantly (F=1.81, n.s.). The result of Experiment 8
therefore seems to be confirmed by the result of the present experiment.
The results of Conditions 2 and 3 were similarly compared to the
corresponding results in Experiment 9. The variances obtained in
Condition 2 and the corresponding throwing distances in the earlier
experiment were significantly different (2x2m, F=2.98, p < .01;
3x3m, F=3.67, p .01). The results of Condition 3 were also found
to be significantly better than at the corresponding distances in
Experiment 9 (2x2m, F=3.16, p < .01; 3x3m, F = 5.28, p <C, .001). This
would indicate that while the results of Experiment 10 are in broad
agreement with the results of Experiment 9, the differences in methodology
between the two experiments have produced differences in degree between
the two studies.
Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 10 was to show that the successful throwing
performance in Experiment 9 was due to the retaining of a map which could
then be used to formulate a program for throwing. It was also designed
specifically to show that the accuracy obtained in Experiment 9 was not
due to the transforming of a program for walking into a program for
throwing, by giving subjects the opportunity to do precisely that. It
was hypothesised that only a map would enable subjects to perform well.
The hypothesis seems to be well confirmed by the results of the experiment.
In Condition 1, we saw that an 8 second delay caused no description
to performance when the subject was asked simply to walk up to the target.
In line with the results of Experiment' 8, it was concluded from this that
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subjects can formulate programs for walking when the distances involved
are less than 6 metres. In Condition 3, where the same conditions were
applied except that at an unknown point the subjects were told to stop
walking and to throw an object the rest of the way to the target,
performance was very considerably impaired. Since subjects are apparently
perfectly capable of walking to the target under these conditions, this
result strongly suggests that the subjects had internalised some form
of program for walking to the target, but were unable to transform this
into a program for throwing. In Condition 2, by contrast, where no time
delay was imposed, performance was very considerably better, not only
mirroring that obtained in Condition 1, but in fact somewhat better than
it. These results, then, fit extremely well with the hypothesis that
for a limited period not exceeding 8 seconds, a map of the environment
can be retained and used to formulate programs. After this critical time
has been surpassed, however, the map has faded. Further programs can
not therefore be formulated except by means of transforming the original
program. The results of Condition 3 indicate that this cannot be done.
The results therefore comply extremely well with the predictions and
seem to evidence the existence of both maps and programs for controlling
behaviour.
A finding which must be noted is that the performance in Condition 3
is superior to the performance in the "blind throwing" condition of
Experiment 9. This suggests that the latter method was perhaps not
appropriate, as was suggested in Experiment 9 itself. However, it should
be borne in mind that that method could only have been expected to give
a very general idea of subjects* ability to transform programs, since
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the distances over which the subjects were asked to throw the object were
defined in metres and it could not be expected that a highly accurate
performance be obtained using such an arbitrary method. The fact that
in a general way, the results of the two experiments correspond, implies
that some trust may be placed in the results of that rather artificial
condition. Clearly, however, such "non-ecological" methods cannot be
recommended: but in neither case can it be said that subjects have the
ability to transform programs with any degree of accuracy.
A further finding to be noted is the greater consistency with which
subj ects attained the target in Condition 2 than at the corresponding
throwing points in Experiment 9. This difference should not be seen as
surprising, however, in view of the short distances over which subjects
had to walk in Experiment 10. In Experiment 9, subjects walked 8 and 7
metres in order to reach the 2 and 3 metre throwing distances, whereas
in Experiment 10, they walked only 3 and 2 metres. It was argued in
Experiment 9 that the variance obtained in any such experiment should
contain two components: one due to walking and the other due to throwing.
A regression analysis conducted on the variances obtained at 3, 6 and
9 metres in Experiment 2 was used to measure the variance to be expected
when S walks 2 metres. The variance components at 2 and 3 metres were
computed to be approximately 27 and 38 respectively. We saw in
Experiment 9 that the variances obtained simply from throwing an object
3 and 2 metres were 32.45 and 30.76, giving theoretical variances for the
conditions of Experiment 10 of 57.76 and 70.45. When these theoretical
variances were compared to those actually obtained (see Table 10.2), the
differences were insignificant (2x2m, F=1.34; 3x3m, F=2.18, both
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insignificant at o( = .01, two-tailed test). The results therefore
fit extremely well with the experimental predictions.
Conclusions
The results of Experiment 10 accord well with the predictions. It
appears that subjects are not able to transform a program for one kind
of activity (walking) into a program for a different kind (throwing).
This would indicate that the successful performances in the "walk +
throw" conditions of Experiments 9 and 10 was due to some other form of
internalised information. The results of these experiments, together
with the results of Experiments 6, 7 and 8, strongly suggest that
the success is due to internalised maps which can then be used to
construct further programs as desired.
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SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS CM PART III
It was stated in the Introduction to Part III that the purpose of
this section of the thesis was to go some way towards discovering the
mechanisms underlying the general ability seen in Part II. It now
seems that we may claim to have had some measure of success in this
direction.
In Part I it was suggested that subjects are able to formulate
programs for action from visual information and that these programs
can then be used to control behaviour more or less independently of
further visual information. It was this programming ability which
was said to underlie the results of the Experiments reported in Part II.
However, it can now be said that this does not seem to offer a complete
explanation of the results.
Part III began by examining the threshold in performance first
seen in Experiment 2, on the grounds that an understanding of this
threshold might lead to an understanding of the basic mechanisms
underlying intermittent control. In Experiments 6 and 7, it was found
that the threshold in accuracy found at 12m. in Experiment 2 is
dependent on the length of time elapsing between closing the eyes and
reaching the target. Whenever the time lapse exceeds 8 seconds,
performance can be expected to deteriorate sharply, at least for
distances in the range of 6 to 21 metres. Time seemed to be capable
of accounting for almost all of the variance found at the 12m. distance
in that experiment.
These findings were taken to militate against the programming
explanation of the results of Part II. This was because programs were
said to consist of specifications of the motor actions necessary for
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solution, these motor actions being defined in terms of action units.
A program would therefore indicate the number of such action units required
to reach the target. However, it does not seem likely that this form of
information would decay in the rapid way seen in Experiments 6 and 7 be¬
cause the program would simply take the form of an instruction as to the
number of action units necessary to reach the target. It seems hardly
likely that information of this sort would be subject to the strict
temporal control seen in these experiments. The alternative explanation
of the results offered was that subjects internalise some form of
representation or map of the environment and use this to control behaviour
in much the same way as vision itself might be used. It was felt to be
easier to understand how such a map might fade in time than to understand
how a program might fade.
To test the argument that programs would not be subject to strict
temporal control and at the same time showing that programs do exist,
though at shorter distances only, the method of Experiment 6 was repeated
at distances of 6m and under. It was found that a large time delay of
over 12 sec. had no influence on performance at distances of 5m and less.
This finding fits extremely well with the arguments advanced and seems
to show that programming is possible at distances of up to 5m. The
concepts of map and program and their mode of operation were further
examined in Experiments 9 and 10. In these experiments, an attempt was
made to eliminate the possibilities of advance programming on the basis
of visual information by using a two-part task, the latter part of which
was specified only after vision had been excluded. This would leave
only two ways of achieving successful performance. One would be to use
an internalised representation of the environment from which the latter
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part of the act (the throw) could be formulated. The other would be to
have a program for walking to the target which could be transformed into
a program for throwing. The results of Experiments 9 and 10 suggest
that this program transformation cannot be done and this supports the
concept of map. In general, then, the results of Part III seem to
support the concepts of both map and program and suggest that programs
can be formulated from maps as well as from vision.
The results of the experiments reported in Part II may be reconsidered
in the light of this modified explanation of the ability. It would appear
that maps are involved in most of these experiments. The results of
Experiments 6 and 7 certainly imply that they are involved in Experiments
1 and 2 as the later experiments were based on these. Maps would also
appear to be involved in Experiments 3 and 4 since the distances
involved in these experiments also exceeded the programming limit of
5m. It is therefore possible that some of the errors at the later
obstacles was due to temporal decay of the guiding map. To test this
possibility, the video-tapes of these experiments were re-analysed
with an automatic timer to see if the 8 second limitation came into
effect in any cases before the course was completed. In fact, in all
cases, the last obstacle had been circumvented before the 8 sec. point
was reached. The results of these experiments may therefore be allowed
to stand.
The extent to which programming (as opposed to mapping) actually
took place in these experiments is not always clear, though the results
of Experiments 8, 9 and 10, together with the theoretical arguments
on which they are based, imply that it must have. There is certainly
evidence that they are involved in Experiment 5 as we saw earlier, but
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there is also some evidence from other sources. It will be remembered
that in Experiment 1, performance at the 2 and 5 metre distances was
significantly better than at 8 or 10 metres. Although attention was
brought to this finding, no explanation could be offered for it at the
time. However, from the results reported in Part III, it might well
be expected that performance should be superior at these distances,
because at distances of less than 5m, it seems that subjects have both
a map and a program for guiding behaviour. It does not seem un¬
reasonable that performance when both of these are available should be
superior to performance when only one is available, as is the case at
the longer distances. This argument has some further evidence in
favour of it in Experiment 2, where performance at 3m. was somewhat
superior to performance at 6m, though the difference was not signi¬
ficant. Nevertheless, it was felt in all these early experiments,
and in the preceding pilot studies, that at distances of less than
5-6 metres performance was somehow more consistent than at longer
distances though this did not always show up as significant in the
results. These findings from the earlier experiments are certainly
consistent with the map/program mechanism outlined in Part III.
There is a number of questions arising from the results reported
in Part III which should be considered at this stage. The first of
these concerns the 5m limitation to locomotor programming found in
Experiment 8. One question which arises out of this is the extent to
which the finding can be said to hold for all forms of behaviour. For
example, it might be asked if the accuracy of throwing would deteriorate
at distances greater than 5m. It certainly seems that accurate throwing
can be achieved from much greater distances than this, as evidenced by
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the ability of fielders in cricket to drop the ball over the stumps,
even when the ball is thrown from the far out-field. Whether there is
a "natural" limitation at 5m which can be overcome only with practice
is not answerable from the studies reported here, but an examination of
programming in alternative behaviours might well prove to be theoretically
enlightening'.
A second problem concerns the extent to which a map can reflect the
information available in the optic array on which it is based. Although
it might be argued from the results of Experiments 3 and 4 that the map
is capable of representing at least four obstacles, it seems likely
that the complexity which the map can take must be limited. How
complex an array of obstacles is a map capable of representing? What
are the limitations to map complexity, and when this complexity is
exceeded what information is represented and what omitted.from the map?
Again, these questions might turn up interesting results.
As in Part II, however, it must be emphasised that the purpose
of this series of experiments was not to follow up all possible lines
of research, nor indeed all of the most interesting ones, but rather
to concentrate on providing sufficient information to establish some
basic principles which could be examined more closely at a later stage.
It was felt that the five experiments reported in Part III were
successful in suggesting, albeit in a general way, how the intermittent
control seen in Part II might be achieved by means of maps and programs.
The results of these experiments were therefore considered to form a
reasonable base from which further investigations might take off.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis began with the problem of how animals get about in a
complex and cluttered environment, and attempted to outline the basic
essentials which any system would have to display in order to come to
terms with such an environment. The thesis seems to have been
successful in discriminating at least one critical capacity which such
a system would have to have in order to realise behaviour at least
approaching the complexity typically seen in animals; namely, the
capacity for intermittent control. Some of the ways in which this is
achieved (by maps and programs) have been outlined and seem to stand
as of considerable importance in motor control.
It will be recalled that in the model presented in Part I, the
critical elements were the Absolute Distance Perception Overlay (ADPO)
and the Programming System (PS). These were the mechanisms by which
intermittent control was said to be achieved. However, from the
theoretical position adopted here, these elements should not be separated.
According to the concept of program outlined here - a concept which was
also supported empirically - the two elements cannot be separated and
amount to alternative ways of saying the same thing. In Part I, the
concepts of absolute distance and programming were kept distinct simply
because it is not of necessity the case that these are the same.
Absolute distance could be perceived in some quite different ways
which could then be translated into programs for action when desired:
and at that stage the primary obj ect was to specify the kind of
information which would be necessary and the uses to which it would
have to be put in order to effect control. However, from the present
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theoretical position it is argued that to perceive "absolute"
distance and to formulate programs for action are functionally-
one and the same, and this should accordingly be reflected in the
model.
A second problem concerns the concept of map, which was not
introduced in Part I. This was because the concept only developed
out of experimental work reported in Part III. However, in view of
these fresh discoveries, the concept should obviously be included in
the model. These changes have consequently been made, and the revised
model, together with the original, is shown in Fig. V.
One final comment on this model must be made. The Proprioceptive
System (PPS) and the Exproprioceptive System (EPS) are concerned to
supply information during the execution of programs as outlined in
Part I. However, it must be realised that these elements too must
operate by means of intermittent control, for they also constitute
receptors like the eye, and must be expected to function in a similar
way. Intermittency and programming would therefore appear to permeate
the system. It seems that this is indeed a central feature of control.
A problem which was raised in the Introduction to this thesis was
the extent to which the mechanisms outlined here would hold for
different species. For example, since many species seem to use a
group of sensory systems to pick up information about the environment,
it might be supposed that this constitutes an alternative means of
obtaining temporary freedom for apy one of the senses. The evidence
for this view comes from studies in which the different systems are
systematically interfered with, to determine the importance of each to









P S = programming sys t em
C_ = con trol I er
ES = effector system






. V Revised model of pereeptuo-motor cont rol.
281
animals were blinded, their ability at maze learning was little
impaired. The same result held when the ears were blocked, the
vibrissae cut, the olfactory system destroyed or the soles of the
feet anaesthetised. When any one of these systems on its own was
eliminated, behaviour was found to be little affected. However, when
a group of these are simultaneously removed, behaviour becomes pro¬
foundly disturbed. Honzik (1936) found that when, for example, sight,
smell and hearing were all eliminated, maze learning became impossible.
Riley and Rosenzweig (1957) found that blinded rats make noises, largely
with the feet, and use the auditory information generated to detect
objects by echo-location. These findings would suggest that some
species might indeed find temporary freedom for any one system by
switching the control-load over to other systems.
While this might be considered an alternative to the mapping strategy
outlined in Part III, the existence of multiple sensory systems cannot
be held to rule out the need for programming, for reasons which have been
repeatedly emphasised. Evidence of programming is readily found in
animals like rats. For example, Carr and Watson (1908) observed in
rats which had learned a T maze that when the corridors were lengthened,
the rats would turn and run into the side wall. Conversely, when the
corridors were shortened, they would run into the wall at the end of
the corridor. These findings would strongly suggest that even in
species with multiple sensory systems, programming still constitutes
an important factor in the control of behaviour. However, it must be
recognised that in such species, mapping may be absent; though the
existence of multiple systems does not necessarily mean that this will
be the case. This problem may be examinable experimentally.
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As might be expected, this thesis seems to pose at least as many-
questions as it answers, and there are many other, potentially valuable
questions arising out of the experiments reported which should be
examined. Some of these have already been outlined in the general
discussions of Parts II and III. Several others in this category may
be mentioned. One problemcwhich has not been dealt with properly is
the problem of how the system executes a program and picks up
information for fresh programs at the same time. There is really no
evidence in the thesis on this matter. Similarly, while it has been
stressed that a fundamental reason for intermittency is the freedom
it gives the system to engage in other activities, no evidence has been
supplied on the effectiveness of control when alternative activities
are simultaneously engaged in. Both these problems deserve examination.
Reference has already been made to the necessity for examining the
extent to which the conclusions drawn with reference to locomotion will
hold for all motor behaviours. It would seem highly desirable to examine
alternative behaviours like reaching or throwing from this point of view.
The results of such studies may well be of considerable theoretical
value. A final problem which may be mentioned is the problem of how
short-term programs and maps of the sort being discussed here are
related to long-term ones. Anyone who can get out of bed in the dark
and then cross the room to the light switch without bumping into
anything would seem to show evidence of having internalised some form
of map or program in a long-term form. This kind of mapping and
programming is most clearly seen in the blind, who can internalise
information about the layout of a room so accurately, that within that
environment they may be virtually indistinguishable from a 'sighted
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person. Just how such maps are derived is unknown, though one pos¬
sibility is that a group of short term maps and/or programs become
gradually transformed into a more permanent form. The process by which
this is done seems eminently worthy of study.
All these problems, then, arising more or less directly out of
the experiments reported above seem well worth following up.
Perhaps the most interesting and potentially important future work
suggested by the results of this thesis, however, is concerned with
the blind. The implication of the present research is that the blind
person is handicapped, not just by the poverty of the information
available to him, but by the way in which that information becomes
available. The cane carried by the blind person allows him information
about one metre (the length of the cane) in advance. From the results
of this thesis, however, it would certainly be predicted that this is
too short a time to enable evasive action to be taken if an obstacle
is detected. This may well underlie the slow and hesitant gait
displayed by many blind people. If information were available further
in advance, it might be that this alone would aid blind mobility. There
is some evidence that longer canes enable blind people to locomote more
freely (Jansson, 1975) and the sophisticated sonar device tested by
Bower (1976) seems to improve control considerably. One experimental
problem arising directly out of the research reported in this thesis
which would certainly have a bearing on this problem, would be to
assess the minimum distance ahead which a person must be able to see in
order to execute different forms of locomotion (e.g. walking or
running). Some theoretical answers to this problem have already been
outlined in our discussions of limitations due to processing times and
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other factors. An experimental examination of this problem might then
provide a group of indices of the length of forewarning necessary to aid
mobility in different situations. This research would therefore seem
to be of potentially great value.
An important implication of this thesis is that absolute distance
is perceived up to distances of only 5 metres. Although behaviour can be
controlled in the absence of visual information over distances greatly in
excess of this (at least up to 21 metres), this was not taken to mean
that these longer distances were accurately perceived. On the other
hand, the evidence of all these experiments suggested that the errors
obtained when the 8 second temporal limitation was exceeded were not
strictly perceptual in nature, because the mean error in almost all
cases fell on the target line. The problem then arises as to how these
different findings are to be explained. This is perhaps the most
interesting problem raised by the thesis. The answer may be that there
are different "levels" of distance perception, extending from absolute
distance perception as seen in Experiment 8 to purely relative distance
perception. We should not expect to find a sharp dividing line between
these two: obviously, at distances of more than 5 metres, there may well
be a gradation in the accuracy of distance perception. For example,
the error at 6m. would hardly be expected to equal in magnitude the
error at half a mile. It seems more likely that the accuracy of
distance perception would decline gradually, perhaps in a series of
"steps" until some form of "chance" error is obtained - though just
how chance would be defined in the present context is unclear. But
again, as stated in Part I, the term "absolute distance perception"
would be reserved for those occasions where accurate behavioural res¬
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